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Abstract 
 
Drawing on recent discussions of relational embeddedness and socio-technical 
agencement, this thesis analyses the relationship between stock rading and lay 
investors’ daily lives, including their social relations, activities, events, devices, 
places, work and ways of thinking. Taiwan’s stock market provides an appropriate 
location for investigation because of the dominance of lay investors in the market 
and the high proportion of Taiwan’s adult population who engage in stock trading. 
The data were obtained from three main sets of sources: in-depth interviews, 
document analysis and ethnographic observation. I argue that lay market actors are 
not only framed by the market’s mechanisms, but also by daily-life structures. 
The Taiwan Stock Exchange, as an electronic, anonymus financial market, 
has been a challenge to the embeddedness approach due to the absence of direct 
interaction between the parties to transactions. This study presents another aspect of 
socio-economic relationships in the market: the rol f financial-market activity in 
wider social interactions. Like taking part in any popular social activity, lay 
investors’ social ties are maintained and expended by engaging in stock trading. 
Social relations and stock trading are woven together and form a largely seamless 
whole, part of lay investors’ daily life. 
The socio-technical agencements of lay investors contain distinctive features: 
diversity, bricolage, use of non-professional ‘devic s’, action in non-financial places, 
everyday means of controlling market risk and associati n with everyday events. The 
differences between the agencements of lay investors and professional practitioners 
produce an asymmetry of calculative capabilities betwe n market actors. Superior 
calculative capabilities tend to give an advantage to professional practitioners in the 
market, but these strengths are constrained by political and economic factors.  
This study sheds light on micro social factors, which are comparable with 
economic, institutional and psychological explanations, in accounting for lay 
investors’ behaviours in financial markets. The analysis also suggests the 
compatibility of the three important social science approaches to economic agents: 
Granovetter’s embeddedness, Zelizer’s relational work and Callon’s agencement. 
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For a long time, stock markets, as other financial m rkets, had been considered a 
domain of professional practitioners, such as analysts, professional traders, financiers, 
fund managers and stockbrokers. For most people, stock trading tended to be 
distanced from their daily life (Michie 1999; Preda 2009a). Investing stocks through 
mutual and pension funds had been a popular means for lay people in many countries 
to take part in the markets (Thatcher 2007). With the growth of global financial 
sectors and technological developments, stock markets worldwide have increased in 
size at a rapid pace and the overall cost of trading has markedly decreased (Weber 
and Devis 2000; Barber and Odean 2001b, 2002; Lavelle 2004). In some countries, a 
significant proportion of the population have directly participated in the stock 
markets, and they (the ‘lay investors’) have become a major role in the markets and 
received attention from other market participants and scholars (e.g., Gamble 1997; 
Hertz 1998; Mayall 2006; Harrington 2008; Roscoe and Howorth 2009; Roscoe 
2013).  
Lay investors are also called ‘amateur investors’, ‘individual investors’, ‘retail 
investors’, ‘small investors’, ‘lay trader’ or ‘non-professional traders’ in different 
social contexts and academic studies. In Taiwan’s ad China’s stock markets, they 
are called sanhu (散戶), which means ‘dispersed or scattered players’. All these 
terms indicate characteristics of lay investors andhave constructed a conventional 
category for them in the markets. Generally, the phrase ‘lay investors’ refers to those 
market participants who do not work for financial institutions; instead, they trade 
small quantities of stock for themselves and usually act individually in the market. In 
other words, they are in contrast to professional pr ctitioners, who are financial 
experts, trading for institutional investors, such as mutual funds, in stock markets and 
managing large investment portfolios. 
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Recently, research on lay investors has grown rapidly in the social sciences, 
such as sociology, anthropology, and social studies of finance1 and behavioural 
finance.2 The research tends to focus on lay investors’ activities in the market and 
have provided analyses of their trading behaviours, purchasing decisions, market 
analysis, information selection, views of the market and uses of contemporary online 
devices through various perspectives (see Section 2). A comprehensive picture of lay 
investors’ market actions has been constructed by the findings of these impressive 
studies. 
Unlike previous studies whose emphasis was on lay investors’ market 
behaviours, this study is interested in another aspect of lay investors: the relationship 
between stock trading and daily life. Lay investors are accustomed to trading stock in 
daily life, as everyday activities in everyday environments. In contrast, for 
professional practitioners, trading is a job, a career and an assemblage of professional 
knowledge, skills and devices (Zaloom 2006). These differences pose a sharp 
distinction between lay investors and professional pr ctitioners, but the distinction 
has not been underscored in this field. The aim of this study is to explore this 
relationship and elucidate the importance of this distinctive characteristic of lay 
investors.  
The main approaches of this study are inspired by schools in economic 
sociology and social studies of finance. In economic sociology, Mark Granovetter’s 
(1985) theory of embeddedness has indicated the inseparable relationship between 
economic activities and social ties. His key argument is that economic actions are 
embedded in social relations. This idea has been developed in social-network studies 
(e.g., Uzzi 1996, 1999; Burt 2001; also see Smith-Doerr and Powell review 2005) 
and the school of social capital (e.g., Coleman 1988; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; 
also see Lin review 2001). With the growth of critiisms of Granovetter’s 
embeddedness (e.g., Krippner 2001; Krippner and Alavarez 2007), Viviana Zelizer 
                                                
1 Broadly speaking, ‘social studies of finance’ refes to ‘the application to financial markets of social 
science disciplines beyond economics’. However, in its more specific meaning, also more relevant to 
this study, the term refers to ‘approaches to markets that are inspired by social science research on 
science and technology’. ‘Social studies of finance’ is seen as analogous to ‘social studies of science’ 
(MacKenzie 2009: 2). 
2  ‘Behavioural finance’ is ‘the application of psychology to financial behaviour’. The school 
burgeoned in the 1980s when a few scholars began to disc ver anomalies in financial markets, and 
empirical data were not consistent with mainstream finance such as efficient market theory (Shefrin 
2002: 4–10). 
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has offered an alternative approach in her recent works to investigate the connection 
between economic action and social interaction by centring on the meanings of the 
economic action, which is called ‘relational work’ (2010, 2012). In brief, these 
schools in economic sociology have provided a set of conceptual tool kits for this 
study to examine how lay investors’ market and social activities are constituted of 
social interactions, interwoven together in daily life and associated with the 
maintenance of personal ties. 
Social studies of finance have furnished another important source of the 
theoretical framework. Though this school includes multidisciplinary works, the 
materiality of financial markets, such as physical artefacts and technologies, is its 
main concern. Michel Callon (1998, with Millo and Muniesa 2007, and with 
Caliskan 2010) has suggested that market actors are the social-technical 
configurations of human beings and non-human entitis, such as information and 
dealing systems. Without market devices, human agents would lose calculative 
capabilities and thus would be unable to act in the market. This idea has been 
developed in Donald MacKenzie’s serial works (2006, with Muniesa and Siu 2007, 
2009). The interconnections between participants and devices in financial markets 
also have been underscored by other scholars, such as Karin Knorr-Cetina and Urs 
Bruegger (2002), Daniel Beunza and David Stark (2004) Caitlin Zaloom (2006) and 
Alex Preda (2009a, 2009b). The idea from social studies of finance has offered a 
perspective for this study to examine how lay market actors assemble in daily-life 
environments and which elements are made up of the actors.  
Taiwan’s stock market probably is one of the best locations for this 
investigation. This is not only because of the dominance of lay investors in the 
market, who contribute to about 60 per cent of the market’s equity trading value, but 
also because it is estimated that over 50 per cent of Taiwan’s adult population are 
engaged in stock trading. These figures are much hig er than similar statistics in 
many other countries, such as the US and the UK (see Section 4). The figures also 
suggest that this society is an appropriate case for the study and imply that the 
interconnections between lay investors’ stock trading and daily life would be 
discernible in the field. 
 4   
The literatures are useful to shed light on different socio-economic aspects of 
lay investors in Taiwan. Granovetterian embeddedness suggests the importance of 
social connections to explain the proliferation of lay trading in Taiwan. Callon’s 
theory of market actors suggests the importance of market devices to illuminate the 
market power of different types of investors. Both social relations and technology are 
expected to play a substantial role in the formation of lay investors in Taiwan’s stock 
market. The viewpoints of this study are mainly based on these two theoretical 
sources. 
Specific research questions of this study are drawn from the theoretical 
perspectives; the actual conditions of the research case should be also taken into 
consideration. The structure of this thesis is arranged according to four main research 
issues. 
Chapter 2 will explore the effects of social relations on lay investors’ stock 
trading, as well as the influences of stock trading o  the maintenance and extension 
of their social ties. The chapter will suggest the int ractions between stock-market 
activities and social relations throughout in this fully anonymous electronic stock 
market. 
Chapter 3 will examine the configurations of lay market actors. The main 
elements include market devices, ideas of stock trading and market risk, and 
environments. The variety of the configurations and their connections with lay 
investors’ daily life will be analysed. 
Devices and other non-human entities constitute market agents’ calculative 
capabilities (Callon 1998, 2007). Chapter 4 will analyse the asymmetry between 
professional practitioners’ and lay investors’ calculative capabilities in the market. 
The chapter will shed light upon the strengths and restraints of professional agents’ 
calculative power. 
Brokerage offices are the specific financial places d igned for lay investors, 
though they have lost their exclusive position as providers of real-time information 
and efficient order placing systems, due to technological developments. Chapter 5 
will look at contemporary brokerage offices and examine the interconnections 
between participants (lay investors and staff), market and social activities, equipment 
and space. Contemporary Chinese brokerage offices will be included in the 
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discussion in order to compare them with Jocelyn Gamble’s (1997) and Ellen Hertz’s 
(1998) studies of the 1990s Shanghai stock market. 
Chapter 6 will be the conclusion and discussion. The following sections of this 
chapter will provide a literature review, methodology and contextual background. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
1.2.1 Sociology of financial markets 
 
Financial markets are an emerging subject in sociolgy, though the issues have been 
previously discussed in Karl Marx’s (1974: 476–504) and Max Weber’s (1968: 82–5, 
635–40, 2000a, 2000b) classical works. After Weber, research on financial markets, 
as on other economic issues, had grown slowly in sociology. With the recent rapid 
development of global financial systems, studies of financial markets have re-
emerged within contemporary sociologists’ concerns (Keister 2002; Smelser and 
Swedberg 2005; Sassen 2005). 
The two important collections edited by Knorr Cetina and Preda, The Sociology 
of Financial Markets (2005) and The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Finance 
(2012), have provided an overall view of this field. The range of topics and 
approaches of the articles in these volumes are broad. The issues include market 
actions, institutions, investors, politics, governance, financial crises, etc.; 
perspectives ranging from economic sociology, political sociology, organizational 
sociology and historical sociology, to gender studies, geography, anthropology, 
social studies of finance and other disciplines are all adopted for the analyses. The 
varieties of topics and approaches are a characteristic of the sociology of financial 
markets and this characteristic has been underscored in other review articles as well 
(e.g., Keister 2002; Preda 2007).  
Actors are a key element of financial spheres and also  focus of sociology of 
financial markets. Of all these ways to examine financial-market actors, theories of 
relational embeddedness, drawn from economic sociology, and the perspective of 
agencement, developed in social studies of finance, are some f the most insightful 
approaches. 
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Embeddedness is a familiar notion for economic sociol g sts and economic 
anthropologists, though the notion does contains more than one concept (Krippner, 
Granovetter et al. 2004). The concept of embeddedness was originally posited by 
Karl Polanyi (2001). In Polanyi’s idea, the idea suggests the essence of economy. In 
brief, he argues that economies of all types of society – including market systems of 
industrial societies – are institutions for production and allocation and are embedded 
in non-economic institutions. Financial markets, a crucial economic institution of 
contemporary capitalism, are one example. The idea has been supported by many 
studies and their findings have indicated that financi l markets and products are 
enmeshed in politics, culture, religion, etc. (e.g., Zelizer 1978; Carruthers 1996; 
Carruthers and Stinchombe 1999; Siu 2008; Preda 2009a). 
Embeddedness is given another meaning by Granovetter (1985, 2005). He 
applies the idea of embeddedness to micro-level anaysis and argues economic 
actions, including individuals’ market activities, are embedded in social relations. In 
the sociology of financial markets, relational embedd dness and relevant concepts, 
such as social network and social capital, have becom  important analysis tools, and 
social relations are argued as the underlay of financial activities’ essential elements, 
such as trust, order, efficiency and information exchange (e.g., Baker 1984; Abolafia 
1996; Uzzi 1999; Mizruchi and Stearns 2001). 
On the other hand, social studies of finance tend to focus on the material aspect 
of financial markets and emphasize the relationship between technicality and society. 
The approaches of this field, as noted, are strongly influenced by science and 
technology studies (MacKenzie 2009). A number of works in social studies of 
financial markets have pointed out that the markets are social-technical constructions. 
Technicalities and technologies, such as computers, economics, financial models, 
trading devices, communication tools, price data, information media and the layout 
of the trading room, not only constitute financial markets but also interact with the 
markets and shape the markets (e.g., Knorr Cetina 2003; Beunza and Stark 2004; 
MacKenzie 2005, 2006; Muniesa 2008; Preda 2009a; Pardo-Guerra 2010). 
With regard to analysis of market actors, Callon’s concept of agencement is 
one major approach in social studies of finance (1998, 2005; with Caliskan 2010). 
The notion of agencement is drawn from Deleuze (Deleuze and Guattari 1998). 
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Callon develops this concept to challenge the conventional concept of market actors 
(human actors) and argues the market actors are social-te hnical agencements 
(assemblages of human beings and non-human entities) (S e Chapter 3). MacKenzie 
and Hardie’s (2009) analysis of hedge funds is an example equipped with this 
perspective. 
Indeed, a number of studies in this field have provided examples of the 
incorporation of these approaches from economic sociology and from social studies 
of finance. The works have suggested that both technicalities and social relations are 
crucial for the existences and operations of financial markets (e.g., Knorr-Cetina and 
Bruegger 2002; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Preda 2008). 
The theories from the sociology of financial markets underpin the viewpoints 
and theoretical frameworks of this study. The specific l terature related to each 
research issue will be reviewed and discussed respectively in each chapter. The 
following subsections are aimed to provide an overview of social science research on 
lay investors. 
 
1.2.2 Social studies of lay investors 
 
Compared to research on professional practitioners, lay investors have received less 
attention in the sociology of financial markets (see Callon et al. 2007; MacKenzie et 
al 2007; Knorr Cetina and Preda 2005, 2012). However, th  number of studies of lay 
investors has grown recently in this field. Trading activities are one of the main 
interests of these studies. Researchers tend to rely on ethnographic data (mainly 
collected from direct and indirect observation and i terviews) and analyse the 
activities in real social settings. 
For example, Margery Mayall (2006) studies different practices of technical 
analysis of lay investors in Australia. She argues these investors’ analysis models 
mirror their ontologies of the market and the investors are categorized into four ideal 
types according to their ontologies: system traders, a t traders, game traders and 
explorer traders. 
Based on Mayall’s findings, Philip Roscoe and Carole Howorth (2009) explore 
British lay investors’ styles of technical analysis. The study enhances Mayall’s 
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argument and provides a more detailed taxonomy of lay technical analysts. 
Furthermore, they argue that technical analysis for lay investors usually is not a 
device to generate extra market returns, but, instead, is a heuristic tool to frame the 
market. 
Preda (2009c) studies trading calculations of US lay investors in the online 
anonymous markets. He argues that the calculations are not planned actions but 
activities which are situational, relational and coordinated with devices (screens). 
The goal of the calculations is brief anonymous encou ters by making absent 
strangers present in the traders’ situations. 
Unlike most studies of this issue which focus on online lay investors and their 
trading actions (i.e., in front of a screen), Brooke Harrington (2008) investigates 
decision making within US stock investment clubs. Investment clubs are formal 
associations which consist of a small group of lay investors. Members pool their 
money, have regular meetings and jointly decide invstments of the club. Harrington 
argues social factors strongly affect these clubs’ operations, performances and 
investment. When the club members come to an agreement about purchasing or 
selling stocks, they not only contemplate the financi l implications of the decision 
but also think about its social implications, such as maintaining the solidarity of the 
club, if it is consistent with their self-identities (e.g., club members view themselves 
as good citizens who avoid investing in unethical companies), if it complies with the 
club’s investing culture (e.g., some clubs are used to assessing a stock in accordance 
with fundamental analysis) and often clubs may project gender differences (e.g., all-
female clubs may buy clothing companies and retailers’ stock and name this type of 
stock ‘girl stocks’). 
In addition, Harrington finds mixed-gender clubs tend to own more diverse 
information sources, and ‘professional clubs’, whose members retain instrumental 
relationships, encourage the members to openly discuss their opinions. As a result, 
these two types of clubs usually perform better than single-gender clubs and 
‘friendship clubs’. However, ironically, due to internal homogeneity and affective 
ties, the latter two types of clubs are less likely to disband, even without positive 
financial performance. In general, Harrington argues that lay investors’ behaviours 
are not inclined to be ‘irrational’, as some financi l theories claim, but they are just 
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more likely to be driven by both economic and non-economic rationalities at the 
same time. 
Other aspects of investment clubs and US lay investors are highlighted in 
Harrington’s subsequent works. Based on Foucault’s perspective of ‘power as 
knowledge’, Harrington (2012a) emphasizes the power relation in the US stock 
market. She suggests the rise of lay investors in the 1990s resulted from the 
contemporary political and economic structural changes: the reform of the pension 
system, the decline in real wages and the amendment of capital-gains tax. In the US, 
stock markets have become an arena where lay investors are competing with 
financial elites, e.g., financial professionals. She claims investment clubs are a means 
to empower lay investors through providing an institution for learning about 
investment. 
After the burst of the dot-com bubble and after several financial frauds, such as 
the Enron accounting scandal, were revealed, Harrington (2012b) notices that a 
significant number of lay investors have continued to participate in the stock market. 
Among investment club members, some experienced shock and stasis, some denied 
the end of the bull market and some blamed themselve  as complicit in the growth of 
the bubble. She argues the ‘group’ (the investment clubs) plays a key role that helps 
those lay investors continue trading and deal with their feeling of shame, which was 
supposed to drive them out the market, according to Goffman’s theory of shame. 
The material embeddedness of UK lay investors is report d in Roscoe’s (2013) 
latest article. Inspired by social studies of finance (Callon et al. 2007), he highlights 
the role of the ‘material’ (i.e., devices) in embedd ness. According to his study, UK 
online lay investors strongly rely on anonymous interactions in the Internet forums 
(through posters) and the online trading tools provided by securities companies. 
Furthermore, he argues the economic function of face-to-face interactions, such as 
attending investment shows or participating in investment clubs, has been 
marginalized in lay investors’ trading. Based on Harrington’s argument, Roscoe 
conjectures the reason of participation in those activities is linked to lay investors’ 
self-identity. 
 
1.2.3 Financial studies of lay investors 
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In financial economics, lay investors are often rega ded as ‘noise traders’, who ‘trade 
on noise as if it were information’, as contrasted o the ‘information traders’ (homo 
economicus in the financial market), who are usually exemplified by professional 
investors (Black 1986: 531; Barber et al. 2009). Following this premise, 
psychological biases behind lay investors’ market dcisions and actions, that 
differentiate them from ‘ideal’ rational traders, have been an important research 
focus in behavioural finance.3 A series of studies in the field, mainly contributed by 
Brad Barber and Terrance Odean, are closely linked to social studies of lay investors.  
The high turnover rate of lay investors’ portfolios is a main issue of Barber and 
Odean’s (2000) study of the US stock markets. They find that excessively frequent 
trading has been detrimental to lay investors’ performances due to cumulative 
transaction costs. They argue this phenomenon is a consequence of lay investors’ 
overconfidence. 
In a subsequent article, Barber and Odean (2001a) ex mine the gender 
difference in stock trading and suggest male lay investors are more overconfident 
than their female counterparts. According to their findings, men tend to trade more 
frequently than women and therefore men’s investmen g erally underperforms the 
women’s. 
In their other studies, Barber and Odean (2001b, 2002) point out that trading 
devices have an impact on lay investors’ performance. They find switching from 
phone trading to online trading encourages lay investors to trade more actively and 
speculatively and, as a result, the investors’ performances can be damaged. They 
argue online trading produces illusions of knowledge and control, and thus makes the 
users overconfident in their trading. However, Mark Grinblatt and Matti Keloharju’s 
(2009) study of the Finnish stock market dictates that sensation seeking is another 
important factor driving lay investors, particularly male investors, to trade more 
frequently. 
                                                
3 ‘Irrational’ behaviours are often displayed by both lay investors and professional investors. For 
example, the famous ‘disposition effect’ (investors tend to sell the winners and hold the losers) is 
observed in both lay investors’ and professional investors’ behaviours in many markets (Barber and 
Odean 1999; Shapira and Venezia 2001; Barber et al.2007). 
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For lay investors, the decisions regarding stock purchasing would be made 
differently depending on whether they are trading as individuals or in a group. Based 
on the comparison of US investment clubs’ and individuals’ portfolios, Barber, 
Heath and Odean (2003) find the clubs are more likely to purchase the stocks of 
most-admired companies and are less likely to be concerned about the stocks’ 
performances. They argue decisions of groups are social dynamics, which need 
reasons to make the agreement, and admired companies re more likely to give the 
investment clubs’ members good reasons for investment. The findings of this study 
are linked to Harrington’s study (2008), as seen above. 
In addition, lay investors and institutional investor  tend to use different 
methods to select stocks and evaluate share prices. Barber and Odean (2008) find US 
lay investors tend to purchase those stocks which grab their attention, e.g., stocks 
highlighted on the news, or with an unusual trading volume, or with extreme returns 
in recent times. By contrast, institutional investor  are not inclined to buy these types 
of stocks. The researchers account for this difference as a result of the limited time 
and resources that lay investors have for seeking out suitable investments. Mark 
Seasholes and Guojun Wu’s (2007) study of the Shanghai stock market reaches a 
similar conclusion. They find stocks which hit upper rice limits are more likely to 
attract lay investors’ attention. Besides, James Frederickson and Jeffrey Miller’s 
(2004) and Kristian Allee et al.’s (2007) studies of stock price evaluation suggest 
less-sophisticated investors (lay/retail investors), compared to sophisticated 
(professional/institutional) investors, tend to use simpler (heuristic-based) valuation 
models and therefore their cognitions of the market ar  more likely to be misled by 
strategically released information. 
 
1.2.4 Research on Chinese and Taiwanese lay investors 
 
Anthropology provides valuable information about lay investors in China’s stock 
markets. Jocelyn Gamble’s (1997) and Ellen Hertz’s (1998) ethnographies of the 
beginning years of the Shanghai stock market (in the early 1990s) are good examples. 
The findings of these two studies are mainly consistent and convergent. Both indicate 
that lay investors apparently occupy an important position in the Shanghai stock 
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market and categorize the lay investors into two sub-groups: dahu (big players) and 
sanhu (dispersed players). The number of dahu in the market is very limited. Dahu 
are usually considered to be those individuals who control a huge amount of capital, 
have great skills and possess good social connectios (e.g., they may have access to 
insiders of listed companies). Particularly, they are usually imagined to have a 
capability to manipulate (i.e., corner) the market. On the other hand, sanhu refers to 
the majority of lay investors. They are usually described as the investors who trade 
only a small amount of money, lack outstanding trading skills and are excluded from 
insider-information networks. 
In addition, both studies also point out some common characteristics of 
Shanghai lay investors. According to their reports, lay investors in Shanghai tend to 
cluster together, forming social groups or taking part in associations to exchange 
market information; they crowd into brokerage offices to trade stock and underscore 
the efficacy of political analysis rather than fundamental and technical analyses. 
In Chinese-language literature, there are several sociological studies of 
Taiwan’s stock market which contain detailed investigation of Taiwanese lay 
investors.4 In Cheng-Shu Kao and Chung-Shen Wu’s (2002) paper, th  rapid growth 
in the number of sanhu (lay investors) in Taiwan’s stock market from the mid-1980s 
to the late 1990s was attributed to the simultaneous transformation of Taiwanese 
economic and demographic structures. They classify Taiwanese sanhu into six 
categories according to information channel and the counterparts of social interaction: 
sanhu in the financial industry, sanhu in listed companies, guyoushe sanhu,5 sanhu in 
brokerage offices, quasi-family sanhu and sanhu based on screen (online sanhu). 
Kao and Wu point out many features of Taiwanese lay investors through this 
taxonomy, although the criteria of the categories are equivocal in some respect (e.g., 
the categories are not exclusive and most Taiwanese sanhu would fit in at least two 
                                                
4 To date, few social studies of Taiwan’s stock market has been published in English academia, to my 
knowledge. However, a number of master’s theses, PhD theses, conference papers and journal articles 
have appeared in Chinese language, whose topics are rel t d to this study. 
5 Guyoushe (股友社) is a specific type of investor association which is not well-known in Western 
stock markets. The members of a guyoushe pay a monthly membership fee and receive daily trading 
instructions from the guyoushe’s organizer. A guyoushe organizer’s services are usually expensive. To 
attract members, many guyoushe claim their trading instructions base on precise insider information. 
As also mentioned in Kao and Wu’s paper, after several scandals about guyoushe were exposed, 
guyoushe have almost disappeared from Taiwan’s stock market. 
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to three categories); therefore, I do not completely agree with Kao and Wu’s 
taxonomy. 
In Wu’s (2005) subsequent work, he examines the hierarchical structure of the 
Taiwan stock market’s informational dissemination. He argues that sanhu occupy the 
lowest level of the structure, because they are distant from the information sauces 
(e.g., up-to-date information about industries) and lack sufficient capability 
(knowledge) to interpret the information. As a consequence, sanhu usually are the 
inferior players in the market, compared to professional practitioners (such as fund 
managers), or dahu. He denotes the disadvantage of being a sanhu as ‘involuntary 
blindness’. 
Ko-Kang Chien (2008) explores the developments of financial media and 
production of investment knowledge in Taiwan’s stock market. He conjectures that 
sanhus’ understanding of the market is framed by the information and knowledge 
reported in the media. In addition, he briefly examines the different ideas of the 
market reported by those sanhu who believe in technical analysis and those who 
believe fundamental analysis. His findings are mainly consistent with the previous 
studies of the Australian and British stock markets. 
In finance, Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean’s studies of Taiwan’s stock market 
(2007, 2008) also provide useful information. First, though Taiwan’s overall male 
population is higher, the number of female investors is slightly higher than that of 
male investors in Taiwan’s stock market for reasons that are unclear, and it is 
unusual in the world. Secondly, they notice Taiwanese men trade more actively and 
frequently than women, which is consistent with thefindings of other stock market 
studies. Third, Taiwanese lay investors trade extremely excessively and aggressively 
and this seriously harms their performance. They conjecture this phenomenon is 
caused by sensation seeking. Fourth, in general, lay investors are the losers in 
Taiwan’s stock market and institutional investors are the winners, particularly 
foreign institutional investors, which make the most profits. 
In brief, social studies of finance, economic sociology, anthropology and 
behavioural finance portray different facets of lay investors and highlight the 
connections between lay investors’ market activities and psychology, analytical 
frameworks, online trading systems, investment ideas and market structures. 




Methodology was designed for investigation of the four research issues: the 
relationship between stock trading and social ties; the assemblages of lay market 
actors in daily-lives; the asymmetric calculative capabilities between professional 
and lay market actors, and the interlock between market actions, social activities and 
technology in contemporary brokerage offices in Taiwan and China. 
Data were obtained from three main sets of sources for the demonstrations of 
configurations of lay market actors in daily lives. In-depth interviewing, document 
analysis and observation were included. 
Interviewing was one of the main methods I used to collect primary data about 
market agents’ behaviours, social relations, ways of thinking and uses of trading 
equipment, particularly under the condition that large-scale quantitative data is not 
available. 
A total of 46 interviews were conducted. Twenty-nine respondents are 
Taiwanese lay investors; five are lay people who trade in China’s stock markets (one 
Hong Kong resident and four Chinese citizens); nine are professionals in Taiwan’s 
stock market, and three are employees of two brokerage firms in China. Forty-five 
interviews were conducted in person and the exception was conducted by Windows 
Live Messenger. Most interviews were recorded and transcribed, but three interviews 
which took place in China were recorded in notes. Interviews lasted between 20 
minutes to two hours. Tables 1.1–1.4 give details of the interviewees. 
A key issue of this methodology is how to approach potential respondents; this 
especially seems a challenge for qualitative studies of lay investors. Lay investors 
have been thought as a class which is difficult to access by researchers, because their 
actions are isolated, their identity (as a lay investor) is difficult to be distinguished 
from their occupation, and their residences are generally geographically dispersed 
(Mayall 2006; Roscoe 2013). To overcome these barriers, some common approaches 
have been taken by the researchers. One is to access them through an organizational 
intermediary, e.g., to send interview requests through brokerage companies to the 
clients or through relevant associations to the members (Mayall 2006; Harrington 
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2008). Another approach is to engage with them in social events, e.g., to recruit 
volunteers for interviews in investment seminars and clubs, public meetings, 
exhibition shows, or relevant Internet forums (Hertz 1998; Mayall 2006; Harrington 
2008; Siu 2008; Roscoe 2013). Furthermore, encounter with lay investors in 
brokerage offices has been made in some studies of China’s stock markets (Gamble 
1997; Hertz 1998). Indeed, reliance on more than one approach has been common in 
this area. 
However, this study chose another way to recruit respondents – that is, to seek 
volunteers for the interviews by guanxi (關係, social connections) – rather than the 
approaches listed above, for some contextual reasons. First, it was less feasible to 
send interview requests through organizational intermediaries in Taiwan. The 
Personal Information Protection Act (個人資料保護法)6 in Taiwan restricts the 
range of the use of contact information of financial ompanies’ clients. In general, 
brokerage companies are not allowed to contact clients for purposes which are not 
stated on the contract; it would be considered an abuse of the clients’ personal 
information. Thus, companies tend not to take any risk of breaking the law, even for 
academic purposes, though academic research can be exempt from the law on certain 
conditions. Besides, there is no major association in Taiwan which is designed for 
retail investors, as is the National Association of Investors Corporation (NAIC)7 in 
the US (Harrington 2008). Although the Taiwan Securities Association8  is an 
important organization in this industry, it is an association for securities companies, 
not for investors. 
Secondly, social events which are designed for lay stock investors are not held 
often in Taiwan. For example, there are no investor exhibition shows, investment 
clubs or public meetings in Taiwan. A few investment seminars are sometimes held 
by brokerage companies for the companies’ clients. However, the majority of these 
seminars are designed to teach lay investors how to trade futures, options and 
warrants, markets which are not familiar to most lay investors, and courses for stock 
investment are not as common. A broker explained the reason to me: the main 
                                                
6 The content and legislative history of the Personal Information Protection Act in Taiwan is available 
at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawContent.aspx?PCODE=I0050021. 
7 The aims of the NAIC are available at http://www.betterinvesting.org/public/default.htm. 
8 The English website of the Taiwan Securities Association is http://www.csa.org.tw/CSAENG.asp. 
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purpose of the seminars is to help clients who are new to the markets adopt 
unfamiliar financial products; the expectation is the clients will be successfully 
encouraged to trade more frequently in these markets – therefore, the courses usually 
are free for the attendants. But ‘the ordinary stock market, most Taiwanese people 
are too intimate with it’ – the clients probably will not be motivated by the courses to 
trade stock more actively or need to learn stock trading from the courses. The 
Internet forums for lay investors are popular in Taiwan.9 However, I had already 
recruited a number of interviewees by guanxi who visit the Internet stock-trading 
forums frequently and the visitors to these forums seemingly belong to a specific 
social group: they are young investors and many of them are students (see Chapter 3). 
In order to diversify the backgrounds of the sample, I decided not to look for 
additional respondents through this approach. 
This is the same reason why I did not recruit respondents in brokerage offices 
though I had visited four brokerage offices in Taiwn and two in China. In brief, the 
people there seemed not to represent a random sample of lay investors but a specific 
social group. For example, in my observations in Taiwanese brokerage offices, only 
a small number of lay investors stayed in the brokerag  offices and they all were in 
their fifties or older (see Chapter 5). Another coner  was that it would have to take 
time to jianli guanxi (建立關係, build connections) with the unknown investors in 
brokerage offices, if I wanted to interview them (Hertz 1998; Siu 2008). However, 
on the other hand, several interviewees, recruited through social connections, 
are/were accustomed to trading stock in brokerage offices and have provided plenty 
of information about their trading and their lives. In order to maximize the limited 
time in the field, I decided not to recruit additional respondents in brokerage offices 
or from other social events. 
The foremost reason I relied on guanxi is that it was an effective and efficient 
approach to recruit interviewees in this case. Guanxi is thought to be one of the 
important elements in shaping the pattern of social interaction in Chinese societies 
and have been discussed in studies of social capital in Chinese societies (e.g., Lin 
2001) and social studies of Chinese financial markets ( .g., Hertz 1998; Siu 2008). 
                                                
9 For example, the Ptt-Stock is one of the largest and nonprofit Bulletin Board System (BBS) for lay 
stock investors (http://www.ptt.cc/bbs/Stock/index.html). 
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Without guanxi, the researcher is likely to be refused admission to the field by the 
gatekeeper, and their request for an interview is more possible to be rejected by the 
potential respondents (Siu 2008).  
          An additional benefit of starting interviews with guanxi is that I could gain 
more accurate and honest answers from some closer tie . In the Taiwanese cultural 
context, several interviewing questions of this study such as personal saving and 
investment gains and losses etc are usually thought ‘sensitive’ questions and hardly 
talked openly to strangers10. In this case, as will be seen in Chapter 2, to keep away 
from unnecessary troubles and to avoid losing face are those people’s main concerns.  
Fortunately, I am a Taiwanese and spent most of my life in Taiwan, and 
therefore the majority of my social ties are located in Taiwan. In the process of data 
collection, my family members, friends, relatives and acquaintances became the 
searcher, intermediary and sponsor. They searched for and contacted potential 
interviewees (people whose situations met the purposes of the study) from social 
networks, then gained permission from the person for the interview and finally gave 
me the person’s contact information. Because a huge n mber of Taiwanese people 
are involved in stock trading, it was not a big deal for them to arrange this. Foremost, 
almost all the respondents recruited through this means were more willing to answer 
all my interview questions. I conjectured that their openness at least partially resulted 
from the trust between the respondent and the intermediary. 
Although my fieldwork began with my personal ties, the snowball-sampling 
method then was used as an additional means of accessing a wider range of 
interviewees. For example, when I told an interviewe , who is a friend of my aunt 
and was contacted by her, that I am looking forward to meeting some homemaker 
investors to interview, she said ‘It’s a piece of cake.’ She immediately went onto her 
mobile phone and asked a friend whether she was willing to take part in this research. 
Her friend agreed and arranged the interview time imediately over the phone. 
                                                
10 I had been aware of these cultural factors during the fieldwork of my previous research, which 
focused on the development of Taiwan’s tea industry and the transformation of tea production models. 
In the fieldwork, I had interviewed 85 people, including tea farmers, manufacturers, wholesalers, 
retailers, customers, government employees etc. The informants in the tea industry had been recruited 
mainly by the snowball-sampling method. Many of these informants had directly refused to answer 
the questions about money, incomes, profits, cost etc or only provided vague information. Some of 
them had frankly told me the reasons: they do not have personal ties with me and are afraid that the 
information would be leaked to others and therefore cause unnecessary troubles such as personal 
safety in risk, increase of tax payment, reduction of production subsidies etc.   
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Through the combination of guanxi and snowballing, I could access a target 
respondent in five minutes. This example underscored th  power of guanxi in the 
first instance of recruiting respondents and in thefurther step of enhancing the 
efficiency of the snowball-sampling recruitment in this case. In addition, it also 
implied the popularity of stock investment in Taiwan.  
However, the disadvantages of this method are obvious. An inevitable hazard 
of recruiting respondents from one’s social connections is that the respondents tend 
to originate from the same social class. Social networks are somewhat constrained by 
social class, and this might lead me to access onlylay investors whose social 
backgrounds are similar to mine and therefore would not provide a broad spectrum of 
Taiwanese lay investors. Thus, in order to mitigate this risk, I purposely selected 
respondents with diverse attributes: to present a variety in gender, age, education 
level, occupation, profile size and trading performance. Although some sections of 
lay investors might still not be represented in the sample group, the diversity of the 
respondents’ social backgrounds seemingly remained to some extent.  
Another hazard is ‘survivorship bias’. The lay investors who currently trade 
stock generally are those who have successfully survived in the market, not those 
who have failed and stopped trading. Therefore, contemporaneous lay investors 
probably overemphasize the importance of trading in daily life and exaggerate the 
chances of making profits from trading. In order to diminish this risk, I interviewed 
three previous lay investors: two have quit trading due to heavy losses, and one left 
due to ‘retirement’. In their interviews, they recalled the life of a lay investor and 
expressed their perceptions of the market. In general, the two informants who ceased 
trading due to considerable loss were more pessimistic about the survival chances of 
lay investors in the stock market, compared to the same comments from those who 
are still in the market. Otherwise, the rest (also the majority) of their statements, for 
example, about the trading models, did not apparently conflict with the data from 
other interviews. 
The interviews with Taiwanese professionals, Chinese lay investors and 
employees of Chinese brokerage firms were conducted in a similar way. The 
interviews with Taiwanese professionals were designed to supplement the 
interviewing data drawn from lay investors. A comparison of the power in the market 
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between professionals and lay investors also highlighted the features of lay investors. 
The professionals in Taiwan’s stock market were recruited through social 
connections as well. My college friends from the same business school were a great 
help. The interviews conducted in China were designed to enhance the observational 
data from the brokerage offices. The Chinese respondents were accessed through the 
same approach. Most of them were contacted by a relativ ’s friend in Shanghai and a 
friend in Hangzhou. Due to their help, I was able to interview a broker and a 
brokerage office manager in China. 
Documents were used to supplement the lack of the interview data and as a 
means of triangulation. Corroborated by the interviewing and observation, document 
data could indicate the changes in market devices, as well as trading mechanisms and 
stock market policies. These documents included the TWSE Monthly Review (the 
official magazine of the Taiwan Stock Exchange), newspaper archives, and other 
relevant books and reports. The TWSE’s publications were an important data source. 
In particular, from No. 593 (September 2011) to No.597 (January 2012), in order to 
celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the TWSE, the TWSE Monthly Review published 
a series of reviews of major events and reforms in the market’s 50-year history, 
drawn from oral-history interviews with TWSE board members, staff and related 
external parties. The reviews revealed the decision-making processes and the 
considerations of the TWSE behind the launches of major market policies, which 
were complemented with the interviews of lay investor ’ and professionals’ views of 
the market mechanism. Statistic data, reports and other books published by the 
TWSE, and periodicals and research reports published by the Taiwan Securities 
Association also contained useful information about the market system. 
Furthermore, the press recorded the changes of the stock market from another 
viewpoint. Two major newspaper digital archives, Udndata.com and Tol.com, have 
detailed reports on Taiwan’s stock market. These datasets contain all the articles of 
two Taiwanese major national general newspapers: the China Times (since 1950) and 
the United Daily News (since 1951), and two Taiwanese major national busines  
newspapers: the Economic Times (since 1967) and the Commercial Times (since 
1978). These four newspapers are considered to be bth authoritative and influential, 
and cover the time span of the Taiwan Stock Exchange.  
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Observational data was collected to examine the contemporaneous 
configurations of equipment and brokerage offices’ functions, and their 
economic/social meanings for lay investors. Overall, I visited four brokerage offices 
in Taiwan (three in Taipei and one in Tainan) and two in China (one in Shanghai and 
one in Hangzhou). Brokerage offices are thought as a ‘quasi-public’ place in both 
Taiwanese and Chinese societies, and people are allowed to enter and stay there 
without restriction during market hours, even if the person is not a client of the 
brokerage firm (see Chapter 5). This openness decreased the difficulty of carrying 
out observations in the six different offices though I had given prior notice to four of 
the offices about my research. Brief but detailed dscriptions of life in brokerage 
offices in late 1980s’ Taiwan and early 1990s’ Shanghai have been recorded in news 
reports (e.g., United Daily News 1989,14 September: 22) and Gamble’s (1997) and 
Hertz’s (1998) studies. Thus, my observations focused on the social and 
technological changes at the brokerage offices overth  past twenty years and the 
market and social behaviours of lay investors there. I was present in the X branch (a 
brokerage office in Taipei) for several hours per day for five consecutive days, and in 
each of the others for one to three hours from December 2010 to April 2011. Field 
notes and photos were used to record the observations. Relevant brochures available 
for free in the offices were collected. The observation data was complemented with 
interviews with the brokers and managers of four offices and with the lay investors 
who are/were used to dealing stock in brokerage offices. 
Furthermore, data analysis did not become a substantial obstacle though the 
data contained some technicalities about securities finance. Prior knowledge of 
finance and the stock market that I gained in business school and in preparation for 
the examinations of ‘Senior Securities Specialist’ and ‘Futures Specialist’ helped me 
a lot in the analysis. Prior knowledge of the background was also useful. 
I acknowledge the data has its limitations. The intrviewees were not selected 
by random sampling and the sample size was limited. Some household demographics 
in Taiwan might not be included in the fieldwork and the features of their stock 
trading might not be illustrated in this paper. Therefore, the sample group could not 
be generalized to the entire populations of lay investors in Taiwan’s stock market. 
Similarly, the interview data with the employees of institutional investors and of 
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securities companies could not represent the universe of professional practitioners in 
the securities industry in Taiwan as a whole.  
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Table 1.1: Interviewees of Taiwanese Lay Investors 
  Gender Age Education level Status Trading frequency* (trade once per) Portfolio 
size (USD) 
1 Ms Hong F 50s college family business member hot: 2–3 d; cold: several m, trapped 3k 
2 Ms Lin F 50s college family business member short: 1 w; long: several m 3k 
3 Mr Chen M 50s senior high school self-employed 1 m 33–50k 
4 Zhi-Chun F 30s master’s degree employed normally 1–2 times a w 3k 
5 Ou-Yang F 30s master’s degree employed uncertain, short: under 1 m; long: 1–2 y if trapped 3k 
6 Ms Zeng F 60s senior high school retired every 10–20 d 50–100k 
7 Ms Liu F 50s n/a employed over 1 y because the stock  are trapped 16k 
8 Cong-Ying M 20s master’s student student maximum within 2–3 m; holding when lasting low 
price 
6k 
9 A-Liang M 50s senior high school self-employed 1–2 m 166k–2m 
10 A-Zhen F 50s junior high school self-employed watching market every day 50–150k 
11 Mr Yang M 70s master’s degree Retired/attends brokerage 
office 
don’t do ‘short term’, selling when making profit, 
example: 2 w 
66–100k 
12 Shu-Ling F 40s university out-of-work/homemaker 
13 Wuma F 70s elementary school homemaker 
uncertain, if making profit, selling on the second 
day; long: several y if trapped 
3–6k 
14 Ms Qiu F 20s master’s degree employed short: under 1 m; long: trapped, over 1 y 1k 
15 Mr He M 30s master’s degree employed normally 2 m; short: 1 m 16–33k 
16 Mr Lin M 60s n/a self-employed n/a n/a 
17 Mr Liu M 20s university student student 1–2 w 3k 
18 Mr Zhan M 30s master’s degree employed 1 w–3 m 3k 
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19 Guang M 20s master’s degree employed 1–2 m 1k 
20 Rou-Zhu F 30s college employed every week 3k 
21 Yi-Zhi F 30s n/a employed n/a n/a 
22 Ms Huang F 60s senior high school out-of-work very short, selling when making profit, an example: 
2 d 
66–100k 
23 Ting-Xuan F 20s university student student 
(mutual fund investor) 
n/a 10k 
24 Mr Yan M 30s master’s degree employed short-term holding, short: 1 w; long: when the stock 
are trapped 
100–366k 
25 Sheng-Ji M 60s university retired/atends brokerage 
office 
holding long, long-term investment (means trading 
the same stocks frequently), watching every day 
n/a 
26 Yi-Hong M 20s university student student 1–2 w; most stock hold for 1–2 m 10k 
27 Mrs Kuo F 60s senior high school homemaker/attends 
brokerage office 
goes to brokerage office nearly every day 233k 
28 Ms Wu F 20s master student student in the beginning: 1–2 w; now: 1–2 m  3k 
29 Mr Zhang M 30s university employed several m 23–26k 
*d: day; w: week; m: month; y: year; trapped: market price is lower than the cost; hot: bull market; cold: bear market; n/a: no available information  
 
Table 1.2: Interviewees of Taiwanese Financial Professionals 
  Gender Age Occupation 
1 Zong-Wei M 30s financial adviser 
2 Shan-Zhu M 30s analyst  
3 Steven M 30s analyst, former trader 
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4 Wei-Qian M 30s trader 
5 Mr Li M 40s branch manager of a brokerage firm  
6 Mr Wang M 30s analyst 
7 You-Zi F 30s broker manager 
8 Jia-Xuan F 30s IPO project manager 
9 Chun-Shen M 20s broker 
 
Table 1.3: Interviewees of Chinese Lay Investors 
  Gender Age Education level Status Residence 
(1) Henry M 30s master’s degree student Hong Kong 
2 Caroline F 20s master student student n/a 
3 Jie M 20s university employed Shanghai 
4 Iv M 60s college retire Hangzhou 
5 Biaoge M 20s university  employed Hangzhou 
 
Table 1.4: Interviewees of Chinese Financial Professionals 
  Gender Age Education level Occupation 
1 Fei M 50s college IT 
2 Ji M 20s university customer manager 
3 Yuan F 30s n/a branch manager 
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1.4 Contextual background 
 
Background knowledge of the Taiwan Stock Exchange, Taiwanese lay investors, 
Taiwanese economic culture and China’s stock market was useful for the research. A 
brief history and summary of each appears below.  
 
1.4.1 The Taiwan Stock Exchange 
 
The Taiwan Stock Exchange is the exchange of Taiwan’s stock market. It was 
launched in 1962. The onset of securities issuing in Taiwan was related to the 
Kuomintang (國 民 黨 , KMT, also translated as the Chinese National Party), 
government’s policy of land reform in 1953 (Peng 2009: 26). The KMT government 
represented the central government of China during the Second World War. The end 
of that war was immediately followed by the Chinese Civil War. With the victory of 
Communist Party in the Civil War, the KMT government retreated to Taiwan in 
1949. Many leaders of the KMT believed that the Communist Party’s victory had 
resulted from its propaganda regarding land reform, which attracted strong support 
from the enormous number of tenant-peasants. This painful experience spurred the 
KMT government to commence its land-reform policy in Taiwan in 1949. In 1953, 
the government implemented the final phase of the land-reform policy. The 
government levied farm land from the vested owners and then resold the land to the 
original tenants for a fair price. The owners’ loss was indemnified by the government 
securities and the equities of state-owned enterprises (Huang 2002). This was the 
first securities issuing in Taiwan (TWSE website).11 
Trade in these equities heralded the beginning of Taiwan’s stock market and 
retail stock brokerage firms were formed. However, there was no government-
sanctioned stock exchange at that time and there wefr quent trading disputes. In 
1958, the Taiwanese government contemplated the possibility of forming a stock 
exchange (TWSE website). A number of government officers were sent to Japan and 
                                                
11 In 1949, the KMT government issued the ‘Patriotic Bond’ to collect funds for the civil war in China. 
However, this bond was seldom seen in Taiwan (Lui 2005; TWSE website). The history of the TWSE 
is outlined in its website, which is available at: 
http://www.twse.com.tw/ch/about/company/history.php.  
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the United States to study the organizational forms and regulations of ‘advanced’ 
stock markets. After a year, it was confirmed that a Taiwan Stock Exchange would 
be established and an American stock-market specialist, George M. Ferris, was 
invited to Taiwan to assist with the preparatory work in 1960 (Chiang 1991; FSC 
website).12 In the same year, the Securities Supervisory Commission was formed. By 
1962, the Taiwan Stock Exchange Incorporation (TWSE) was launched (TWSE 
website). The TWSE has always been a ‘private’ company, though the government 
has remained as the largest shareholder and thus has the power to appoint the 
TWSE’s president and to direct the policy of the organization (Peng 2009).13 
In its first decade, the TWSE’s trading value and volumes were maintained at a 
low level. The market had grown substantially with rapid economic development 
since the 1970s. From 1986 to 1990, the TWSE entered an unprecedented bull 
market. The market index, the Taiwan Stock Exchange Capitalization Weighted 
Stock Index (TAIEX),14 soared from 1,000 to the highest level in history, 12,000 in 
just five years. However, the market only stayed at this peak for a few days and the 
TAIEX immediately plunged to below 3,000 in the same year. From the mid-1980s 
to present, Taiwan’s stock market has experienced several boom-and-bust cycles 
(Peng 2009). 
The mid-1980s was also the beginning of the reformation of Taiwan’s financial 
sectors. The ideas of liberalization, privatization, deregulation and 
internationalization impacted banking industry as well as securities industry. 
‘Modernization’ had been the goal of the TWSE’s refo mation (TWSE website). 
One fundamental reform of the market mechanism was to introduce the 
computerized automatic order matching system.15 Previously, the trading orders in 
the TWSE had been matched by the staff of the TWSE one after another by hand and 
the mechanism was less efficient (see Chapter 3). The TWSE adopted the electronic 
                                                
12 There is no information about Mr Ferris’s occupation n the United States at that time. However, 
according to his obituary in The New York Times (1 November 1992) and Who’s Who in America 
(2003: 1612), he was an ex-investment baker and the founder, former president and chairman of the 
Washington Stock Exchange. 
13 In the UK and the US, the stock exchanges are private and were set prior to the institutes of 
regulations, which are different to the TWSE. 
14 The TAIEX is an index compiled by the TWSE. The introduction of the TAIEX is accessible on the 
website http://www.twse.com.tw/en/products/indices/tsec/taiex_1.php. 
15  The establishment of Taiwan’s future market in 1997 was another achievement of the 
‘modernization’ of Taiwan’s financial markets (TWSE website). 
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assisting order matching system in 1988. Since then, orders of all securities listed on 
the TWSE have been automatically matched through the Fully Automatic Order 
Matching System (‘FAST’) since 1993 (TWSE website). Compared to many leading 
stock markets in the world, the TWSE introduced the electronic trading system at an 
early stage (Jain 2005).16 
Internationalization was a part of the market’s modernization process. Foreign 
direct investment into the stock market had been strictly controlled until the 1990s. 
With the progress of internationalization, the market was completely open to foreign 
investors by 2003. In 2010, the TWSE was ranked the 21st largest stock exchange in 
the world by the measurement of market capitalization (US$818 billion) (WFE 2010 
Annual Report & Statistics: 74). 
 
1.4.2 Lay investors in Taiwan 
 
Historically, the main participants in the stock markets were lay investors (Preda 
2001; Harrington 2008). The situation generally changed in the 1960s when the 
number of institutional investors, such as pension funds and mutual funds, increased 
in stock markets worldwide. Most main stock markets have been dominated by 
institutional investors since the 1980s. For example, in the US, institutional investors 
accounted for around 25 per cent of securities trading value in the 1950s, but this 
figure increased to over 60 per cent after 1969 (Thatcher 2007: 43). In the 1990s, 
there was a renaissance of lay investors in the US stock market with the boom of the 
dot-com economy and the transformation of the pension ystem (Harrington 2008). 
At the boom’s peak, in 2001, over one-fifth of US families held publicly traded stock. 
Afterwards, the number decreased to 15 per cent in 2010 (Bricker et al. 2010: 34). 
The situation in the UK was similar. In 1963, 54 per c nt of UK equities were owned 
by lay investors, but this figure declined to just nder 18 per cent in 1993 (Thatcher 
2007: 43). 
                                                
16 The London Stock Exchange introduced the electronic trading system in 1997 (LSE website), the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange in 1997 (DBG website) and the New York Stock Exchange in 2005 
(combined with floor-based auction) (NYSE Euronext website). The resistance of incumbent traders 
seemed a key to why these stock exchanges had hesitated to adopt automatic order matching systems 
(Thatcher 2007: 73–121). 
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Unlike the US and UK markets, lay investors have consistently been the major 
player in Taiwan’s stock market for half a century. In 1990, lay investors (called 
‘domestic individual investors’ in statistics) still accounted for 96 per cent of 
Taiwan’s securities trading value. The percentage of foreign juridical person’s 
(foreign institutional) investment was substantially increasing after the market was 
fully opened to overseas financial companies in 2003. By 2010, the share of lay 
investors had decreased, but they still formed over 60 per cent of securities trading 
(TWSE statistics). Diagram 1.1 gives detailed information of these changes.  
On the other hand, a high proportion of Taiwan’s adult population have been 
involved in the stock market. In particular, these investors actively trade stock in the 
market, not simply hold stock in mutual or pension fu ds. In 2010, there were nearly 
18 million adults with over 15 million stock trading accounts (see Table 1.5).  
The statistics do not differentiate between active and inactive accounts. 
According to a popular back-of-envelope calculation in the securities industry, the 
sum of active accounts is approximately equivalent to 60 per cent of accumulated 
accounts (Wu 2005: 53). It was estimated that about 9 million Taiwanese adults 
(over a half of the adult population) traded stock in 2010. 
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Source of data: TWSE. 
 







Accounts Per 100 
Adults 
1975 205,802 8,558,481 2.40 
1980 362,271 10,119,628 3.58 
1985 400,461 11,685,421 3.43 
1990 5,033,088 13,079,468 38.48 
1995 5,734,866 14,273,013 40.18 
2000 12,359,893 15,698,216 78.73 
2005 14,002,106 16,921,080 82.75 
2010 15,659,669 17,929,658 87.34 
Note: The adult age in Taiwan is 20. 
Sources of data: TWSE; Wu 2005: 59–60; Department of Household Registration Affairs, MOI. 
 
Economic, institutional and technological factors are commonly used to 
explain the rise of lay investors in stock markets. For example, the introduction of 
online trading systems in the late 1990s, which substantially reduced the costs of 
trading for retail investors, is thought crucial (e.g. Barber and Odean 2001b, 2002). 
On the other hand, Harrington (2012a) emphasizes the effect of institutional reforms 
such as the changes of the pension system and the tax system on the increase of US 
lay investors in the 1990s. Wu (2005) claims that economic growth, such as the 
growths of the stock market, GDP and household savings, and reforms of the market 
institution, such as the introduction of the computerized order matching system, 
caused the surge of lay investors in Taiwan in the lat  1980s. He also suggests the 
strong correlation between the boom and bust of the market and the number of new 
brokerage account opening. However, several institutional factors are conjectured to 
be important for the rise of Taiwanese lay investors as well, including low brokerage 
fees, the absence of any conduit for mass savings to professional investors, late 
development of mutual funds and the government’s policies (see below). 
Taiwan is not the only case in the world that the stock market is dominated by 
lay investors. It is common in many emerging economies (e.g., China and Turkey) 
(Liu et al. 2010; Tarim 2013). However, Taiwan’s stock market has its own 
characteristics: the gross number of lay investors c ntinuously grows, the proportion 
of adult population engaged in the market continuously increases and the trading 
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frequency of lay investors are high17. It may not surprise that lay investors in Taiwan 
do not perform outstandingly in the market. They underperform institutional 
investors and suffer huge lose due to active trading (Barber et al 2008). Thus, the 
structural reasons mentioned above seem not able to fully account for these features 
of Taiwan’s stock market. As will be seen, this study will illuminate the effect of 
micro social factors on this particular financial phenomenon.  
 
1.4.3 Culture of Taiwanese economic life: The SMEs spirit 
 
The culture of Taiwan’s stock market is still an area waiting to be explored. At 
present, this topic has not been the focus of academic study according to my 
knowledge. However, a number of studies about the culture of Taiwanese economic 
life may provide clues, for two reasons. First, theexpansion of the stock market in 
the 1980s and 1990s was apparently driven by Taiwan’s contemporaneous economic 
boom. Secondly, both lay investors of the market and participants in small and 
medium-size enterprises (SMEs, the infrastructure of Taiwanese economic boom, see 
below) respectively accounted for a very large propo tion of Taiwan’s adult 
population. A cultural connection between the two sectors seems reasonable and 
probable, and therefore the findings of the studies in culture of economic life are 
worth a brief report. 
Features of Taiwanese economic cultures are conjectured by Ka (1993), Chen 
(1994) and Shieh (1997) to be shaped by the predominant ndustrial organizations of 
the rapid development period: small and medium-size enterprises. From the mid-
1970s to the 1990s, the economy’s substantial growth, ith a continuous increase in 
industrial exports, transformed Taiwan’s economy from an agriculture-based 
economy to an industry-based one. This period of development has been called the 
‘Taiwanese economic miracle’. A distinctive characteristic of this development was 
the role of the enormous number of SMEs. In many other countries, SMEs often play 
an important role in the domestic service sector. However, in Taiwan, the situation 
occurred in the export sector as well (Chen 1994; Biggart and Hamilton 1997). In 
1985, SMEs accounted for nearly 30 per cent of the Taiwan’s export value and 70 
                                                
17 The annual turnover rates for the group of lay investors are estimated between 308% and 630% 
from 1995 to 1990by Barber et al. (2007:430).  
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per cent of the SMEs-product value was sold to foreign countries (SMEA 2005)18. In 
2001, there were 1,098,185 enterprises in Taiwan and 98.18 per cent of them were 
SMEs (SMEA 2001)19 . Thus, it is argued that the SMEs culture represents 
Taiwanese economic culture. Three characteristics of Taiwanese SMEs culture are 
highlighted in these studies: a spirit of diligence, the ambition of becoming a boss or 
SME business owner, and personal relations with economically and socially tied 
interests. 
To endure long working hours was a common characteristic of Taiwanese 
labour in the industrialized period. In particularly, workers in SMEs were 
accustomed to working much longer hours than normal – this has been called ‘the 
spirit of diligence (勤 勞 精 神 )’ (Chen 1994). It was attributed to the peculiar 
structure, ownership and labour source of Taiwanese SMEs. In Taiwan SMEs, it was 
customary for the patriarch to be the head of the ent rprise and other family members 
to be the principal workers. These family businesses tended to set up production 
inside their homes, and called ‘family factories (家 庭 工 廠 )’. As a result, the 
boundary between home life and work life was dissolved and work usually 
dominated family life (Ka 1993; Shieh 1997; Hu 1997). 
‘To be a boss’ became a common life goal of many workers during the period 
of rapid economic development and was conjectured to strongly support Taiwan’s 
industry at that time (Chen 1994; Shieh 1997). The p rase, ‘the black-hand becomes 
the head’ (黑手變頭家), demonstrated this belief. The ‘black-hand’ is the worker 
and the ‘head’ means the boss. This phrase was used to describe the chance of 
success: you will establish your own enterprise one day, if you constantly work hard 
(Chen 1994; Shieh1997). The contemporaneous structure of industry seemingly 
supported this belief. The major sector of industry was consumer products 
manufacturing and this was a kind of low-technology industry. Low barriers to entry 
rendered the predominance of SMEs in this industry. As a result, the production 
chains consisted of numerous subcontracts between SMEs and were supported by 
                                                
18  2005 Statistics of SMEs. SMEA (Small and Medium Enterprise Administration, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs).   
Available at: http://www.moeasmea.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=689&CtUnit=140&BaseDSD=7&mp=1.  
19  2001 Statistics of SMEs. SMEA (Small and Medium Enterprise Administration, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs).   
Available at: http://www.moeasmea.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=689&CtUnit=140&BaseDSD=7&mp=1. 
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their social networks (Ka 1993; Chen 1994; Shieh 1997; Biggart and Hamilton 1997). 
The belief motivated Taiwanese labour to work hard an suggested their expectations 
of social mobility and self-controlled economy. 
The production chains in Taiwan’s industry were based on numerous 
subcontracts and networks among SMEs. Therefore, maintaining good relations with 
both up-stream and down-stream manufacturers was important. Due to the small size 
of Taiwanese enterprises, a relationship between two enterprises was almost 
equivalent to a personal relation between the two oners. This personal relation was 
compounded with economic interest and social support. Thus, the boundary between 
the private and the public relations of Taiwanese tended to become blurred (Chen 
1994; Biggart and Hamilton 1997). 
 
1.4.5 Stock markets in China 
 
Stock markets emerged in China in the beginning of the twentieth century. The first 
exchange was the Beijing Stock Exchange, which was established in 1918, though 
there had been some unofficial intermittent securities trades in Shanghai before then. 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange opened two years later, in 1920. In 1949, the 
Communist Party successfully controlled Mainland China. Due to the market’s 
ideological conflict with communism, the Communist government shut down all of 
China’s stock exchanges in 1952 (Karmel 1994: 1106–7; Green 2004: 8).  
Until December 1990, the date of the reopening of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, stock markets had not existed in China for nearly forty years. The 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange followed in 1991. In December 2007, the total market 
capitalization of the Shanghai Stock Exchange hit around US$ 3.6 trillion (Shanghai 
Stock Exchange 2009)20. At the same time, the total market capitalization of the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange was around US$ 0.14 trillion (Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
2009)21. 
                                                
20 2009 Shanghai Stock Exchange Fact Book.  
Available at: http://www.sse.com.cn/researchpublications/publication/yearly/. 
21 2009 Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Book.  
Available at: http://www.szse.cn/main/marketdata/wbw/marketstat/.  
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China’s stock markets are also full of lay investor. In 2005, the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange recorded a total of 38.56 million trading accounts. Of them, 37.413 
million were retail accounts (Shanghai Stock Exchange 2005: 2)22. In the same year, 
35.36 million trading accounts were recorded in the S nzhen Stock Exchange, and 
only 158,500 were institutional investors (Shenzhen Stock Exchange 2005)23. In 
other words, more than 95 per cent of China’s stock rading accounts were owned by 
lay investors. In addition, according to the China Securities Depository and Clearing 
Corporation Limited (2008)24 , lay investors (domestic individual investors) 
accounted for over 80 per cent volume of all day trding in China’s stock markets. 
However, compared to the huge Chinese adult population (855 million adults in 
2000),25 the owners of stock trading accounts remain a minority in Chinese society. 
Stock trading does not yet seem to play an important ole in most Chinese people’s 
daily life. This is an important contrast to the main case, Taiwan. In the next chapter, 















                                                
22 2005 Shanghai Stock Exchange Fact Book.  
Available at: http://www.sse.com.cn/researchpublications/publication/yearly/. 
23 2005 Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Book.  
Available at: http://www.szse.cn/main/marketdata/wbw/marketstat/. 
24 2008 Annual Report. Available at: http://www.chinaclear.cn/zdjs/xgsnb/rp_list.shtml.  






































Recently, Granovetter’s (1985) concept of relational embeddedness has faced 
challenges in contemporary electronic anonymous markets and criticism for its 
theoretical separation of the economic and the social. This study attempts to provide 
an example of a solution by examining the relationship between stock trading and 
Taiwanese lay investors’ social relations. 
Granovetter’s idea of relational embeddedness has developed to become a 
foundation of economic sociological studies since the 1980s (Smelser and Swedberg 
2005). The core idea is that when actors carry out economic actions, they are not 
atomized, as neoclassical economists claim, but are enmeshed in networks. He 
argues that an individual’s economic action is ‘embdded in concrete, ongoing 
systems of social relations’ and the action is considerably affected by those relations 
(Granovetter 1985: 481, 487). In mainstream economics, social relation is argued to 
hold a marginal status in economic activities and its existence is regarded as the 
‘friction’ for market efficiency (Granovetter 1985: 484). Granovetter’s theory of 
embeddedness takes a contrary view and asserts the effect of social relations on 
economic action should be heeded. The concept of embeddedness has offered an 
important research approach for sociologists to explore social relations in economic 
fields and to examine how social relations benefit or handicap economic performance 
(see Smith-Doerr and Powell’s review 2005). Granovetter’s idea has been one of the 
main theoretical sources of current economic sociolgy (Granovetter 1985, 2005; 
Smelser and Swedberg 2005). 
 The emergence of anonymous electronic markets, particul rly in financial 
industries, has been a challenge for the theory of relational embeddedness in 
contemporary economic sociology (Krippner, Granovetter et al. 2004: 129–30; 
MacKenzie 2004; Preda 2012; Zelizer 2012: 164–5). Conventionally, financial 
markets are regarded as one of the examples closest to economists’ ideal type of 
 36 
market. Participants are expected to trade individually, keep counterparts at arm’s 
length, compete for the best prices and maximize self-int rest in the market. 
However, a number of sociological and anthropological studies of financial markets 
have indicated that social relations are an intrinsic element in both open-outcry 
markets and telephone-based and electronically mediated markets. 
 In open-outcry trading, members of the exchange trade contracts face-to-face 
using voice and gestures. In telephone or electronically mediated trading, traders 
make contracts by means of telephone or electronic messages. In both types of 
markets, social ties among the market participants play a crucial role in establishing 
the market, smoothing trades, arranging prices, exchanging information and 
maintaining moral order (that is, preventing opportunism) (Baker 1984; Abolafia 
1996; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Knorr Cetina and Brugger 2002; Zaloom 2006; 
Muniesa 2008). These studies’ findings suggest that the substance of social relations 
in this sphere are mainly consistent with the relational embeddedness in other types 
of markets and other economic fields (e.g., Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Uzzi 
1996, 1999; Mizruchi and Stearns 2001). In other words, the technological 
transformation from open-outcry trading to telephone and electronically mediated 
trading does not dispel social relations among participants in financial markets. 
 However, as mentioned above, the emergence of electronic anonymous trading 
systems in financial markets becomes a challenge to the core argument of 
Granovetter’s embeddedness, that ‘economic action is essentially meshed in social 
relations.’ Electronic anonymous trading mechanisms have been successfully 
introduced into worldwide financial markets since th  late 1990s and have reshaped 
the trading patterns in this field (Jain 2005; MacKenzie 2012). A key feature of 
electronic anonymous trading mechanisms is that the trading partner’s identity is 
principally unknown. This is an important distinction between electronic anonymous 
markets and the open-outcry, telephone and electroni ally mediated markets, and is 
perhaps also a crucial reason that the social ties among participants in the electronic 
anonymous markets are impeded (MacKenzie 2004). 
 This does not mean that sociality is completely extinct in electronic 
anonymous financial markets, though personal relations among participants are 
absent. Various kinds of social interactions among traders in these markets are 
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reported. For example, MacKenzie (2004) points out tha social connectivity, in the 
form of imitation of trading strategies between market participants whose identities 
are unknown, is observable in some anonymous financal markets. In addition, Preda 
(2012) argues transactions themselves could be considered as a type of 
communication in an electronic anonymous market because market actors there tend 
to use tags to typify the aims and agents behind the transactions. However, these 
cases, suggesting implicit social interactions among traders, do not support the 
existence of embeddedness in contemporary electroni anonymous financial markets. 
Does this absence imply the embeddedness approach must to be withdrawn from this 
field? 
 On the other hand, criticism of the embeddedness appro ch has arisen in 
sociology. Economic sociological studies which apply Granovetter’s embeddedness 
approach, particularly in the subfield of network analysis, tend to focus on the 
‘effect’ of social relations on individuals’ economic outcomes (see Smith-Doerr and 
Powell review 2005; Granovetter 2005). By contrast, the ‘effect’ of economic action 
in individuals’ social relations has not been emphasized, and therefore the interaction 
between the social and the economic tend to be reduced to a unilateral action in this 
school. As a result, these studies are criticized for positing ‘an exterior relationship 
between the economic and the social’ and the view that ‘social relations shape 
economic outcomes from the outside’ (Krippner 2001; Krippner and Alavarez 2007: 
30; Zelizer 2010: 1–12, 2012). Based on these criticisms, Zelizer (2012: 149) argues 
economic sociology should ‘move beyond an approach that centres on “relational 
embeddedness”’ and toward analysing ‘the continuously negotiated and meaningful 
interpersonal relations that constitute economic activity’ 26. 
                                                
26 The primary thought of this approach has showed in Zelizer’s research on intimacy and economy 
(Zelizer 2005, p. 7-46). In her recent article, Zeliz r amends and fleshes this approach by 
incorporation her original idea with the critiques of the embeddedness approach, mainly drawn from 
Krippner’s argument (Zelizer 2012). In brief, Krippner argues Granovetter’s concept of embeddedness 
essentially posits ‘an exterior relationship between the economic and the social’. As a result, the 
subsequent studies views ‘social relations shape economic outcomes from the outside’ (with Alavarez 
2007: 30). Krippner claims this natural division betw en economy and society within Granovetter’s 
theory is a peril to economic sociology, because ‘it leaves the hard core of instantaneous market 
transacting outside the realm of economic sociology,’ and thus, ‘we will be unable to grasp markets 
fully as constitutive of and constituted by social relations (2001: 785, 798) .’ Krippner’s argument has 
received considerable attention and sparked a lasting and server debate on the limitation and the 
amendment of the embeddedness concept among economic s ciologists (e.g. Krippner, Granovetter et 
al. 2004). Ostensibly, Zelizer’s work has both resolved the ‘problems’ of Graovetter’s embeddedness 
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 This study can be considered a response to these chall nges and criticisms of 
the embeddedness approach. I attempt to investigate he substantial social relations in 
electronic anonymous financial markets by widening the focus from social relations 
inside the marketplace to outside the market, and by shifting the focus from 
professional practitioners to non-professional participants. 
 Social ties between professional practitioners are usually underscored by 
economic sociologists (e.g., Uzzi 1996, 1999). Sociol gical studies of financial 
markets also tend to focus on the social relations nside the marketplaces, because 
they aim to examine the relationship between social rel tions and financial-market 
actions. In general, professional practitioners’ social connections inside the 
marketplace – e.g., the ties among traders – would receive more attention from 
scholars rather than their other social relations, such as their relations with family 
members (e.g., Baker 1984; Abolafia 1996; Knorr Cetina and Brugger 2002). 
 However, in some social contexts, personal relations utside the marketplace 
probably play a crucial role in individuals’ market actions as well, and the relations 
are interwoven with these people’s market activities. Portes and Sensenbrenner’s 
(1993) study about immigration communities provides a clue, though the study does 
not examine the immigrants’ market actions. The findings of the study suggest that 
immigrants’ existing social ties within the community are crucial for and bound up 
with their economic activities, such as the establishment of business enterprises. 
According to the study, strong community ties have both positive and negative 
effects on individuals’ economy, and it is difficult to detach their economic actions 
from their existing social networks. 
 Similar models are thought to exist within the market sphere as well, including 
some electronic anonymous financial markets. For this purpose, Taiwan’s stock 
market is a case which is worthy of investigation. Taiwan’s stock market is a fully 
electronic anonymous market.27 One feature of the market is the great number of 
                                                                                                                                
approach and responded to Krippner’s claim─ to decompose market transactions into sheer social 
relations. 
27 The Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) was launched in 1962 and introduced electronic automated 
order matching mechanism in 1993 (http://www.twse.com.tw). There is no direct interaction between 
trading partners in transactions and all orders must pa s through brokerage companies’ computers into 
the central computer of the TWSE. In 2010, the TWSE was ranked the 21st largest stock exchange in 
the world by the measurement of market capitalization (US$818 billion) (WFE 2010 Annual Report: 
74). 
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retail lay investors dominating the market, a number estimated to be around 7.5 
million, or nearly half of Taiwan’s adult population28 (see Table 1.5). In this social 
context, stock trading is very likely to penetrate lay people’s daily lives and existing 
social relations. 
 Drawing on the case study of Taiwan’s stock market, this chapter aims to 
examine the relationship between lay investors’ existing social ties and market 
actions (stock trading) in electronic anonymous markets, with an emphasis on a 
conventionally overlooked dimension of this connection: the influence of market 
actions on individuals’ social relations. 
 As will be seen, many Taiwanese lay investors’ stock trading is embedded in 
their existing social networks, although the market is an electronic anonymous one 
and consists of millions of individuals. From engaging in trading, exchanging 
information, learning skills to collecting capital, people’s existing social ties usually 
play a key role in their stock trading. Furthermore, there are examples where stock 
trading would support, extend or threaten people’s social relations. In other words, 
these lay investors’ social relations outside the marketplace are naturally interwoven 
with their market actions.  
The findings illuminate the connection between Granovetter’s theory of social 
network and Callon’s theory of human-technology network. In Callon’s (1998, 2007, 
and with Caliskan 2010) argument, market actors are made up of linked human being 
and non-human elements as human-technology networks. In this case, lay market 
actors are framed by the computerized market system and are constituted of 
technology devices and human agents (see Chapter 3). However, those market actors 
were constructed in the existing social networks and re continuously entangled in 
social relations. In other words, social relations could be the contents (an element of 
market actors) as well as the context (where the market actors assembled). Human-
technology networks, even in the electronic anonymous market, are still rooted in the 
structure of social relations.  
                                                
28 In Taiwan, individual stock investors are colloquially called ‘sanhu’ (散戶; ‘dispersed players’). 
The term implies that they are the market’s scattered, unorganized, retail and non-professional stock 
traders. Furthermore, in Hertz’s ethnography of the S anghai stock market (1998), she also adopts the 
local jargon, ‘dispersed players’ (sanhu), to denote Shanghai’s individual stock investors. In her 
interpretation, sanhu means loose, scattered, random, or unorganized stock market participants. The 
contextual meaning of sanhu seems to be the same in both Taiwan’s and China’s stock markets. 
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The findings also suggest that stock trading is not only an economic activity 
but also a social activity. It is consistent with Krippner and Zelizer’s argument: 
economy is not an autonomous sphere which is separat d from the social. However, 
it does not mean the notion of economy should be abandoned. The terms ‘economy’ 
and ‘market’ are popularly used in daily life, in business and in academy, and the 
concepts are crucial for people’s communication and knowledge exchange. Foremost, 
when economic agents consider economic activities as ocial activities, it does not 
mean they do not ‘imagine’, ‘believe’ or ‘perform ’ the law of the market economy. 
Callon (1998) and MacKenzie’s (2008) studies of performativity have indicated:  
market agents perform economics in markets and therefor  markets are shaped by 
economics. As will be seen, in Taiwan’s stock market, both lay investors and 
professional practitioners (even some insiders) generally ‘believe’ the law of the 
market governing the market trend more or less althoug  they seemingly have 
different opinions of how effective the law is. Indeed, economics is not the only 
standard for market actions. This study will show that lay investors’ market activities 
are shaped by both the market law and the daily life framework.  
As a result, Granovetter’s embeddeness is still a useful conceptual tool to 
illustrate the way social and market relations are entwined and investigate how stock 
trading is anchored in these people’s existing social relations. Particularly, in this 
case, the sociality of the relations is not the same to Zelizer’s argument, between 
counterparties in the anonymous market, but instead, within investors’ existing social 
networks. 
Furthermore, the entwined relationship between trading and social ties suggests 
a connection between Granovetter’s and Zelizer’s appraoches. For Zelizer, all 
economic activities are operated in different and distinct categories of relations (see 
Chapter 6). However, this study will show each category of relations tend not to be 
independent but highly interactive. For example, purchasing stock in the anonymous 
market and borrowing trading money between family members are different 
economic transactions and operated in different categories of relations, but they 
apparently affect each other. This type of interaction has been illustrated by theories 
of social networks and social capital theories, and the framework of embeddedness is 
helpful to underpin Zelizer’s theory of relational work.  
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 This analysis is expected to contribute to another discussion: that is, to suggest 
social relations as one of the key factors which encourages continuing large-scale 
participation of lay investors. Like many other countries, rapid economic 
development is usually cited as a reason for the explosive expansion of Taiwan’s 
stock market and the increase in lay investors (e.g., Wu 2005). ‘Stock fever’ is often 
the phrase used to describe the similar social structure when a large number of lay 
people actively engage in the stock market. For example, Hertz (1998) uses this term 
to denote the popularity of stock trading in Shanghai in the early 1990s. At that time 
(1990), when the Shanghai Stock Exchange was established, many citizens 
participated with great enthusiasm in the market. The word ‘fever’ implies that the 
structure is not expected to last for a long time, similar to how the word ‘mania’ is 
used to describe the short period of intense speculation in tulip bulbs in the 
Netherlands in the seventeenth century. However, in Taiwan, ‘stock fever’ has 
transformed into a relatively ‘durable’ social struct re. The high level of stock-
market participation has been maintained since the mid-1980s, and during this period 
of time, there have been several cycles of boom-and-bust (see Chapter 1). Thus, how 
can ‘stock fever’ thrive in a society over decades without cessation or decline? It 
seems insufficient to answer this question citing oly economic factors. An insight 
from the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) is helpful to an lyse this phenomenon further 
(e.g., Callon and Latour 1981; Law 1992; Latour 2005). 
 From the ANT perspective, a social structure is considered as a heterogeneous 
network, integrated with human actors and non-human entities, such as technology. 
The duration and extension of the heterogeneous network would determine this 
social structure to be a macro/micro and a temporary/lasting structure. Following this 
idea, the stock-market engagement in Taiwan can be thought as a heterogeneous 
network (in the ANT definition), and lay investors, ocial relations, calculative 
devices and connotations of stock trading29 (for discussion of these devices and 
connotations, see Chapter 3) are both the components and the glues that form and 
                                                
29 Culture and social definitions often seem to be adopted by anthropologists to explain the inception 
or the continuance of social activities which are similar to stock trading in Taiwan. For example, Hertz 
(1998) tends to elucidate the causes of the Shanghai stock fever by its culture and history. In addition, 
Evthymios Papataxiarchis (1999) takes the cultural perspective to explain the enduring popularity of 
illegal gambling in Aegean Greece. However, the ANT approach seems capable of enhancing the 
cultural explanation (see Callon and Latour 1981) 
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retain the network.30 Thus, an examination of relational embeddedness in this field 
would be expected to highlight a key element of this phenomenon’s configuration, an 
element which is less discussed in the relevant studies. 
In terms of this chapter, the fieldwork includes the collection of social 
connotations of sanhu (lay investors) and stock trading, observations in brokerage 
offices (which are usually thought to be the ‘embodiment’ of the stock market) and 
interviews with 29 Taiwanese sanhu of various ages and social backgrounds in 2010 
and 2011. The list of interviewees is in Table 1.1. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In therest of this section, I will 
summarize the concept of relational embeddedness and give a basic introduction to 
Taiwanese lay investors, anhu. The subsequent four sections will explicate different 
‘dimensions’ of social relations in Taiwanese lay investors’ stock trading. In Section 
2, I examine how the social relations could act as a ‘bridge’ to draw lay people into 
the stock market. In Section 3, I examine the models of assembling trading capital 
through the social relations. I then argue that the social relations sometimes work as a 
channel for learning trading skills. In Section 5, I analyse the characteristics of the 
market information which is accessed through the social relations. Finally, I elucidate 
the importance of stock trading in the maintenance and expansion of Taiwanese lay 
investors’ social relations. 
 
2.1.1 Social relations in economic actions 
 
The underlying theme of relational embeddedness studies is how the outcomes of 
individual persons’ or companies’ economic actions are affected by their social 
relations. According to these studies’ findings, the remarkable influence of social 
relations in the economic actions mainly results from the ‘structures’ of social 
relations and the ‘resources’ which could be accessed through the social relations. 
The different ‘resources’ are usually thought to be channelled through different 
‘structures’. 
                                                
30 Most social studies of Taiwan’s stock market, according to my knowledge, tend to take the 
continuing large-scale stock-market participation fr granted and as the status quo, these studies tend 
not to examine the causes of the market’s endurance (e.g., Wu 2005; Qian 2008). 
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 The structures of social relations are usually called ‘social networks’. In 
studies of social networks, a person’s social network usually is seen as a composition 
of both ‘strong ties’ and ‘weak ties’ (e.g., Granovetter 1973, 1983, 2005; Uzzi 1996, 
1999; Lin 2001; Burt 2001). ‘Strong ties’ usually refer to those connections with 
people who are close to an individual’s ego, such as relations with family members, 
close friends and intimate relatives. By contrast, ‘weak ties’ usually means an 
individual’s connections with people who are acquaintances but not close, such as 
the relations with distinct colleagues. Indeed, the concepts of ‘strong ties’ and ‘weak 
ties’ are relative ideas and their definitions vary in the studies. 
 Some scholars focus on a complete network depiction, made up of the social 
ties within a ‘closed’ community, such as a company, and emphasize the 
characteristics of different ‘cliques’ and ‘nodes’ (individual people) in this network. 
For example, Burt (2001) has proposed the concept of ‘structural holes’ to refer to 
the strategic advantage of the ‘node’ that has ties between ‘near-closure’ groups. He 
argues this ‘node’ is similar to a ‘broker’ and would earn benefits by ‘brokering’ 
information between these two groups. 
 The ‘resources’ available in a person’s social network are usually called 
‘social capital’. The ‘resources’ include tangible it ms, such as economic capital, and 
intangible items, such as information, advice and eforceable trust. Economic capital 
is straightforwardly helpful to most economic actions. The money people borrow 
from their social ties tends to be easier or less expensive (that is, with a lower interest 
rate) than from formal financial organizations, such as banks. This is because the 
enforceable trust between lenders and borrowers, baed on their strong social 
connections, can reduce the cost and risk of transactions (Coleman 1988). In 
particular, borrowing money through social relations seems popular in many 
immigration and ethnic minority communities. The communities tend to have strong 
solidarity and interior sanctions, and the community members are more likely to be 
rejected by outside financial organizations than mainstream society members (Portes 
and Sensenbrenner 1993). 
 Knowledge, advice and suggestions gained from social networks could help 
individuals to reduce the uncertainty of the busines with which they are dealing. For 
example, Mizruchi and Stearns (2001) find that when ba kers are handling highly 
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uncertain business cases; they tend to seek advice from their colleagues. Beunza and 
Stark (2004) also argue that advice from colleagues responsible for other financial 
products could help the traders in a financial company to make arbitrage. 
 Information is one of the main factors which influence individuals’ economic 
performance. It is often considered one of the most precious ‘resources’ accessible 
from social networks. For example, many studies have indicated the importance of 
information gained from personal social ties in jobmarkets (e.g., Granovetter 1973, 
1983, 2005; Lin 2001). Although close friends and relatives are more likely to be 
eager to help individuals to find jobs, acquaintances are more likely to provide job-
seekers more useful information about available job p sitions, because people’s 
social connections tend to frequently overlap with their close friends and close 
relatives. Therefore, the information flowing from individuals’ strong ties are often 
repeated. On the other hand, acquaintances belong to another social circle, so they 
tend to provide more novel information to the indivi uals. This is called ‘the strength 
of weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973). The studies of relational embeddedness provide a 
standpoint to examine social relations in Taiwanese lay investors’ stock trading from 
these aspects. 
 
2.1.2 Taiwanese sanhu 
 
In Taiwan’s stock market, sanhu are officially labelled ‘domestic individual 
investors’ in surveys and documents (TWSE Annual Sttistics)31. However, their 
market behaviours are more similar to those of Western ‘stock traders’. The different 
connotations of ‘stock investment’ in Britain and in Taiwan may possibly confuse 
some readers. In most English-Chinese dictionaries, ‘stock investment’ translates as 
‘gupiao touzi’ (股票投資) and ‘investing stock’ translates as ‘touzi gupiao’ (投資股
票). According to the interviews, when these Taiwanese individual investors explain 
the details of their ‘gupiao touzi’ (stock investment) or their behaviours of ‘touzi 
gupiao’ (investing stock), around one-third of them mentio  that they usually 
purchase or sell stock ‘every one to three days’; other third say ‘every one to three 
weeks’; and the rest say ‘every one to two months’. What is called ‘gupiao touzi’ 
                                                
31 Available at: http://www.twse.com.tw/en/statistics/statistics.php?tm=07. 
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(stock investment) in Taiwan seems closer to ‘stock trading’ in British context. In 
other words, the British connotation of ‘stock investment’ (that is, holding stock for a 
long term) would not be identically recognized by Taiwanese individual investors. 
To avoid misunderstanding and contradiction, in this esis, the term ‘stock trading’ 
is used to refer to the Taiwanese idea of ‘stock investment’. 
 However, the idea of ‘long-term holding’ is not completely alien to these 
Taiwanese individual investors. For them, holding a stock for over two months 
without trading is a ‘long-term investment’ or ‘long-term possession’. If a stock is 
held over a year, the reason must be that the stockis taolao. The term ‘taolao’ (套牢) 
literally means ‘to be locked up’, or ‘to be trapped’. In Taiwan’s stock market, the 
term means that ‘the share price continues declining after purchase, but the stock 
holder does not want to sell the stock to realize loss.’ In this situation, ‘holding the 
stock’ suggests ‘having an opportunity of switching the investment from loss to 
profit’. Some lay investors joke, ‘we are “forced” to do a long-term investment; the 
stock is trapped.’  
 Examining the lay investors’ conversations, ‘doing stock’ (做股票, zuo gupiao) 
and ‘playing stock’ (玩股票, wan gupiao) are the most frequently used words to 
suggest ‘trading stock’. To ‘do’ (做, zuo) stock (股票, gupiao) is analogous to ‘do’ 
(做 zuo) business (生意, shengyi) or to ‘do’ (做 zuo) work (工作, gongzuo). To 
‘play’ (玩, wan) stock (股票, gupiao) is analogous to ‘play’ (玩, wan) a game (遊戲, 
youxi). These two verbs, to ‘do’ and to ‘play’, imply the deep meanings of stock 
trading in the investors’ mind. 
 Indeed, ‘investing stock’ (投資股票, touzi gupiao), ‘purchasing-selling stock’ 
(買賣股票 , maimai gupiao) and ‘trading stock’ (交易股票 , jiaoyi gupiao) are 
sometimes used to describe ‘trading stock’. They are probably formal terms and 
therefore less common in everyday conversations. ‘Stir-frying stock’ (炒股票, chao 
gupaio) is the most popular slang phrase in China’s stock markets used to refer to 
‘trading stock’ (Gamble 1997; Hertz 1998; Interviewng data). ‘Stir-frying stock’ 
(chao gupaio) is a neutral term in China and can be used to describe sanhu’s and 
dahu’s (big player) stock trading. However, in Taiwan’s stock market, ‘stir-frying 
stock’ is a kind of negative term which is used by sanhu to describe their market 
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competitors’, dahu’s and institutional investors’, immoral trading strategies. It 
usually means ‘to intentionally and improperly manipulate share prices by throwing a 
huge amount of capital or releasing inaccurate information’. The notation of ‘chao 
gupaio’ in Taiwan is similar to ‘cornering a market’ in the West. The terminology of 
‘stock trading’ implies Taiwanese lay investors’ worldview of the stock market. A 
further discussion of this issue is in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2 ‘Bridges’ to stock trading 
 
In Western societies, stock markets are principally the domain of professional market 
participants and are generally separated from most lay people’s life world (Preda 
2009a). However, in Taiwan, lay people are introduced to the stock market through 
many different routes. One of the most important ‘bridges’ leading to the world of 
stock trading is probably that of social relations. In this section, I provide three 
common models to account for why many lay investors’ inception of trading stock 
was motivated by, or associated with, social relations. The different models appear at 
different stages of the stock market’s history. Initially, ‘reliable endorsers’ could act 
as ‘brokers’ to ‘introduce’ lay people to stock trading when trading had not yet been 
popular in society. Secondly, during the peak of the stock trading explosion, social 
ties might suggest ‘duplicable models’ of becoming overnight millionaires through 
trading. These role models possibly encouraged and motivated lay people to enter the 
stock market. Third, when stock trading has ‘taken root’ and become a ‘familiar’ 
system in the society, trading culture shared by ‘peer groups’ and ‘families’ often 
gradually and naturally ‘bring’ lay people into the stock market, because people tend 
to ‘join’ the same ‘social activity’ (stock trading) as their friends or family members. 
 
2.2.1 Reliable endorsers 
 
 Prior to the stock market boom of the late 1980s, stock trading probably had not 
been well-known in Taiwan. In 1985, on the eve of Taiwan’s stock market explosive 
expansion, the number of accumulated stock investor accounts was 440,461, and the 
rate of stock accounts per hundred Taiwanese adults was 3.4. This figure increased 
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dramatically in the subsequent ten years: 1986 to 1995 was the period of market 
explosion. In 1995, the number of accumulated accounts had grown to 5,734,866 and 
the rate of the stock accounts per hundred adults was 40.2 (see Table 1.5). 
 Before the explosion, trading stock probably was an unfamiliar activity for 
most people whose jobs were not related to the securiti s industry. Among the 25 
interviewees, 11 interviewees’ ages were over 50 in 2010.32 In 1985, these people 
had been over 25 year old and therefore could plausibly have traded stock. However, 
only two people had begun stock trading before 1985. Four people engaged in stock 
trading during the peak of Taiwan’s stock explosion (1986–90). The remaining five 
people began trading after the market boom. Of the interviewees, Mrs Kuo was not 
the oldest, but is the most experienced investor. She is a homemaker with nearly 40 
year’ experience stock trading. Her first encounter with ‘stock trading’ took place in 
her brother’s house, where she was surprised to find that he had erected a blackboard: 
 
 [My brother] bought a blackboard and wrote closing prices of shares on 
the board every day. [At that time, the shares prices were broadcast over 
the radio.] I felt very strange. Why was there a blckboard in his house? 
[Such] Taiwan-Cement and Chia-Cement [listing companies] [were 
written on it] … All day [he] was writing words and numbers on it. 
 
This first experience was not successful in attracting Mrs Kuo to engage in stock 
trading, because ‘after observing his activity for a long time, I still could not 
comprehend what he was doing.’  
However, rather than her brother, it was another of Mrs Kuo’s social relations, 
her school friend, who acted as the ‘bridge’ that led her to the stock market. Mrs 
Kuo’s friend had moved from Kaohsiung to Taipei and sked Mrs Kuo to accompany 
her to a brokerage office. Mrs Kuo remembers enterig a brokerage office for the 
first time in 1974. In that time, the number of brokerage offices was very limited and 
most were located on Huai-Ming Street, near the Taipei Railway Station. 
Accompanied by her friend, Mrs Kuo walked into Huai-Ming Street for the first time. 
Inside the brokerage office, she was impressed by the noisy crowd of people and the 
                                                
32 I started interviewing Taiwanese investors in 2010. Of these eleven people, six were in their 50s, 
four in their 60s, and the other two were in their 70s. 
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loud broadcast of share prices. For her, it was a brand new ‘world’. Encouraged by 
her friend, she bought her first stock, Formosa Plastics (the company her friend’s 
husband was working for). Her friend told her that this company was a very stable 
enterprise and almost impossible to bankrupt. In reality, 1974 was a harsh year for 
Taiwanese plastics industry in general. The oil crisis had just started and the price of 
crude oil, the raw material for plastics manufacture, had surged. As a result, 
prospects for plastics enterprises were full of uncertainty. However, Mrs Kuo began 
her ‘career’ of stock trading by choosing the company with which her friend was 
very familiar. Mrs Kuo trusted her friend and had confidence in her judgement. 
 Indeed, network studies have pointed out that the social ties among people can 
act as a crucial channel to distribute information, k owledge and innovations (e.g., 
Granovetter 1973, 1983; Krackhardt 1992). Based on the trust of friends and 
relatives, people are more willing to adopt the new innovation that their kith and kin 
recommend. In this case, the stock market is like an unexplored ‘world’ for those 
who are new to it. For them, to engage in stock trading is very similar to beginning a 
‘venture’. To be introduced to this ‘venture’ by reliable friends or relatives probably 
inspires people’s interest and gives them confidence to begin. 
 
2.2.2 Duplicable models 
 
 Economic interest is one of the main reasons for people to participate in stock 
markets. The ‘potential’ high profit from stock trading implies that stock trading 
could be one of the ‘feasible’ ways to rapid wealth creation. Thus, in a particular 
society, there may be plenty of tales about people becoming overnight millionaires 
by trading stock. Even if the stories are true, they still sound like ‘fairy tales’ and 
don’t seem relevant to most people’s daily lives. Indeed, most people probably have 
never really seriously thought the stories could apply to themselves (interviewing 
data). However, stories of wealth accumulation would not sound like a ‘fairy tale’ 
but a ‘duplicable’ model, when the protagonists are, e.g., family members, friends, or 
colleagues. In the case of Mrs Kuo’s brother, he had told her about his decision to 
begin stock trading, using one of their uncles, who had earned a lot of money by 
trading stock, as his role model. This uncle had made enough money to buy a 
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property in central Taipei. His was an unusual but impressive story that took place 
before the stock market explosion of the 1980s. MrsKuo’s brother believed that he 
could copy this model and become as rich as their uncle. 
 Social relations could be an ‘introducer’ to lead potential investors into the 
world of the stock market, as mentioned above. However, if the ‘endorsers’ of the 
stock market have become wealthy through trading, then their persuasion would be 
even more convincing. Their achievements possibly inspire inexperienced people to 
try this new activity without hesitation. Ms Zeng, a retired civil servant, began stock 
trading 26 years ago. In her case, a neighbour was the ‘introducer’, who portrayed 
herself as a successful example when encouraging Ms Zeng to do stock trading. One 
day, her neighbour said directly to her, ‘You are too poor, so you have to do stock 
trading.’ At that time, her neighbour had purchased two houses with money made on 
the stock market. ‘I told her that I don’t know how to buy [stock],’ Ms Zeng says, ‘I 
didn’t know how it [stock trading] could make a profit.’ However, her neighbour’s 
achievement gave her courage. Following her neighbour’s suggestion, Ms Zeng 
mortgaged her house and used the money to trade stock.
 Approval from successful individual investors could strengthen novices’ 
confidence to engage in stock trading. In 1988, Sheng-Ji was an engineer in a large 
Taiwanese home appliance factory and had never before tried stock trading. His 
monthly salary was NT$30,000, which was pretty good at that time. However, he 
was not satisfied with his income and really wanted to change his status. He sought 
advice from his cousin, who was the same age but had earned NT$10 billion 
(approximately US$377 million). His cousin considered Sheng-Ji to be very smart 
and believed Sheng-Ji would have no problem making a profit from the stock market. 
After the discussion with his cousin, Sheng-Ji quit his job and engaged in stock 
trading. 
With the rapid growth of Taiwan’s stock market, more and more overnight 
millionaire stories are reported in newspapers and magazines and on the television. 
As noted above, most of these stories sound like fairy t les, not something that 
happens in real life, and thus don’t seem to convince the majority of their audience to 
begin stock trading (Wu 2005). However, the same stories make it much easier to 
lure people into the stock market when their acquaintances are successful traders. 
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 Even if the potential investor does not immediately follow their successful 
acquaintance into the market, they will still remember the success story. Mr He 
started trading stock when he began his first job. In fact, he had planned to 
participate in the stock market for years, ever since he had studied at graduate school: 
 
At that time in the past, when the VIA [a listed company] was the ‘king 
of shares’ [the highest price stock in the market], [the share price] was 
growing to over 600 dollars [NT$]; [it was in] our college period. I had a 
friend in the graduate school who had staked on the VIA since [his] time 
in college. The result was that he earned four years’ tuition fees. All 
[money] were taken back by that [that is, the person earned the same 
amount of money as the tuition fees by trading the VIA shares]. It seems 
incredible that [his] graduate school tuition fees were ‘sponsored’ by the 
VIA as well. 
 
Due to the shortage of trading capital, Mr He could not start trading stock at that time. 
However, the model set by his friend had inspired him, and he fulfilled this goal after 
he had saved up his trading capital. 
 In White’s discussion of social formations (2008: 20–34), social networks 
connect individuals, uniting them, and transform these interwoven individuals into 
structures. The stories meshed in social networks are a crucial mechanism of uniting 
various individuals’ dispositions and actions. In White’s view, sharing stories with 
other people is a way to ‘control’ other people, that is a way to make conformity 
between the individual’s ego and other people’s others. Narrative floating on an 
individual’s social networks has the power to orient this individual’s dispositions and 
actions. As the cases above indicate, successful storie  of stock trading from friends 
and relatives would easily motivate potential investors to start the same ‘activity’, i.e., 
trading stock. White’s study does not discuss the different degrees of the story’s 
effect. It can be conjectured that not all stories enmeshed in the social network have 
the same influence on individuals’ orientations. That is, the persuasive powers of the 
stories will not be equal. When the protagonist is an individual’s acquaintance, the 
story is expected to be more influential on that individual’s orientation. 
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2.2.3 Peer group 
 
 After Taiwan’s stock market boom of the late 1980s, ‘stock trading’ is no longer a 
strange activity to most Taiwanese people. Usually, they have a basic idea about the 
stock market, even if they have no practical experience or professional knowledge of 
it. A decline in the importance of ‘endorsers’ has been conjectured. Several market 
crashes probably have reminded people that the chance of becoming a millionaire 
overnight through stock trading is not huge. The lay investors who participated in the 
stock market over the past twenty years tend to have different ideas about stock 
trading (see Chapter 3). 
 However, social relations perhaps still influence people’s willingness to take 
part in stock trading. Many interviewees told me that they were involved in the stock 
market because their peer groups had been in the market. Mr Yang started to trade 
stock a short while after he retired from his positi n as a junior high school head. 
After retirement, he had a lot of spare time and felt a little bored. Some of his friends 
had traded stock for a while, so he thought it might be interesting to join them. 
 Employees, homemakers and students also tend to begin their stock trading 
because of their peer groups. For example, A-Zhen, a tea retailer, had saved money 
in order to purchase a flat, but she changed her mind and instead put the money into 
the stock market. The reason she gave is that her close friends were doing stock 
trading and she thought they could analyse the market nd trade stock together. 
 Sometimes influence from peer groups transforms into a kind of ‘peer 
pressure’. Mr Yan began stock trading when he was 22 years old, the year he entered 
postgraduate school, the top research institute for electrical and communication 
engineering in Taiwan. Most of Mr Yan’s classmates and seniors had gained their 
undergraduate degree from this school. In other words, they had known each other 
for years and had created their own ‘culture’. According to Mr Yan’s description, his 
‘pure-blood’ classmates, who had studied as both undergraduates and postgraduates 
in this school, were very confident. They thought temselves to be smart in 
everything, including stock trading and also had professional knowledge of IT and 
electrical manufacture, which could be used to analyse the IT and electrical 
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industries’ market cycles. Trading stock was a part of the school culture. ‘All [the 
students] in the postgraduate school were investing [ rading stock]’, Mr Yan says, 
‘All [the people] in the postgraduate school [and] in [my] office were buying stock.’ 
Mr Yan was one of a few students who had graduated from less prestigious 
universities. He had to work hard to integrate himself into the peer group, and thus it 
seemed better to join the same activity. The ‘culture’ shared by Mr Yan’s peer group 
in the postgraduate school pushed him to start stock rading immediately after 




Stock trading has spread all over in Taiwan over th past two decades, and probably 
has become a cross-generational social phenomenon. The younger generation 
possibly grow up in a society familiar with stock trading, and it has been practiced in 
many families for a period of time. All but one of the young lay investors 
interviewed have ‘investor parents’: twelve of the interviewees are under 35 year old 
and eleven of these people’ parents are lay investors as well. In some cases, not only 
their parents but also their siblings are involved in stock trading. Cong-Ying, a 
master’s student in sociology, engaged in stock trading in college. He describes the 
influence of his family: 
 
It [trading stock] happened naturally, because my family are ‘playing’ 
[trading stock]. Father and mother are ‘playing’ [stock]. Besides, my 
junior brother is studying finance in [his] postgradu te [and college]. It 
became three people at home are ‘touching’ [involved in stock trading] It 
would be [weird] … if I had not ‘touched’ it. [Being] influenced 
gradually, I [decided to] ‘play’ [stock] with them. 
 
      The investor parents could ‘recruit’ children to the stock market in a subtle and 
unintentional way. Through practising trading in daily life, stock trading possibly has 
become a component of family culture and has been ‘inherited’ by the children in 
these families. Observing their parents’ stock trading may be an initiation for the 
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younger generation to trade stock. In some cases, th  effect could be traced back to 
adolescence. Mr Liu started trading stock when he ent r d the college, but he had 
learned stock trading and analysed the market by himself when he was only a junior 
high school student. At that time, his father went to open a stock account attached to 
an online account. Mr Liu always saw his father browsing the stock-trading websites 
at home. ‘It looked very interesting,’ Mr Liu says, ‘ o I got involved in it.’ He joined 
internet forums about stock trading, bought stock-investing magazines, and watched 
stock analysis programmes on television. ‘Through these [channels], I partially 
understood some probably right or wrong theories [about stock trading],’ he says. 
Sometimes this kind of family culture succeeds in crossing three generations. 
Yi-Hong is a college-student investor. His mother is a homemaker investor who 
watches real-time stock market information on television at home every weekday. In 
his home, not only both his parents but also his grandfather are lay investors. He still 
remembers stock charts piled always on the top of his grandfather’s desk when he 
was a child. His grandfather had been a big player t that time, but lost almost all his 
money at once in a crash. After that, his grandfather as rarely touched stock. 
However, the trading culture still remains in his family. 
As well as the passive absorption of stock trading as part of family culture, 
some investor parents openly and actively encourage children to practice stock 
trading. Zhi-Chun started to trade stock when her occupation changed to being a 
cabin crew member, a job in which it is usual to have days off during the week. Her 
mother suggested Zhi-Chun take up stock trading. According to her mother, Zhi-
Chun’s spare time should not be wasted and stock trading would be a good use of 
that time. 
Assisting family members in handling stock accounts can also be a ‘lure’ to 
draw potential investors into the stock market. Two of my interviewees have had 
similar experience. For example, Mr Zhan opened a brokerage account, in his own 
name, for his mother; that is, ‘[T]he money was provided by a parent [his mother],’ 
he says, ‘the parent bought [stock through the account registered in his name].’ The 
reason for opening this account was information revealed by his uncle, who advised 
his relatives to buy his company shares soon. For Mr Zhan’s mother and other 
relatives, it seemed an assured opportunity to make a profit (the interviewee does not 
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explain the reason explicitly): ‘So, everybody bought the stock.’ However, Mr 
Zhan’s mother did not already have her own stock account and at the time, she was 
too busy to handle the ‘triviality’ of this trading, including going the brokerage firm 
to open an account and buying and selling the stock herself. Thus, Mr Zhan ‘had to’ 
be his mother’s ‘agent’. Namely, it was up to him to open the stock account, observe 
the share price’s movement, and trade the stock, though it was really his mother’s 
money, stock and profit. Trust between Mr Zhan and his mother was fundamental to 
this event. During the process of setting up and managing the account, he was 
generally ‘tempted’ into the stock market. After his mother took back the capital and 
profit, Mr Zhan kept the account open and started his ‘own’ stock trading. 
 Because of the trading culture, practices and encouragement of stock trading 
inside or ‘outside’ the family, it is taken for granted that the children will probably 
engage in stock trading. Ms Wu began stock trading when she first earned money 
from a part-time job. ‘[My] parents gave me moral support,’ she says. ‘They set an 
example.’ Moreover, the friends around her had traded stock for a while at that time. 
‘[In addition,] their [her parents’] friends are [trading stock] as well,’ she adds. This 
environment helped to formulate Ms Wu’s ideas about stock trading. One idea is that 
‘stock [trading] equates to “investment” [Taiwanese connotation]’. Another one is 
that ‘no matter early or late, stock trading is necessary to learn in everyone’s life.’ 
According to her understanding, ‘[if you want] to d “investment”, [you have] to 
learn [trading] stock first.’ 
 When stock trading becomes an everyday practice in some families, the 
trading culture is easy to construct and to transmit across generations. The people 
who grew up in individual-investor families are used to trading and take it for 
granted. Although the discussion is in a different context, Pierre Bourdieu’s 
argument regarding the reproduction of habitus and lifestyle within the family is 
helpful for further understanding of this issue. In Bourdieu’s studies of the 
inheritance of cross-generational lifestyles in each class (1984: 169–225) and the 
transmission of cultural capital (1986: 241–58), he emphasizes the importance of 
family. Family is key in transmitting culture, idea and practices between parents and 
children. In particular, during childhood, people ar  shaped by their habitus without 
awareness. When a worldview is constructed, the dispos tions and behaviours of the 
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actors would be taken for granted and not be reflect d upon. Through the process, 
tastes are formed and the distinction between different classes is displayed. Like the 
reproduction of habitus, stock trading can be argued as a ‘practice’ of ‘financial 




 Social networks can be a ‘bridge’ for lay people to enter the stock market; they also 
could be a ‘channel’ for them to learn the basic skills of stock trading. To do stock 
trading, it helps to have some basic analytical skils, such as fundamental and 
technical analyses. From the perspective of finance, technical analysis is 
conventionally considered a ‘pseudoscience’ (e.g., Malkiel 1996; Preda 2009a). 
However, in terms of Taiwan’s stock market, both professional practitioners (such as 
analysts) and lay people tend to think both fundamental and technical analyses are 
useful tools when analysing market trends (Interview data). 
Nowadays, it’s not difficult for a Taiwanese lay investor to learn basic stock 
trading skills. Hundreds of books, dozens of magazines, and several newspaper 
columns offer advice for lay investors who wish to teach themselves fundamental 
and technical analysis skills. In addition, stock analysis programmes on television 
and Internet websites, blogs and forums explain stock rading basic skills, and lay 
investors can also attend courses offered by educational institutions or brokerage 
companies to gain more professional knowledge of market analysis. As in many 
other countries, the diffusion of stock trading knowledge in Taiwan is developing 
with the growth of the stock market and the development of technology (Wu 2005; 
Siu 2008; Chien 2008; Preda 2009a). 
 However, for Taiwanese lay investors, personal social networks sometimes act 
as one of the channels to learn stock trading skills. In particular, in the earlier stage 
of the market’s explosion, learning materials and accessible channels had not been 
fully developed. In the case of Ms Zeng, her neighbour was not only the person who 
introduced her to the stock market but also taught her the ‘most’ basic idea of 
charting, that is, recording daily closure share prices. Ms Zeng remembers: 
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[S]he asked me to draw the lines [of share prices]. She said, ‘You studied 
in high school and I only graduated from elementary school. You have to 
draw it.’ [Her neighbour thought Ms Zeng had the ability to do it.] … In 
that time, temperature-recording sheets with small grids were often 
available in hospitals. I took temperature-recording [sheets to recording 
share prices] … Actually, I did not understand much [about charting]. I 
only drew one type [of chart]. Drawing, drawing, drawing. [When the 
prices reached] a very high [point], [I would] sell it [the shares] quickly. 
That was all. 
 
Shu-Ling is another example of someone drawn into stock trading through her social 
network. When she started to trade stock in 1990 with her mother, she was a 
complete novice. Her acquaintances in the brokerage office taught her the basic ideas 
of finance, for example, ‘how to evaluate the “reasonable” share prices by EPS 
(Earnings per share) or dividend’. In fact, knowledg  learned from acquaintances is 
usually very basic, because most ‘teachers’ are not professionals, but simply more 
‘experienced’ lay investors. After gaining more exprience, the newcomers may 
realize just how ‘basic’ is the level of knowledge they gained from their 
acquaintances. 
In the interview, Shu-Ling’s mother mocked this kind of ‘teaching’ as 
‘amateur-teaching-amateur’. Shu-Ling completely agrees with her mother, but she 
still admires these ‘non-professional teachers’ who helped her understand the world 
of ‘stock trading’ when she was a newcomer. Shu-Ling also emphasizes that the 
situation totally changed after several television channels focused on stock trading 
were set up, and nowadays, stock trading skills are often taught on television. As a 
result, learning ‘basic’ techniques of stock trading and finance has become much 
more convenient. ‘Just watch TV,’ Shu-Ling says. ‘On TV, some analysts would 
introduce charts,’ her mother supplements, ‘[If you] take time to study, [you] would 
understand.’ 
 With the increase in teach-yourself materials and the television channels, the 
function of learning stock trading skills through social networks seems to be mainly 
replaced. However, for some lay investors, social networks sometimes are not just a 
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channel to learn ‘basic’ skills but one to learn the ‘advanced’ skills or ‘tacit’ 
knowledge which is based on other people’s many years of practical experience in 
stock trading. As mentioned above, Mr Liu has taught himself many fundamental 
and technical analyses skills starting from when he was a junior high school student. 
However, a friend, who is an analyst in an investment bank and on a stock trading 
online forum, shared many ‘advanced’ trading techniques with him. The skills which 
he taught Mr Liu are based on a combination of professional knowledge and practical 
experience. To the present day, they have never met each other in person and only 
contact each other via emails and online messages. 
 Social relations may be a channel that helps lay investors learn market analysis 
skills, but sometimes also can be a factor that ‘allows’ lay investors to benefit from 
stock trading without necessarily learning stock trading skills. For example, Cong-
Ying has a brother who is an individual investor who studied finance in college and 
graduate school, and is very familiar with many fundamental and technical analyses 
skills. When Cong-Ying is interested in some company’s stock, he just asks his 
brother to ‘check the conditions’ of the stock (that is, analyse the company) for him. 
He has some basic ideas of stock trading, but has not had enough motivation to learn 
more advanced market analysis skills because he knows his brother will do it for him. 
 
2.4 Trading capital 
 
 Social networks have been considered as one way for individuals to raise funds for 
starting business enterprises. Compared to borrowing money from banks or raising 
fund in capital markets, the social network channel is very informal and the amount 
is usually not much. However, gaining capital through social networks tends to be 
easier, especially at the beginning of establishing a business (Granovetter 1973, 1983; 
Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). In this section, I examine two aspects of social 
networks for some Taiwanese lay investors looking to raise their stock trading capital. 
The first one is the transfer of stock trading capital between parents and children, 
while the other is to manage a stock trading ‘mutual’ fund funded by family 
members and/or friends. 
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2.4.1 Family and the original capital 
 
 In Bourdieu’s discussion of social class, economic capital is still the foundation of 
social stratification. A class’s cultural capital and social capital would convert to its 
economic capital in the end. In this system, family is the key fact of class inheritance. 
Family is not only the ‘mechanism’ to transmit ‘cultural capital’ (lifestyles) and 
social capital (social connections) from parents to children, but also the mechanism 
to directly transmit ‘economic capital’ (money) betw en generations (1986). 
Furthermore, in theories of social networks, embeddedness and social capital, the 
relations between family members are a kind of ‘strong tie’, belonging to 
individuals’ ‘social capital’. In general, economic resources tend to be accessible 
through personal strong ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983; Portes and Sensenbrenner 
1993; Lin 2001). 
 In terms of Taiwan’s stock market, family is the main provider of younger-
generation investors’ original trading capital. The situation is probably more 
common among student investors because of two reasons. First, it is not easy for 
them to save enough money while they are in college. Secondly, their parents usually 
are individual investors as well and therefore are inclined to support them to trade 
stock. I interviewed four Taiwanese student investors. All of their parents are lay 
investors and three of their families sponsored or loaned them part or all of their first 
trading funds. The stock trading culture inside their families perhaps made this 
‘natural’ occurrence. For example, Mr Liu, mentioned above, has studied stock 
trading since he was a junior high school student, due to his father’s influence. 
During his junior and high school period, Mr Liu often discussed stock trading with 
his father. When he entered college, his father accompanied him to a brokerage 
office to open an account into which he deposited NT$50,000 (US$1,700). His father 
directly told him that this money is lent to him solely for trading stock. After a period 
of time, he felt the money not enough and asked his father to lend him another 
50,000. Due to their many years of talking about stock trading, it seemed very 
‘natural’ for Mr Liu to ask his father to provide him the trading capital. 
Yi-Hong’s case is similar but a little different. At the end of his first year of 
college, Yi-Hong had the idea to engage in stock trading. However, he did not have 
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any capital and hesitated to tell his parents about his intentions. At that time, he 
wasn’t sure if his parents would support him. His he itation might have been a result 
of his grandfather’s huge loss in the stock market. It took Yi-Hong several months to 
confess to his parents. In order to convince them about his resolution and trading 
capability, for three months he had practiced simulated trading on paper, sharpening 
his ‘sense’ of the market. Only then, in a chat with his parents, he casually asked ‘Do 
you think it’s a good time to do some stock trading?’ The result was a little outside of 
his expectations: his parents’ attitudes were very positive. They immediately gave 
him a brokerage account which was owned by his father, but had not been used for a 
while. The account still had around NT$30,000 (around US$1,000), which he used as 
his original capital for stock trading. 
 To encourage their children to start stock trading, some investor parents 
provide them with their first trading capital, even if these children have been 
employed for a while and had a steady income. When Zhi-Chun’s mother 
encouraged her to do stock trading, she and her husband gave their daughter 
NT$100,000 (around US$3,350) as the starting capital. They wanted to give her not 
only moral but also economic support. 
 Ou-Yang’s case is somewhat similar to Mr Zhan’s. Ou-Yang’s mother 
deposited money in Ou-Yang’s bank account. Her mother asked her to use this 
money as the original capital to do some ‘investment’ (i cluding to do stock trading) 
for her. Although Ou-Yang had never studied business and finance, and her job was 
not connected to commerce, she is the closest person to her mother in the family. Ou-
Yang’s mother’s behaviour not only suggested that she trusted her daughter. The 
mother also apparently ‘implied’ that the main profit f the ‘investment’ could be 
freely used by Ou-Yang, if she was successful in stock trading. It meant that the 
mother provided the capital and took the risk of capital loss, but that her daughter 
would earn the profit. In other words, this was a ‘covert’ action of gifting money. 
However, Ou-Yang’s mother always claimed that Ou-Yang is only a helper for 
managing her wealth. Avoid Ou-Yang’s sister’s jealousy and any ‘potential’ tension 
between the sisters may be the reason for this. 
 
2.4.2 ‘Fund manager’ 
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 In Taiwan, raising capital from family members and close friends to establish 
businesses is not restricted to minority groups. Indeed, it is popular in the society and 
is one of the main sources of the establishing capital of some Taiwanese small to 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Notably, in some cases, a lay investor ‘passively’ 
accepts capital from relatives and is responsible for managing the fund. Usually the 
capital providers are people who desire to earn money from the stock market but are 
not confident stock traders. They entrust their savings to a skilled and reliable friend 
or relative to trade stock. The structure of this kind of fund is somewhat similar to the 
structure of a mutual fund, but it is much simpler, smaller and more informal. The 
role of fund manager is performed by a reliable lay investor. Ms Zeng played this 
role. In the late 1980s, she managed NT$12 million (around US$440,000) in the 
stock market. Her own capital was $3 million; another $6 million was from her two 
sisters, and the remaining $3 million was from a very close friend. Mrs Kuo also tells 
me a similar story. She is very close to her cousin, who had no idea how to do stock 
trading. Her cousin provided Mrs Kuo with capital and asked her to do stock trading 
for her. Mrs Kuo successfully stock traded, earning a profit and making her cousin 
very happy. 
 In general, the work doesn’t seem to be a desirable ‘job’. First, usually there is 
no formal contract or agreement between the capital roviders and the ‘manager’ 
entrusted with the capital, so disputes can easily break out. Secondly, the ‘manager’ 
probably suffers high pressure, because the money is from their close relatives or 
friends. If the ‘manager’ loses money in the market, the relationship between the 
‘manager’ and the capital providers may be damaged. Except for very close relatives 
or friends, people tend not to accept this kind of offer. Ms Huang’s friend once asked 
her to do this work, but she refused immediately. ‘If I did that,’ she says, ‘I would 




 For the financial industries, information is one of the most fundamental components. 
Without information, no financial market can operat. In some way, a financial 
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market is simply an assembly of market information (K orr Cetina and Bruegger 
2002; Preda 2009b). On the other hand, market information transmitted through 
personal social ties is one of the main interests in tudies of social networks and 
social capital, though the studies tend to focus on the job market (Lin 2001; 
Granovetter 2005).33 In terms of Taiwan’s stock market, as will be seen, lay investors 
are embedded in a net of information. Their social relations embody this net and 
work as a means to facilitate market information circulation. 
 The market information which Taiwanese lay investors ften gain from 
relatives, friends and acquaintances can be divided into three general categories. The 
first is xinwen (新聞, news), or zixun (資訊, general information/intelligence) of 
markets, industries, or listed companies. This sort of information is publicly available. 
The informant transmits this publicly available information which he/she knows to 
the information recipient in an interaction. The informant does not add personal 
comments to the information and the recipient could access the exact same 
information on their own, from the mass media. To exchange this sort of information 
between lay investors is very similar to chatting about news between friends or 
colleagues. 
 The second sort of information is jianyi ( 建 議 , suggestion) of trading 
strategies, or tuijian (推薦, recommendation) of stocks. This sort of information s 
based on the informant’s judgement of the future trends of companies, industries, or 
the market. The opinion stems from the informant’s analysis of the market trend or 
his/her interpretation of published information.  
 The third sort of information is xiaoxi (消息), which literally translates as 
‘information’ in English. In the context of Taiwan’s stock market, xiaoxi usually 
refers to the latest, or unpublished, unreleased, or unconfirmed information 
(sometimes simply rumours) of listed companies’ operations, industries, markets, 
government policies and market corners (for example, share-price-manipulation). 
The idea of xiaoxi is in some way similar to that of ‘insider information’, but with a 
much broader context. Due to the secretive character in the transmission of this sort 
                                                
33 It does not mean that the transmission of information on other markets has not been discussed. For 
example, Brian Uzzi (1999) discusses embeddedness and its effect on the access to lending 
information in the business capital market. 
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of information to some extent, personal social networks become the main channel to 
convey and receive this sort of information. 
 This classification is not the only taxonomy of market information of Taiwan’s 
stock market, though I argue it is an appropriate model to analyse features of lay 
investors’ social relations in the circulation of market information. For example, Wu 
(2005) categorizes information of Taiwan’s stock market into three types: 
informative information, market knowledge, and industrial knowledge. His argument 
is based on the idea that principally all market information is informative information 
and the information receiver would translate information into market or industrial 
knowledge. However, the features of different sorts f market information would not 
be revealed in Wu’s classification. 
In addition, Preda (2009b) provides a systematic taxonomy of market 
information. In his argument, relational information (e.g., gossip heard at a party) 
and transactional information (e.g., price) would be exchanged (or produced) when 
market actors encounter each other in the market (in transaction or in social 
interaction). Furthermore, economic and financial experts produce another type of 
information (epistemic objects) outside the market, .g., securities analysts’ 
comments on share price tendencies. However, Preda’s study focuses on the 
information which is produced or exchanged inside th market (relational and 
transactional information), or which is created by professional experts (epistemic 
objects). By contrast, the market information discussed here mainly refers to 
information which is circulated in lay investors’ social networks. Thus, the taxonomy 
of market information in this study is expected to complement Preda’s theory. 
  Though the three sorts of information – news, advice and xiaoxi – are all 
frequently received through lay investors’ social re ations, this section will only 
focus on the last two, because they stand out as the features of informational 
circulation in this information transmission mechanism. 
 Before moving on, I would like to take Mr Yan as an example of the 
circulation of xiaoxi in Taiwan’s stock market. He relied heavily on xiaoxi to trade 




2.5.1 Mr Yan’s story 
 
In [20]07, I knew Shan-Zhu. While I was in graduate school, my trading 
had not been successful. During that period [in graduate school], I was 
not good at buying stock. Shan-Zhu said [he would] help me. At that time, 
his girlfriend and the people around him all said ‘his investment [trading 
strategy] is not an easy way to make money’, so they had reservations. 
However, in that time, the items [shares] which he recommended … [He] 
seemed to [be able to] freeze water by words. What he said would be that 
[true]. Immediately, [my money] increased from more than [NT$] 5 
million [around US$150,000] to more than [NT$] 9 million [around 
US$280,000]. At best, it was over [NT$] 11 million. He was incredible. 
[Every time] I called [him] to ask which share is better, and then [the 
share price] would directly hit the limit-up [daily 7 per cent from the last-
trading-day closure price] on the second day. The situation had lasted 3–
4 months. During that time, I felt he was like a god. In the best situation, 
it could grow over four columns [reaching the daily l mit-up for more 
than four days]. I didn’t use margin buying at that time, just bought 
shares [with my own money]. BOM! BOM! BOM! [The money] 
increased by one million in a month. [It was] really incredible. Therefore, 
when entering the MT [a semiconductor company], I had [NT$] 9½ 
million cash. In the [end of the] second month in the MT, I had more than 
[NT$] 11 million, 11.73 million. I clearly remember. After that, it was 
constantly going down. When [the market was] dropping, Shan-Zhu[‘s 
information] was not reliable. He had his own trading strategy which was 
not suitable for everyone. However, I didn’t figure out it [at that time] … 
[I] lost money and wanted to earn the money back, so I bought stock on 
margin. [The strategy] was not right. The trend was turning to down. This 
[margin buying] made [the situation] worse. That was the first time I lost 
money [after I followed Shan-Zhu’s information]. I lost until the rest [of 
the money] was only [a little] more than 3 million … [In that period,] I 
only staked on only one stock [at a time]. All of them were obscure [not 
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well known], such as YungTay. During [20]07 to early [20]08, all [stocks] 
were obscure. Even if you tried to memorize [all of them], you could not. 
How could you know these [strange stocks]? Finally, [the amount of 
money was NT$] 3.38 million. [The digit] marks in mind. Only 338 left 
after selling all shares… After 338, I have not followed Shan-Zhu[’s 
information and suggestions]. I buy [stock] by myself. 
 
 Mr Yan’s story is not an unusual one. Similar plots are often heard from lay 
investors when they talk about some of their previous transactions based on xiaoxi, 
accessed through their social relations. Through analysing these cases, some 
common features of these stories are uncovered. These features suggest a typical 
model of Taiwanese lay investors’ trading by xiaoxi. The first characteristic is that 
lay investors usually do not know the sources of their informants’ information. 
 
2.5.2 Unknown sources of xiaoxi 
 
 The ‘original sources’ of xiaoxi are usually unknown to lay investors. In Mr Yan’s 
case, it was difficult to confirm the source of Shan-Zhu’s information. The 
information might have been his personal analysis of the market, but the share prices 
rose almost immediately after the information was given, so the information was 
more likely based on the information of the ongoing dahu’s share-price manipulation 
( corner plans). In Taiwan’s stock market, this sort of information is called ‘neixian 
xiaoxi’ (內線消息), usually shortened to ‘neixian’ (內線). Neixian could be literally 
translated as ‘insider information’ in English, but has other meanings.34 The official 
definition of ‘insider information’ from regulation is included in the idea of ‘neixian’, 
but ‘neixian’ in Taiwan’s stock market also includes the ‘information’ of share-price 
manipulation plans35  (as will be seen below) and ‘leaked’ information of the 
government’s future policies. Within Taiwanese lay investors’ social networks, these 
                                                
34 According to Paragraph 1, Article 157-1 of the Securities and Exchange Act (Taiwan), ‘insider 
information’ means ‘any information that will have a material impact on the price of the securities of 
the issuing company, after the information is precis , and prior to the public disclosure of such 
information or within 18 hours after its public disclosure’ 
(http://www.twse.com.tw/en/investor/insider_trading.php). 
35 In China’s stock markets and futures markets, corner events, manipulated by dahu, seem very 
common as well (Hertz 1998; Siu 2010). 
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three sorts of ‘insider information’ (neixian) are often circulated. However, their 
‘truthfulness’ is always difficult to prove. 
 Shan-Zhu did not seem to be a member of a share-pric  manipulation group 
(Shan-Zhu’s status will be mentioned later), so his ‘information’ probably came from 
someone else. Who was the person providing this ‘information’ to Shan-Zhu?’ From 
the beginning to the end, the ‘original source’ hadremained anonymous. 
 According to the interviews, when Taiwanese lay investors face this kind of 
situation –that is, to be given eixian from someone else – they rarely probe the 
information’s ‘original source’. They presume the ‘original source’ is a valuable 
secret of the informant’s and that they shouldn’t probe too deeply about it. 
Sometimes, lay investors tend to know the ‘original source’ of the information but 
their acquaintances fail, because even the informant may not know the original 
source of the information and only know their informant. Furthermore, when the 
neixian seems very ‘sensitive’ (that is, when the revelation of the information is 
possibly against relevant regulations), the information receivers are aware that they 
should not actively pursue the source’s identity. 
         On the other hand, knowledge about the original source is usually not important 
for information receivers. Investors tend focus on whether or not the information can 
help them make a profit; other questions usually don’t factor into their consideration. 
Ms Qiu is an example. She usually follows a friend’s information when trading stock: 
‘[About trading strategies,] namely, I just follow her [the friend] to purchase [stock]. 
In fact, I don’t spend much time reading about some things, such as fundamental data 
[of these listed companies].’ 
After Over the years, Ms Qiu has never asked her fri nd about her source of 
information. She assumes that her friend obtains the information because she 
‘seemingly knows some friends who play [a] “larger” [amount]’ (that is, they trade a 
large amount of money in the stock market). Zhi-Chun is another example. She often 
receives ‘useful’ trading information from her uncle. She has no idea who is the 
original source of her uncle’s information, but ‘all [information] is very useful’, she 
says. ‘So I think this thing [the way information is transmitted] must be that dahu 
know [the information first] and then [they] reveal it to some xiaohu [small players, 
sanhu] who have some guanxi [social relation/connections with them, like her 
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uncle].’ In Wu’s (2005: 138) study of the mechanism of informational transmission 
in Taiwan’s stock market, he also argues that market information (which is not 
specified) is transmitted/flows in one direction, from dahu to sanhu. 
 
2.5.3 The reliable informant 
 
 In an ideal situation, the information receiver would be able to acknowledge the 
‘original source’ of information and then to judge the information’s accuracy 
according to the credibility of the ‘original source’. For example, if the informant 
says ‘the information originates from a high-level staff of a listed company’, the 
information would seem more reliable than if the informant had said ‘the information 
originates from another lay investor.’ However, in reality, acknowledging the 
‘original source’ is not easy. 
 If the ‘original source’ is usually unknown, how can the information receiver 
have confidence in the information and rely on it when making a transaction? The 
answer is the expected one: ‘they trust the informant.’ But what is the foundation of 
the trust between the information receivers and providers? According to the 
interviews, this kind of ‘trust’ mainly based on two elements: the relationship 
between the information receiver and provider, and the ‘status’ of the information 
provider. 
 Having a close relation with the informant would increase an information 
receivers’ confidence in their informant’s advice. People are inclined to think that 
friends or relatives would not deliberately relay ‘fake’ information to them, so people 
tend to trust the information’s authenticity if it is provided by friends or relatives. 
Similarly, the tendency of trusting relatives’ or fiends’ neixian exists among 
Taiwanese lay investors. For example, Ms Qiu’s informant is her friend and Zhi-
Chun’s informant is her uncle. Informants and information receivers are linked by 
strong social ties. 
 The case of Mr Yan seems somewhat unusual, because he followed Shan-
Zhu’s information to trade stock even though he had known Shan-Zhu for just a short 
while. However, Shan-Zhu is a mutual friend of three of Mr Yan’s close friends. 
Before they met in person, Mr Yan had heard Shan-Zhu’s name mentioned many 
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times over the years and knew that his three friends trusted him. Mr Yan naturally 
extended his trust of his friends to that of Shan-Zhu. This kind of trust-extension is 
not unusual. The extension of strong ties and trust ha  been discussed (Granovetter 
1973). An individual’s close friend’s close friend is likely to be this individual’s 
friend, because it would be helpful to maintain thebalance of social interactions 
between these people. 
 The ‘status’ of the informant also affects the information receiver’s trust of the 
informant. Shan-Zhu’s professional qualifications were another factor which 
underpinned Mr Yan’s trust in him. Shan-Zhu is a securities analyst with a master’s 
degree in finance from a top university. To Mr Yan’s mind, it was reasonable to 
believe that Shan-Zhu could provide him with correct information, because Shan-
Zhu works in the securities industry and therefore p obably has guanxi (social 
connection) with dahu and managers of listed companies and can get neixian from 
them. 
 Ms Zeng’s informant is another example. In Ms Zheng’s interview, she insists 
that she always chose stock based on her own judgement and had not followed other 
people’s neixian. However, she also admits that she had benefited from information 
provided by her son’s ganba (乾爸, roughly equivalent to a ‘godfather’ in Western 
countries). At that time, her son’s ganba was working in the Ministry of Finance. 
The ganba seems a typical neixian provider, having a close relation with the 
information receiver and working in a related ‘industry’. 
Besides professional links, the ‘status’ of an informant could be based on their 
‘social position’ in the market, for example, their position as a dahu.36 Mrs Kuo 
experienced what is usually regarded as the ‘darkest’ time in the Taiwan stock 
market’s history, the incident of ‘the proposal of restoring capital gain tax from 
securities trading’. In September 1988, Financial Minister Kuo, Wan-Rong 
announced that the government would restore capital gains tax for securities trading 
                                                
36 Dahu (big players/‘big’ individual investors) tend to have a higher status among lay investors. The 
original reason probably is that they control a huge amount of trading capital (more than most 
individual investors), which is the literary meaning of dahu. However, there are other factors which 
perhaps facilitate dahu to occupy a higher social position in the market. First, dahu usually access 
information more rapidly than other individual investors (Wu 2005). Secondly, in China’s stock 
markets, dahu are usually believed to have better trading skills (Hertz 1998). In interviews, some lay 
investors sometimes use ‘dahu’ to refer institutional investors as well, probably ecause institutional 
investors have met the criteria of dahu in aspects of capital, information and skills. 
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in the following year. After the announcement, share prices in Taiwan’s stock market 
continued to fall for 19 days and thousands of investors demonstrated against this 
new ruling. Finally, the government was forced to withdraw the plan. Hours before 
the announcement, Mrs Kuo got a call in the middle of the trading hours: 
 
A daka [大咖, an important person, meaning ‘dahu’ in this context] told 
me, ‘run out [and sell] half [of the shares] first. Something’s already 
[happened].’ [I thought] can any important incident happen? [The worst 
incident was when] the US severed the diplomatic relations with R.O.C. 
[Taiwan], but [the relations] had been severed [in 1979]. Can it [the 
relations between the US and Taiwan] be [broken up] again? … [It is 
definitely] impossible. [However,] I said ‘ok, ok, ok,’ [on the phone]. I 
immediately went to clear [sell shares] at that time. 
 
According to the conversation, even the informant himself was not sure how the 
market would react after the policy announcement. In hat time, Mrs Kuo had no idea 
of the reason, the context and the ‘original source’ of the information. However, she 
still followed the advice to make a crucial decision, selling half of her holding shares 
immediately without concern for the price. Her trus in this person, a familiar dahu, 
overcame any suspicion in her mind. 
 Preda (2009b) argues that ‘charismatic trust’ is the foundation of the type of 
market which is constituted of status groups, and the credibility of the information is 
determined by the informer’s status in the market structure. On the other hand, in the 
network-structural market, relational trust, highly based on ‘knowledge of the 
person’, supports the reliability of the information. In this case, the credibility of 
neixian is determined by both the ‘status’ and ‘familiarity’ of the informant. Social 
status has its influence on the informational network. 
 
2.5.4 The uncertainty of neixian 
  
 Before a transaction, the intimacy with and status of the informant are the 
‘credentials’ (or probably the only available information) for the information receiver 
 69 
to evaluate the information’s credibility. After foll wing the same informant’s 
neixian trading advice several times, the information’s accuracy would be the third 
criterion to evaluate the reliability of the informant’s information. In Wu’s study of 
Taiwan’s stock market (2005: 84), he mentions some dahu using money to ‘test’ the 
reliability of each informant. To ‘test’ means to fllow all neixian to trade and then 
to figure out which informants are more reliable. Due to the limit of capital, it is not 
feasible for most lay investors to test all neixian which they have received. 
 Indeed, neixian always remains to some extent uncertain. Even information 
from a long-term reliable informant can be wrong sometimes. In the case of Mr Yan, 
the neixian provided by Shan-Zhu (a trusted informant), had been perfectly accurate 
in the first few months until it turned wrong. In general, the majority of the 
interviewees agree neixian could be very useful for them to do stock trading, but 
many of them also are cautious about neixian. Inaccurate neixian sometimes would 
incur a huge loss for the information follower. For example, both Mrs Kuo and Ms 
Zeng mention some of their friends were ‘tripped up’ in the market due to inaccurate 
neixian. A number of other interviewees also tell me that ey have heard this type of 
story from their social ties. Overall, the structure of all these stories is quite similar. 
The common theme that they share is that ‘the informant only calls the follower to 
hop on the bus, but the informant never reminds the follower when to hop off the 
bus.’ Based on the interviewing data, here I attempt to relate a typical unsuccessful 
neixian-trading story. 
 
 Lay investor A got neixian from friend B, who said, ‘Friend C reveals 
neixian to me that some ‘powerful market participants’37 are going to 
corner XXX. It’s a great time to purchase shares in XXX.’ After A 
purchased some, the share price rose for several days, but then, the price 
started to dip a little. A thought the slight fall was temporary and 
continued to hold their shares. A few days later, however, the share price 
sharply dropped, and continued to do so. A was aware that the situation 
seemed problematic and called B right away. It would be then that A
might find B had already sold his shares but did not inform A, or that B 
                                                
37 Several different powerful market participants are m ntioned in the interviews, dahu being one of 
the typical figures. 
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was trapped in the market as well. No matter which s tuation, A had been 
‘tripped up’. 
 
 Sometimes, when neixian becomes ‘faulty’, it does mean that the informant 
attempted to ‘cheat’ the receiver, or intentionally feed ‘incomplete’ information to 
the receiver. A familiar waiwei (外圍, a member of a ‘corner’ group; see below) 
even told Mrs Kuo about some details of corner events which he and others had done 
together. The waiwei confessed that not every corner was successful. Sometimes, 
even when they had thrown in a huge amount of money to raise the share prices, they 
still could not reverse the market’s dropping trend. They called this ‘the power of the 
market’. One failed case led to the waiwei losing a tremendous amount of wealth, 
much higher than what he had earned by corner. 
For lay investors, to trace powerful market participants’ corners could be a 
trading strategy. Mr Liu has constructed for himself a typical mental model of a 
market corner. In general, the model is mainly consistent with Mrs Kuo’s story. 
Using the relevant information from Mrs Kuo and Mr Liu, a rough picture of corner 
in Taiwan’s stock market is introduced here. 
 Usually a joint group of powerful market participants choose a small company 
as the ‘target’, and would incorporate with the company’s main shareholder. A small 
company does not have many shares in the public market nd is easier for the corner 
group to manipulate the price. Members of a typical corner group includes zhuli (主
力, head) who conducts the corner, the waiwei (外圍, outsider) who provides capital 
to the zhuli, gongsi (公司, company) who is the company’s main shareholder and 
provide the shares to the zhuli. They often successfully manipulate the company’s 
share prices when the market remains ‘stable’. However, if the market trend changes, 
the ‘artificial’ price can be broken easily, which may explain Mr Yan’s experience, 
that is, why the neixian became inaccurate when the market trend reversed. 
 Due to the unpredictability of corner, some lay investors still hesitate to 
follow this kind of neixian to do trading, even if the neixian is provided by a reliable 




[When] a person told us [the neixian about Tang-Feng], [the share price] 
was over 90 dollars [per share] at that time. We [Shu-Lin and her mother] 
said, ‘This stock [company] does not earn much money. [It is too 
unreasonable to] be over 90 dollars, [because it] only earned one to two 
dollars [last year EPS].’ [Then] it grew to over 200 dollars ‘to show you’ 
[to surprise you]. Later, it was warned [by the Taiw n Stock Exchange]. 
Later, the transaction [in Tang-Feng shares] was suspended.  
 
The price of Tang-Feng quickly increased, from 39.25 dollars per share to 238.50 
dollars in two months. The regulator noticed the abnormal share price rise and 
investigated. In the end, a manipulator (zhuli), a capital provider (waiwei) and the 
director and several managers of Tang-Feng (gongsi) were prosecuted. Some of them 
had admitted the increase of Tang-Feng’s share price in two months was actually 
manipulated by them by making fake transactions and revealing false information 
(CAN News 10/02/201238). This was a recently disclosed corner event in Taiwan’s 
stock market.  
 
2.5.5 Unprovability of neixian 
 
 In many Taiwanese lay investors’ understanding, the category of ‘xiaoxi’ includes 
not only valuable ‘neixian xiaoxi’ (insider information) but also other ‘valueless’ 
information. Generally, information can be considered ‘valueless’ for many reasons, 
for example, it might be out of date. Regarding xiaoxi in the stock market, the credit 
of the informant would mainly decide the ‘value’ of the information. The information 
provided by an ‘unreliable’ informant is usually called ‘malu xiaoxi’ (馬路消息, 
‘road information’), ‘xiaodao xiaoxi’ (小道消息, ‘path information’) or ‘caishichang 
xiaoxi’ (菜市場消息, ‘food market information’) in Taiwan. These are pjorative 
terms which literally mean the information is gained from a person met on a road, on 
a path, or in a food market. According to the interviewees, this type of information is 
                                                
38 Available at: 
<http://tw.news.yahoo.com/%E6%B6%89%E7%82%92%E8%82%A1 E7%8D%B2%E5%88%A9-
%E5%8F%A4%E8%91%A3%E5%BC%B5%E5%88%A49%E5%B9%B4-10567 27.html> 
(accessed on 16 July 2012). 
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almost equal to rumour and is clearly distinguished from neixian xiaoxi. Casual 
acquaintances, such as some acquaintances known in brokerage offices, are a main 
source of this sort of information. Unreliable information seems to flood through lay 
investors’ social networks. Lay investors must train themselves to ‘automatically’ 
filter out these types of xiaoxi and not give them serious consideration. 
 However, when the ‘original source’ of the information is unknown, the 
distinction between ‘reliable’ and ‘unreliable’ neixian is always tricky and subjective. 
Some neixian is easy to prove, for example, leaked government’s fu ure policies or 
companies’ unpublished financial reports. After the official announcement is 
released, the information receivers can confirm the ‘accuracy’ of the neixian. On the 
other hand, the ‘accuracy’ of some types of neixian is difficult to confirm. For 
example, the information is about a stock has been chose as the target of corner. 
With the exception of a few cases which have been investigated by the regulator, 
such as the case of Tang-Feng, most information about corners cannot be confirmed. 
Except members of the corner group, the public (such as lay investors, journalists 
and securities analysts) only can ‘guess’ at possible manipulation by abnormal 
changes of share prices. 
 However, even if the information about corners is ‘true’, it may be ‘incorrect’. 
Some corner groups may attempt to raise share prices, but theyfail and thus the 
information looks like a ‘false’ information due to the fall of share prices. By 
contrast, even if the information is not ‘true’ (no one is intentionally raising the share 
price in reality), the information may look ‘correct’ due to the rise of the share price. 
In the market, many reasons besides intentional manipulation can make share prices 
rise. When the ‘original source’ of the information is unknown, it is always difficult 
to prove the performance of this share price is really the result of a ‘secret’ corner or 
not.39 
To disperse ‘inaccuracy’ xiaoxi would damage the ‘insiders’ influence in the 
market. However, the vague, fuzzy and imprecise nature of some of the neixian is 
conjectured to open the space for the reliable insider  to justify the inconsistency 
between the market trend and the information. As a result, the neixian informants 
would be allowed to sustain their reputation and defend their positions within the 
                                                
39 Some individual investors, for example, Mr Liu, claim they are able to tell whether the share price 
is manipulated by dahu or not by some technical analysis indices. 
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hierarchy. The unprovability of the neixian may ironically encourage some of the 
insiders to actively offer neixian.  
 Similarly, the ‘unprovable’ market information could be tricky for research. 
For example, Hertz (1998:174–87) discusses a ‘corner’  from the Chinese 
government in the Shanghai stock market. She claims the Chinese government was 
willing to raise the share-prices index level by means of secret interventions. 
However, in the end, the government failed due to the overwhelming power of the 
market. The argument probably is based on the unofficial information which was 
widely circulated among lay investors at that time. The trick is that it is difficult to 
prove that the fluctuating share-prices index level in that time was ‘really’ a result of 
the government’s price-manipulation. If it was a ‘secret’ manipulation, how could the 
public confirm with certainty the fact that manipulation had occurred? From some 
aspects, this kind of information is similar to the ‘r asonable interpretation’ of 
change in share prices. 
 
2.5.6 Trading suggestions and recommendations 
 
 Besides xiaoxi, trading suggestions and recommendations of stocks (jianyi and 
tuijian) are another type of information which is widely circulated amongst lay 
investors’ social networks. Taiwanese lay investors a e used to gaining trading 
advice from family members, friends and acquaintances, because many of them are 
also lay investors and have their own trading experience. Unlike xiaoxi, the 
suggestions stem from these ‘non-professional advisers’ understandings of the 
market. The understanding is usually based on, say, one adviser’s market analysis, 
and then comments provided by other people (such as securities analysts, brokers, 
journalists, or the person’s friends, relatives, or acquaintances), or a combination of 
all of these. When lay investors evaluate these suggestions’ credibility, a close 
relationship between the advisers and themselves is not crucial. It is the ‘expertise’ of 
the non-professional advisers that is the priority. For example, Ou-Yang often 
follows her postgraduate-school classmate’s suggestions when trading stock and 
hence makes profit. ‘I think he probably knows [the market] better,’ she says, ‘he 
probably has much more knowledge of industries rather t an I.’ 
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 However, a lay investor may receive an overabundance of trading suggestions 
through their social network, but the trading suggestions – very similar to malu 
xiaoxi, xiaodao xiaoxi and caishichang xiaoxi – provided by unreliable advisers are 
usually filtered out ‘automatically’ by the listener. For example, Mr Yang admits that 
he is used to ignoring most friends’ suggestions: 
 
Some friends are not really reliable. Probably they are not experts [in 
stock trading]. [They] make [the suggestions] ‘unseriously’ [casually] 
and [I] listen [them] ‘unseriously’. [My investment will] go to pot [if I] 
‘jump in’ (follow their suggestions). [I know] many people[‘s investment 
went to pot due to] this reason. 
 
Only two friends’ suggestions are considered by Mr Yang: ‘They also graduated 
from university [as Mr. Yang], [they studied in the] department of finance, [their] 
levels are higher.’ 
Suggestions from friends, relatives, or acquaintances who have different 
‘principles’ of stock trading – that is, trading model/strategies, and preferences for 
certain types of stocks – tend to be filtered out by he listeners as well. Each investor 
has their own ‘principle’ of stock trading, for example, some investors tend to trade 
in stocks with volatile price changes and they only hold the stocks overnight. The 
trading suggestion is ‘meaningless’ for a person who is used to trading according to a 
different principle. Ms Hong explains the reason: 
 
Everyone’s principle is different. Everyone prefers different [types of] 
stocks. When he [the adviser] makes his [comments], you [Ms Hong 
refers to herself] just listen ‘unseriously’ [casually]. Because you are not 
familiar with [the adviser’s recommended stocks], you would not really 
‘do it’ [buy the stocks]. 
  
Trading suggestions and lists of ‘recommended’ stocks are not provided only by lay 
investors’ social ties. Nowadays, this type of information is almost available 
everywhere in Taiwan’s stock market. Financial companies, television programmes, 
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websites, newspapers and magazines frequently update their lists of recommended 
stocks, which are provided by professional securities analysts. The suggestions from 
these analysts are regarded as more ‘professional’ than those from other lay investors. 
Most interviewees agree that suggestions from friends, relatives and acquaintances 
are not expected to be as professional as those from securities analysts, but they 
usually still give the former some attention. ‘[When a friend] makes [suggestions] 
certainly,’ Shu-Ling says, ‘we [Shu-Ling and her mother] feel [that we] should “look 
at” [the stocks].’ By ‘look at’, Shu-Ling means she spends some time analysing the 
companies and the share prices. Mr Zhang describes h s practice in this situation: 
 
I sometimes pay a little attention to other people’s ‘xiaoxi’ [means                    
‘suggestions’ here]. Then [I would] think whether [it] is really worth it to 
invest (buy). [I would] see [check] the historical data [of the company] and 
how the fundamental dimension is [what conditions the company is in]. 
 
In his interview, Mr Chen also indicates a similar p ttern. After hearing a suggestion 
from friends and relatives, he would use his technial analysis skills to ‘trace’ the 
changes in the suggested company’s share price. In Taiwan’s stock market, there are 
over a thousand listed companies. It is nearly impossible for a lay investor to analyse 
all these companies and then find out the proper trading targets. For these people, 
recommendations from friends, relatives and acquaintances act like a ‘preliminary’ 
selection of stocks from the ‘pool’. Indeed, many la investors tell me that they are 
used to carry out the same ‘examination’ on stocks recommended by professional 




The role of the broker is very special in Taiwanese lay investors’ social relations. 
The ‘social distance’ between brokers and individual investors can be as close as that 
of friends, or as far as unfamiliar acquaintances. Brokers are the staff in brokerage 
companies who handle opening accounts and placing trading orders for investors. 
From a business perspective, the relation between brokers and investors is similar to 
 76 
that between sellers and clients. A broker ‘automatically’ enters an individual 
investor’s social network when that person begins to trade stock. Whether close to 
their clients or not, it is necessary for brokers to maintain at least a ‘reasonable’ 
relation with them. Otherwise the brokers may be dismissed by their clients one day 
(see Chapter 5). 
 Brokers’ main source of income from share trading fees. Theoretically, they 
have the incentive to given xiaoxi and suggestions to lay investors in order to 
encourage them to trade stock more frequently. In particular, brokers are professional 
practitioners of the securities industry, and thus are usually expected to be more 
professional than their clients’ lay-investor friends or relatives. Particularly, the 
production of xiaoxi (including neixian) also suits the interest of the brokerage 
industry.  
It is illegal for brokers without securities analyst qualifications to provide 
trading information to clients. Securities analysts’ income is generally higher than 
that of brokers in Taiwan, so few people with qualifications are willing to act solely 
as a broker. However, according to the interview with Mrs Kuo, brokers were 
accustomed to providing xiaoxi and suggestions to clients in the past. After market 
regulation became more stringent, the situation has apparently changed, but the 
practice is not entirely extinct. Nowadays, some broke s still occasionally provide 
their clients something resembling trading suggestion . The interaction between Ms. 
Lin and her broker is an example. 
 
[I have been] friends with our broker … They [he] is not irresponsible to 
give [me] xiaoxi. [He] does not tell you what to do. However, if [my 
trading] decision deviates from the market [trend] a lot, he would analyse 
[explain the situation] to you. [He] tells you the g neral situation [of the 
market]. 
 
This is also why Zhi-Chun prefers to place trading orders by telephone rather than 
via the Internet. She once received a ‘warning’ from her broker over the phone when 
her order seemed obviously to be going against the market trend. Due to the warning, 
she did not make a ‘bad’ trading decision. 
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However, not all brokers’ suggestions are welcome. Ms Qiu is annoyed with 
her broker, who often tells her some n ixian. However, she always ignores his x aoxi 
and suggestions. ‘First, [the information is] not accurate,’ she complains, ‘secondly, I 
don’t like his attitude.’ She implies that she will probably change her broker in the 
future. Some lay investors, such as Mr Chang, rarely interact with their brokers, 
because they do not like their trading decisions to be influenced by their brokers’ 
opinions.  
 
2.5.8 Information and actively trading 
 
Overall, these three different types of market information – news and general 
information, neixian xiaoxi, and trading suggestions – are often received by 
Taiwanese lay investors from social relations – family members, friends, and 
acquaintances. Furthermore, the majority of these social ties (information providers) 
are lay investors as well. Regardless of the quality of the information (whether useful 
or worthless), the amount of information circulated in lay investors’ social networks 
is apparently huge. 
An important impact of the flood of information probably is to boost the 
trading frequency of lay investors and also offer them a motivation (or ‘a confidence’) 
to continue to trade in a disadvantage environment. In general, lay investors 
underpeform large institutional investors in Taiwan’s stock market, and most of lay 
investors seemingly clearly acknowledge the overwhelming power of institutional 
investors (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 4). However, th y are still inclined to enter the 
market and trade actively. 
According to Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean’s (2007, 2008) study, this paradox is 
partially accounted for by the combination of psychological biases: overconfidence 
and sensation seeking. They argue the high level of overconfidence in Taiwan, which 
is estimated to nearly double to the same measurement in the US, contribute to much 
of excessive trading of lay investors in Taiwan (the annual turnover rates for the 
group of lay investors are estimated between 308% and 630% from 1995 to 1990). 
The answer is helpful to understand the activeness of lay investors but still not 
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sufficient, because they do not explain that which factors may facilitate lay investors 
in Taiwan to continuously sustain overconfidence at a higher level.  
The market information, which is intensively fed by la  investors’ social ties, is 
expected to play a role here. The n ixian, which is offered by reliable insiders, is 
probable to give lay traders the impression that they ave market advantage. The 
xiaoxi and suggestions, which is frequently talked in lay investors’ everyday social 
interactions, are probable to give lay investors the impression that they have 
knowledge of the market, industries and companies. The confidence of lay investors 
in Taiwan is probable to be spurred by this large amount of information, and lay 
investors’ social networks are the structure of the mechanism.  
Furthermore, a tendency of keeping silence over losses might strengthen the 
confidence. Although lay investors are used to share their trading experience with 
and give market information to their friends, relatives and acquaintances, many of 
them tend to avoid talking about their personal losses straightforwardly. As will be 
seen in Section 6.4, to ‘save face’ in front of close ties is a main concern. When the 
information about losses is only occasionally circulated in lay investors’ social 
networks, the difficulties of making profits by trading might be underestimated.   
     
2.6 Stock trading as ‘social activity’ 
 
Among Taiwanese lay investors, transmission of market information is rarely ‘one 
way’ only. Ostensibly, talk about stock trading betw en lay investors is a kind of 
‘information exchange’. However, for the participants, they may not expect to either 
hear or provide any useful market information; for them, joining this kind of 
discussion is not only to participate in information exchange but also a ‘social 
activity. In other words, ‘maintaining social relations’ is a reason to have this kind of 
talking. 
 Furthermore, due to engaging in the same ‘social ativity’ (stock trading), two 
unacquainted individual investors possibly have found a common topic for 
discussion and then become familiar with each other and build their social 
connections. In addition, in stock trading discussion, the topics are selected 
depending on the relation. Having a close relation o each other does not mean they 
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will have an intimate conversation. For example, at times, some lay investors will 
deliberately avoid some ‘sensitive’ topics when they talk about stock trading with 
their family members, as opposed to discussions with friends. 
 
2.6.1 Maintenance of social relations 
 
As mentioned above, the number of individual investors in Taiwanese society is very 
impressive. Ms Hong, one of the interviewees, uses th  term quanmin yundong (全民
運動, a movement for all people) to describe stock trading’s popularity in Taiwan. 
She thinks it is necessary to know how the stock market works, and to be able to talk 
about it. ‘Otherwise’, she says, ‘you cannot take part in other people’s discussions.’ 
Indeed, stock trading seems to be one of the most common discussion topics among 
those Taiwanese who participate in the stock market. Mr Yan says, ‘Everyone 
[around me] likes to chat about [stock trading].’ He has an explanation for the 
popularity of this discussion topic among his friends and relatives: he thinks the 
average income of Taiwanese ‘salarymen’ (white-collar workers) is too low and 
many of them are looking for an alternative way to accumulate wealth. Stock trading 
is one way to do that, so it is a popular topic for discussion. 
 Even if people usually have their own principles for stock trading, talking 
about trading and exchanging ideas seem to be common practice for many lay 
investors. For example, Mr He often discusses the sock market with friends who 
have different ideas about trading: 
 
Everyone has different opinions of [stock] ‘investment’ [trading]. Having 
a talk [is still not bad]. For example, other people may have ideas which I 
had never thought of before. [Such as] the xiaoxi which they pay 
attention to or some dimension … I might neglect either. Those [ideas] 
could be [used as] the basis of comparison. 
 
 Due to the large number of individual investors in Taiwan, it may happen quite often 
that a lay investor encounters an old friend and they find out that they each are 
involved in stock trading. Mr Zhan’s experience is an example. He encountered a 
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college friend at the architect’s qualification examination and by chance realized that 
both of them were doing stock trading. His friend excitedly told him a lot about his 
own ‘theory’ of stock trading. Since they’ve re-established contact, they sometimes 
exchange ideas about the market. 
 Talking about the stock market with friends and relatives tends to be very 
casual and relaxed. Ou-Yong uses the word ‘popomama’ ( 婆 婆 媽 媽 ) as the 
metaphor to describe the feeling of discussing stock rading with friends and relatives. 
Popo literally means ‘the mother of one’s husband’,40 while mama literally means 
‘mother’. Popomama usually means to be ‘fussy’ or ‘emotional’, and carries a 
stereotypically female association. In this context, Ou-Yong means that stock trading 
discussion amongst family and friends is equivalent to ‘women’s gossip’: 
 
You can do some research [about the market and talk about it]; or to [tell] 
some xiaodao xiaoxi. That feeling is really similar to everyone [in] 
popomama. Everyone tells you a ‘mingpai’ 41 [‘a recommended stock’ or 
stock tip] today. Then, everyone exchanges information and maintains 
relations. 
 
 Providing market information can also be a way to express friends’ care for each 
other. When some of Ms Huang’s schoolfriends, who are experienced individual 
investors, found out she had just started stock trading, they worried about her 
performance, because she was a newcomer. They often sent her emails about market 
information. Although Ms Huang does not think the information has ever been 
helpful, the emails represent her friends’ care for her. 
 In some investors’ families, talking about stock trading can be a regular social 
activity between family members and relatives. For example, Zhi-Chun talks about 
market information with her grandmother, uncle and mother when they have a meal 
                                                
40 In Chinese, ‘the mother of one’s wife’ is called ‘yuemu’ or ‘zhangmuniang’. In English, popo, 
yuemu or zhangmuniang is called ‘mother in law’. 
41 Mingpai (明牌) cannot be literally translated into English. This term originates from lotteries. 
Originally, to tell you mingpai means to tell you the exactly drawn numbers of a lottery in prior. The 
information of the drawn numbers is surely profitable information. In the sphere of Taiwan’s stock 
market, it means to recommend you a stock and you will surely make profit by purchasing this stock. 
The content of mingpai sometimes is simple and only contains the titles of companies. 
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together, and they also often chat about trading by MSN messages or phone. ‘When 
we have time,‘ she says, ‘[we] form a discussion group [on the MSN].’ She considers 
discussing stock trading has become one of the activities which facilitate frequent 
contacts between the family members. 
 A number of studies have pointed out financial market participants tend to 
exchange market information when they encounter each other in the market (e.g., 
when they are making a transaction) and this type of social interactions is thought to 
facilitate the maintenance of social relations which are an element of the market 
structure (e.g., Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002; Preda 2009b). In Taiwan, the stock 
exchange itself is an anonymous market and there is no direct interaction between 
trading partners in transactions. However, exchanging stock market information has 
become a regular form of social interaction in many lay people’s daily lives. Thus, it 
is not only an example that social relations help individuals in their market activities, 
but also that market activities enhance many individuals’ social solidarity. 
 
2.6.2 Extension of social relations 
 
 Participating in stock trading, or talking about it with friends, relatives and 
acquaintances is perhaps similar to joining a ‘social activity’ sometimes, and is 
helpful in maintaining a lay investor’s existing social relations, as well as extending 
their social network. The situation occurs often in brokerage offices, according to the 
interviews and observations. A brokerage office is one of the main ‘places’ where lay 
investors who are strangers meet each other42. The ‘consumption of time of meeting 
each other’ is a key factor for developing social relations between people 
(Granovetter 1973, 1983). If people frequently visit a place and stay there for a while 
each time, it would not be unusual that some of these people begin to chat with other 
people sitting nearby and become acquainted, especially because they have a 
common discussion topic: the stock market. Thus, with the passage of time, it is 
natural that some of these acquainted people become friends. 
                                                
42 In Taiwan, a brokerage office is a kind of the ‘embodiment’ of the stock market. All trading orders 
need to travel through the computer of each brokerage office to the central computer of each 
brokerage company, then to the Taiwan Stock Exchange fi ally. A typical brokerage office in Taiwan 
provides a hall with chairs, screens with real-time arket information and water or tea to individual 
investors (See Chapter 5). 
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 Brokerage offices are a place where social connections among lay investors 
proliferate. Both Sheng-Ji and Mrs Kuo are lay investors who are accustomed to 
trading stock in brokerage offices and both have friends whom they met in brokerage 
offices. Sheng-Ji goes to a brokerage office everyday, where he has a reserved seat in 
the VIP area, and where he usually stays until the market closes. Those individual 
investors in the VIP area often have dinner and other social activities together. For 
him, it is very natural for these people to be friends, because ‘[we] chat here [in the 
brokerage office] everyday.’ 
 Mrs Kuo also made many friends in the brokerage offices and sometimes 
received useful xiaoxi from them. Nowadays, she does not do stock trading as 
frequently as in the past. However, she still regularly visits the brokerage offices to 
‘see friends there’. Some lay investors, like Shu-Ling and her mother, no longer go to 
brokerage offices for stock trading and they have lost contact with the acquaintances 
they met there. However, as mentioned above, Shu-Ling and her mother still 
remember some of the lay investors they knew in the brokerage offices who had 
taught them basic stock trading skills, which were helpful for them at that time. The 
social interactions among lay investors and between lay investors and brokers in 
brokerage offices are worth exploring and are discus ed further in Chapter 5. 
 Brokerage offices are a ‘physical’ space where social relations among lay 
investors would flourish. By contrast, online stock-trading forums are a ‘virtual’ 
space, where some individual investors communicate with each other and develop 
friendships in the process.43 Mr Liu is an example. As mentioned above, one of his 
cyber-friends teaches him some advanced skills for selecting proper trading targets 
by means of online messaging. In addition, eight of his friends who met each other 
on an online futures-trading forum have formed a discussion group. One of them, 
who studied finance and psychology, is the group’s organizer. They have a regular 
‘physical’ meeting every month. In the monthly meeting, they discuss each other’s 
feelings about trading stock and futures, and possible strategies to avoid emotional 
biases when trading. The group members’ backgrounds are diverse. Their ages range 
from the 20s to 40s, and their occupations include a student, a lecturer, a homemaker 
                                                
43  Online internet forums are also argued to be an important ‘place’ for professional market 
participants of electronic anonymous financial markets to have social interactions and exchange 
information (Preda 2012)  
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and others. In the ‘real’ world, lay investors from diverse backgrounds have less 
opportunities to get to know each other. However, Internet forums overcome the 
‘real’ world obstacles and facilitate people from different social backgrounds in 
constructing social relations through their common interest: stock trading. 
   
2.6.3 Threats to social relations 
 
 In studies of social networks and social capital, the job market is usually one of the 
main areas to be scrutinized. Information about the job market (i.e., information 
about available positions) transmitted through personal social ties is always useful 
for the information receiver and is thought to strengthen the social relations between 
the informer and the receiver (Lin 2001; Granovetter 2005). However, this may be 
not the case in financial markets, because sometimes ‘wrong’ information would 
bring about a huge loss for the information receiver, as mentioned in Section 5. As a 
result, the social relations perhaps are not underpinned but are instead undermined, 
due to information transmission. Similarly, Preda (2009b) also argues that financial 
experts’ charisma would be damaged when they give wrong market advice and it 
would undermine their status in the group (the market). Thus, although stock trading 
is a common discussion topic for Taiwanese lay investors and all of the interviewees 
are used to talking about trading with friends, colleagues, relatives, or acquaintances, 
they tend to be somewhat cautious in their talk. 
         Some lay investors are used to take a ‘passive’ stance toward this topic. Both 
Ms Liu and Ms Wu admit that their stock trading performances are not good. They 
believe their poor performances suggest insufficient stock trading skills. Both of 
them worry that they cannot provide any useful information to their friends, so they 
usually avoid ‘actively’ opening a discussion about stock trading. Ms Liu thinks the 
situation is like school students doing their homework together:  
 
We [the people like me] cannot provide any opinion. Our 
performance/mark [in the stock market] is not good.  
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How could a bad student teach other students how to do homework?’ However, 
when other people ‘actively’ begin on this topic, both of them would take part in the 
discussion. 
 Some lay investors tend to avoid talking explicitly about their ideas regarding 
the market, or trading suggestions and names of recmmended stocks to people when 
they first meet them. For example, Mr. He says: 
 
f he [the person] followed my opinion to purchase [the stock] and then 
lost money, [the situation] would be awkward when we meet next time. 
Even if I hadn’t told him to purchase [the stock], he might have another 
attitude the next time he sees you. If you are famili r [with me], [it] may 
be fine [i.e., may be not so awkward in the same situation]. 
 
For similar reasons, Ms Zeng presently avoids revealing her opinions when 
discussing the stock market: 
 
I rarely speak out what I think [about the market]. I did it before. I always 
sincerely thought the stocks were good [and recommended them to other 
people]. However, what I said was wrong. Then I thought that these 
people would not have done [the trading if I had not said it]. Due to what 
you [I] said, it made other people’s loss. Somewhat, I felt guilty [about 
that]. 
 
 ‘Worrying that friends might think they are to blame if a stock tip fails’ is probably 
the main reason why some lay investors are enthusiastic to provide general market 
information to friends but hesitate to mention recommending specific stocks. For 
example, Yi-Hong’s classmate asked Yi-Hong to teach him stock trading. Before 
beginning to teach him, Yi-Hong told his classmate: 
 
I would like to tell you the basic knowledge [of stock trading. For 
example,] ‘what is stock?’ ‘Why does [the price of a share] grow or fall?’ 
However, I would not tell you which stock [you should] purchase. If 
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what I say caused you to lose money, should you blame me? [I would be] 
disappointed if [you] blamed me. 
 
Mrs Kuo has similar concerns. She is used to talking about stock trading with friends, 
relatives and acquaintances, but she does not like o t ll other people which stocks 
she has recently purchased: 
 
[For example,] I tell him which stocks I bought. If then he followed me to 
buy [the stocks] and was ‘trapped’ up [in the market], I would feel 
anxious. I had been trapped up … and had to worry about you as well … 
If [the person] made profits, he would say ‘Mrs Kuo, great! Great!’ … If 
the situation was bad, he would feel angry with you[me]. 
 
 Although people have different concerns when discus ing stock trading, the focus of 
their caution is similar. Many lay investors are afraid they may provide incorrect 
trading suggestions, lists of recommended stocks, or xia xi. If their friends, relatives 
or acquaintances follow their advice for trading stock and subsequently lose money, 
it may damage the existing or future social relations between them. 
 
2.6.4 Safety and face 
 
 In stock trading discussion, some individual investors tend to avoid revealing private 
information. With the exception of family members and close friends, some 
Taiwanese lay investors usually avoid mentioning details about how much their 
trading capital is worth, or profits from, and outcomes of, trading. For the investors, 
their stock trading money is usually the main portion of their personal savings, so 
they don’t want other people ‘guesstimating’ their wealth by knowing how much 
trading capital they possess. For example, except for close friends and family 
members, Cong-Ying has not revealed details of his stock trading to his ‘normal’ 
friends, because he believes in a traditional saying: ‘wealth should not be flaunted.’ 
To avoid unnecessary trouble is a possible reason why some lay investors don’t 
reveal that they usually make profits in the stock market. 
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 However, on the other hand, other lay investors don’t want others to know if 
they lose money in the stock market. My interviews contain some evidence that the 
main reason is that they are worried they will lose ‘face’ in front of friends, relatives 
and acquaintances. Some Taiwanese individual investors tend to view the stock 
market as a game and each individual investor is a player in this game (see Chapter 
3). Therefore, the performance of stock trading implies the level of each player’s 
intelligence and capability. If you lose money in the stock market, in some lay 
investors’ mind, the implication is that you are a ‘loser’ or an ‘inferior’ person.  
For example, A-Liang admitted in his interview that he lost a huge amount, 
around NT$60 million (around US$2.4 million), in the stock market, but he 
emphasizes that most of his investor friends would never reveal their losses to 
unfamiliar people, because they care about their ‘face’. However, due to our guanxi 
(he is a family friend) he was willing to talk about his loss openly. Mrs Kuo also 
knows that some of her friends have lost a lot of mney in the stock market, but they 
still ‘pretend’ that their trading performances are good in front of distant 
acquaintances. Mrs Kuo thinks these friends ‘love “face” more than other things’. 
 
2.6.5 ‘Close’ might be ‘far’ 
 
Family members are supposed to be very close to an individual. Surprisingly, some 
Taiwanese lay investors are likely to talk about stock trading with friends, distant 
relatives and acquaintances, but seldom talk about stock trading at home. Around 
one-third of the interviewees refrain from discussing stock trading with family 
members, although all the interviewees do so with fr ends, colleagues, or classmates. 
Indeed, most of these interviewees’ family members are lay investors, and they and 
their family members know that each other is trading stock. In this type of 
environment, it could be surmised that stock trading would be a topic for discussion 
at home. However, the reality is that it is not. In general, two different concerns are 
linked to this phenomenon. 
 The first reason for people’s reluctance to discus stock trading within the 
family circle may be to avoid a family quarrel. In some cases, lay investors and their 
family members may have completely different principles of stock trading and they 
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apparently disagree with each other’s. Unlike friends or other distant relatives, family 
members are more likely to directly argue with each ot er when their ideas differ. 
Furthermore, compared to ‘outsiders’, family members sometimes tend to think they 
have a ‘right’ to ‘intervene’ in other members’ decisions and ‘instruct’ them in what 
should be done. Due to intensive, frequent and intimate interactions, disagreement 
and irritating ‘instruction’ sometimes develops into family quarrels. Mr Yang is an 
example. As mentioned above, he is used to take seriou  consideration of some 
‘reliable’ friends’ trading suggestions and opinions, while casually discussing stock 
trading with other friends. However, he tends to avid talking about stock trading 
with his family members: 
 
[I] don’t talk [about stock trading] at home. [Our] opinions are different 
and will become a quarrel. Because … [our] understandings [of the 
market] are different. I only use my own money [to trade stock]. [I] do 
not dare to use [my] wife’s [or] other [family members’] money … [If I 
use their money to trade stock and] make a profit, everyone will be 
happy … [but if I] lose money … [I] don’t talk about stock [trading] with 
[my] child either. He thinks he know [stock trading] better than me. Your 
generation knows [how to use a] computer, [but] I don’t. [However,] to 
know [how to use a] computer does not ensure [that you will] win [in the 
stock market]. 
  
 Sheng-Ji and his wife are another example. Both of them are individual investors, 
but they have different principles of stock trading. They do not discuss each other’s 
trading strategies. Sheng-Ji says: 
 
She buys some [stocks]. She buys her own. She is inclined to listen [to 
other people’s information] and follow. I don’t like that … Following 
other people’s [suggestions] means she does not have confidence [in her 
own judgement]. Listening to other people’s [advice and] asking other 
people which one [stock she] should buy means she does not have 
confidence and [she] could not make money [by stock rading]. 
 88 
 
Shen-Ji apparently disagree his wife’s principles of t ck trading and thinks his own 
strategies and performance of stock trading are bett r than his wife’s, but he does not 
want his opinion to become an ‘instruction’ and set off quarrels between the couple. 
For him, the best way to avoid a quarrel is to avoid talking about stock trading at 
home. 
 The other reason for lay investors’ reluctance to discuss trading within the 
family home is related to secrecy regarding personal savings. In Taiwan, personal 
savings which are unknown to other family members is called ‘sifangqian’ (私房錢). 
The idea of sifangqian originates from the Taiwanese traditional idea of the family 
economy. Traditionally, a family was an economic unit, and each person’s savings 
was considered to be part of the family’s wealth and should be used for the family’s 
benefit. Therefore, many people were inclined to have their private and secret 
savings of which other family members were unaware. If other family members 
discovered the secret saving’s existence, they might demand that the savings be 
handed over for the family’s use. In the past, especially, the husband controlled the 
family’s economic resources and budget, so the wife ould have sifangqian for 
herself. Nowadays, sifangqian remains in some form in many Taiwanese families, 
and both husbands and wives may have sifangqian. Thus, they probably withhold 
from their partners the amount of their s fangqian, because if their partners discover 
their real wealth, and not what they have claimed, they may be asked to add more 
money to the family funds. 
 For some lay investors, money for trading stock is a part of their sifangqian. 
Although it seems difficult for these people to keep the existence of sifangqian 
completely unknown to the family, they probably tryas hard as possible to keep 
secret the exact amount of their s fangqian. Thus, the best way to do this seems to 
avoid discussing stock trading at home Ms. Qiu’s family is an example. All her 
family members know the others are trading stock, but they do not discuss this issue 
at home: 
 
My father plays a lot [throws a lot of money into the stock market] … 
Indeed, he has never told [us] when every time he plays … He has not 
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discussed this kind of questions [stock trading] with me. Probably, he 
does not want me or my mother to know the cash flowof his money … 
Our family members seldom ask [each other about the situation of each 
other’s stock trading]… It seems that [each family member] does not 
want another [family member] to know [the detail of their sifangqian]. 
 
Ms Qiu’s family doesn’t seem to be an unusual case. Ms Wu’s family situation is 
similar. Although both of Ms Wu’s parents are lay investors and encouraged her to 
trade stock when she had her first savings, her parents have never discussed stock 
trading with her. When people do discuss it, they more or less have to reveal some 
details about their money. Her parents apparently tend not to reveal to her any details 




The relational embeddedness approach suggests individuals’ economic activities are 
meshed in their existing social relations, but the perspective is challenged by 
electronic anonymous market systems and criticized for its theoretical separation of 
market and social spheres. This chapter aims to respond to the challenge and 
criticism by examining the relationship between social relations and stock trading of 
Taiwanese lay investors. Although the stock market is a fully electronic, anonymous 
market with millions of participants, social ties act as an important channel for lay 
investors to learn trading skills, collect trading capital and access information. The 
information circulated in the social network includes publicly available information, 
personal advice and neixian, which is a particular type of information. Neixian is 
usually unprovable and full of uncertainty, and theinformation source tends to be 
unknown. Foremost, many lay investors were introduce  to the market by friends, 
relatives, or family members who had already been trading stock. As a result, stock 
trading acts as a key element of lay investors’ daily social interactions. Taking part in 
stock trading is generally helpful in maintaining and extending their social relations, 
because stock trading has been become a common topic for discussion and a popular 
social activity. However, improper talk of trading may damage social relations and 
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lay investors are conscious of this. In general, for lay investors, social relations and 
stock trading have become interlinked. Therefore, the characteristic social 
phenomenon – the large-scale participation of lay people in the stock market – is 




































Economic actors are a fundamental element of the market. In many schools of both 
economics and sociology, the actors are equivalent to individual human beings. The 
contrast between the schools is to denote the different properties of the economic 
actor. For example, in neoclassical economics, market actors are assumed to be 
individuals who do rational actions in the market (see Weintraub 1993). In the field 
of behavioural economics, market actors are suggested as individuals whose 
decisions are somewhat driven by psychology (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
For many economic sociologists, economic actors are human beings embedded in 
social relations and therefore their market actions are enmeshed in the social network 
(e.g., Granovetter 1985). Otherwise, economic actors a e also argued to be 
interactive individuals whose actions are integrated in existing webs of meanings and 
relations (e.g., Zelizer 2012). 
Michel Callon’s study of the market does not completely follow this line of 
debate. Inspired by scientific and technological studies, he offers an alternative 
approach for studying economic actors: to think about what are economic actors 
made up of? For Callon, a market actor is not merely an individual human being or 
an aggregation of individuals. A market actor needs to be equipped with the 
capability of evaluating and exchanging in the market, because evaluation and 
exchange are the essence of the market’s action. Without this capability, an 
individual is unable to act as a market actor. To explore the configurations of market 
actors therefore becomes a key issue in Callon’s discussion of the market (Callon 
1998, 2005; Caliskan and Callon 2010). 
For Callon, a market actor, that is, an entity with the capability of calculating 
and exchanging (which is also called an ‘individual market agency’), is ‘made up of 
human bodies but also of prostheses, tools, equipment, technical devices, algorithms, 
etc.’ (2005: 4). The notion of socio-technical agencement is introduced to describe 
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the ‘arrangement of a market actor’. The notion of agencement is drawn from Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s work (1998), but Callon applies this notion to the 
economic field in a specific way (Palmås 2007). 
Callon elucidates the idea of agencement in an article with Koray Caliskan:44 
 
The term agencement is a French word that has no exact English 
counterpart. In French its meaning is very close to ‘arrangement’ (or 
‘assemblage’). It conveys the idea of a combination of heterogeneous 
elements that have been adjusted to one another. But arrangements (as 
well as assemblages) could imply a sort of divide between human agents, 
those who do the arranging or assembling, and things that have been 
arranged … We therefore choose to use the French word agencement, 
instead of arrangement, to stress the fact that agencies and arrangements 
are not separate. (Caliskan and Callon 2010: 9) 
 
The concept of agencement also suggests that the action, cognition and calculation in 
the market are distributed among human beings and non-human elements. The 
individual human agent (the conventional concept of the market actor) is only one of 
the elements of the action, cognition and calculation (Callon 2008: 33–7; also see 
MacKenzie 2009: 16–9). 
Although market actors are considered human-technology networks (the 
connected human agents and technology) rather than social connected individuals in 
Callon’s theory, the agencement approach does not necessarily conflict with 
Granovetter’s embeddedness. As shown in Chapter 2, even in an electronic 
anonymous market, the market actors are still constructed in the existing social 
networks.  The findings of this chapter will illustrate the compatibility of these two 
approaches. 
A number of social studies of financial markets have suggested that the market 
actors in financial markets are agencements. Computers, communicative equipment, 
market information, mathematical models, calculative ools, the layout of the trading 
                                                
44 Donald MacKenzie (2009: 19–25) also deliberates Callon’s concept of agencement and points out 
the double references of the term in French. This French word could refer both the meaning of 
‘assemblage’ and the meaning of ‘agency’ in English. 
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room and even the back-office in another country are vital for market practitioners to 
trade in foreign currency markets, option markets, s ock markets, hedge funds and 
arbitrage (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002; MacKenzi and Millo 2003; Beunza and 
Stark 2004; MacKenzie and Hardie 2009; Preda 2012). If the market agents (e.g., 
traders) are taken off material, technical and textual devices, the arrangements are 
disassembled and they would be deprived of the capability of doing market action. In 
other words, without assemblage, they would not be a l to engage in the markets, 
and thus they would not be market actors anymore. 
A common feature of these studies is the focus on the professional market 
actors, that is, professional market agents. Professional agents probably are the 
dominant participants in most leading financial markets. Here, ‘professional’ means 
that these market agents are those individuals who are specialists in financial trading, 
who engage in market activities as their main paid occupation (that is, they work in 
the financial industry) and are usually, though notalways, members of professional 
financial organizations. The similarities of these market actors across different 
financial markets seemingly have been accounted for in these studies. A typical 
professional market actor in financial markets would be the arrangement comprised 
of a professional trader, a trading room, screens, real-time market information 
systems and dealing mechanisms (e.g., Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002; Beunza and 
Stark 2004; Zaloom 2006; MacKenzie and Hardie 2009; Preda 2012). This model 
indicates a professional market participant as the market agent equipped with a list of 
sophisticated, specialist equipments for calculation. In other words, these market 
actors are arranged in professional environments. Thus, when the individual agent is 
replaced by a lay investor and the configurations assemble in daily-life environments, 
the arrangements are expected to differ in many ways. Two aspects of the 
configurations are investigated in this study: the diverse and bricolage models of the 
arrangements and the connotations of stock trading. They mark the characteristics of 
lay market actors. 
 
3.1.1 Diverse and bricolage models 
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The variety of agencements of economic actors is proposed in the market sphere 
(Callon 2007). In particular, the configurations of the market actors ‘in the wild’ (that 
is, in non-professional environments) are assumed to be more diverse and bricolage 
occurs. Lay investors are less confined in an isomporphic financial organizational 
field and usually are unable to afford sophisticated, specialist, well-designed and 
often identical market devices (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Fligstein 2001). By 
contrast, these characteristics are usually shared by professional market practitioners 
(e.g., MacKenzie and Millo 2003; MacKenzie 2005; Callon et al. 2007). Without 
strong organizational support, each lay investor is conjectured to use their own at-
hand resources and devices to achieve the same goal as the professionals: to calculate 
and exchange in the market. The configurations of lay market actors are expected to 
be less identical and less ‘professional’, which is what the idea of ‘bricolage’ 
suggests here. ‘Bricolage’ is used as a metaphor for the diverse ag ncements of lay 
market actors in everyday life environments; whose metaphorical connotation in this 
paper is different to the use in classic Lévi-Strauss (1966) sense45.  
However, at present, social studies of contemporaneus lay investors seem to 
not fully support this assumption (e.g., Mayall 2006; Preda 2008; Roscoe and 
Howorth 2008; Roscoe 2013). For example, Roscoe’s study (2013) gives a detailed 
description of the agencements of UK lay investors. According to his findings, the 
agencements are principally organized by securities service companies and therefore 
the models are similar: screens with online trading interfaces which are inscribed by 
the companies.46 This model seems also common in the configurations of lay stock 
investors in Australia and the US (Mayall 2006; Preda 2008c). The convergence of 
these agencements perhaps is because, at least apparently in the US, the renascences 
                                                
45 ‘Bricolage’ in everyday French means to ‘do-it-yourself’ or ‘makeshift jobs’. Originally, the notion 
‘bricolage’ was introduced by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1966) into social sciences. This term was taken as 
a metaphor in his work to contrast the thought of engineers with the myth-making bricoleur. 
Following Lévi-Strauss, Raghu Garud and Peter Karnøe (2003) use the term to indicate the different 
paths of technology entrepreneurship; Ismail Erturk et al. (2013) use the metaphor to highlight the 
innovation of financial products by financial elites. However, Lévi-Strauss’s bricolage— the contrast 
between experts/ scientists/ engineers and non-experts/ non-scientists/ non-engineers— is criticised by 
Barry Barner.  Following Barner, Donald MacKenzie (2003; with Pardo-Guerra 2013) uses bricolage 
to describe the way that innovators use pieces of culture in new ways to perform new tasks, and to 
illuminate the histories of innovations in financial markets.   
46 To some extent of diversity of the agencements of the lay investors still remains. Roscoe (2013) 
indicates the lay investors would select a list of t ols provided by different investment service 
companies. However, the models of the tools are similar in general.  
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of lay investors in the market was associated with the popularity of online discount 
brokerage companies at the end of last century (Barber and Odean 2001b).47 The 
packaged and modelled online information and trading systems rendered by these 
companies steer the isomorphic configurations of lay investors in the market (Preda 
2008; Roscoe 2013). 
The identical model of the configurations of lay market actors should not be as 
universal and permanent phenomenon as the theory sugge ts. To investigate a market 
which has been dominated by non-professional investors for a prolonged time 
without interruption is conjectured to be a more proper means to examine the variety 
of the agencements. Taiwan’s stock market is a case which meets this criterion.48 
Unlike many worldwide stock markets, Taiwan’s stock market has been dominated 
by individual investors for over fifty years (see Chapter 1). Furthermore, the number 
of stock brokerage accounts is nearly three-quarters of Taiwan’s adult population.49 
These figures suggest the prolonged popularity of stock trading in Taiwanese society. 
The growth in the number of lay investors should be associated with the development 
of approachable, affordable and adequate information and trading devices. 
Market information provides the essential data (e.g., prices, trading volumes) to 
market agents to accomplish calculation, and the market mechanism is the necessary 
mediation for them to carry out exchanges. Information and trading devices are 
intrinsic items of any market actor’s configuration. Without these two kinds of 
devices, an individual will not be arranged as a market agency. A specific 
professional space with advanced and sophisticated information and trading devices, 
such as a trading room with the Bloomberg information system and high-frequency 
trading computers, seems somewhat out of reach for the majority of lay market 
agents. As will be seen, lay investors trade stock in daily-life places, such as the 
home or workplace. The information and trading devic s which are popularly 
adopted by lay investors must be approachable in their everyday life. Thus, a review 
                                                
47 The companies provide low fees to individual investors to trade stock through their online trading 
systems. With the reduction of trading cost and the prosperity of the stock markets, lay investors 
seemingly revived in several stock markets (see Chapter 1). 
48 The Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) was ranked the 21-largest stock exchange in the world by the 
measurement of market capitalization (US$818 billion) in 2010 (WFE 2010 Annual Report: 74). 
49 In 2011, the amount of stock brokerage accounts is 16,175,554 (http://www.twse.com.tw), and the 
amount of the adult population (over 20 years old) is 21,612,675 (http://www.ris.gov.tw).  
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of the securities market’s information and trading devices will help us to identify the 
crucial elements of the configurations of lay market actors. 
 
3.1.2 Connotations of trading 
 
The studies undertaken using with Callon’s approach tend not to emphasize the 
market practitioners’ understandings of economic actions. For Callon, ‘the 
construction of its meaning is part of an agencement’ (Callon 2007: 320). 
‘Economics’ has given the meaning and principle of economic actions to market 
agents, and the market agents perform ‘economics’ in the market (Callon 1998). 
Indeed, Callon (1998, 2007) uses the term ‘economics’ in a broad sense, and in his 
works, the term includes a range of disciplines in commerce, such as finance, 
accounting and management. With regard to financial markets, the performativity of 
economics has been attested by MacKenzie (2006). 
In a stock market, ‘to trade’ tends to be taken for granted by professional 
traders and the scholars who study them, because it is the ‘job’ of traders. The 
meaning of the action, interlocked with the ‘material esource’ (i.e., a large amount 
of manageable capital for transaction), has been inscribed in the title of the 
occupation. The professional traders’ attitudes to their job are described in Caitlin 
Zaloom’s study (2006). The traders define their work as to ‘take risk’ (make profit by 
taking risk) and ‘enforce’ themselves as ‘pure economic people’ to do that. In other 
words, to deal with the market’s volatility is the core of stock trading. The 
professionality of the job has rendered sufficient meaning to them to trade (and deal 
with the risk). However, this is less the case for lay investors. Lay investors, as the 
phrase implies, lack neither the identity as ‘homo economicus’ nor a large amount of 
managed capital. The meaning of stock trading for them could not be fully drawn 
from the professionality and economics (in a broad sense). The different handles on 
trade with risk, presenting in different connotations, suggest another key distinction 
between the agencements of professional and lay market actors. 
Since Max Weber’s study of the spirit of capitalism (2001), the religious and 
social meanings behind economic activities have been addressed in sociology. In the 
recent literature, the importance of the ‘meanings’ of the economic action has been 
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emphasized by Viviana Zelizer (1978, 2005, 2010, 2012). She argues that ordinary 
people need to integrate economic activities into their existing webs of meanings. 
Without this integration, it is less possible for the economic activity to become 
acceptable and popular.50 The connotation that economic actors (human beings) give 
to economic activity would determine a set of the activity’s ‘appropriate’ operations 
of (Zelizer 2010, 2012: 146).51 From other perspectives, Preda’s (2009) historical 
study of the transformation of stock investment’s social connotations – that is, from a 
gambling activity to a science – and Harrington’s (2008) examination of the links 
between the connotations of different industrial categories of securities, gender 
projection and self-expectation in securities selection in investment clubs also 
enlighten the essence and influence of meanings in fina cial markets. 
Zelizer proposes that what meanings stock trading holds for lay investors is 
worthy of investigation. However, there is a difference between her theory and the 
approach of this study. In her argument, the meaning of each economic action is 
formed in social interactions (Zelizer 2012). In the case of Taiwan’s stock market, 
the meaning of trading probably is not produced in social interactions, because the 
market is a fully anonymous, electronic market with millions of participants and the 
counterparty in transactions is completely unknown (see Chapter 1). Thus, the social 
interaction of this activity would not be the focus of this study. Instead, the analysis 
will underscore the shared pattern of Taiwanese lay investors’ personal definitions of 
stock trading, particularly about the core of the activity: how to deal with risk. 
 
3.1.3 Sources and structures 
                                                
50 Take the money transaction between two people as an ex mple. It could be a ‘gift’ or a ‘debt’ 
between them. The ‘meaning’ of this economic transaction is relevant to the social relation between 
them. Are they the father and the son, the debtor and the creditor, or both? The content of the 
transaction and the subsequently interactions between these two people are linked to the ‘meaning’ 
and ‘social relation’ of the economic action. Four elements are argued by Zelizer (2012) to be found in 
all economic activities: social ties, economic trans ctions (interaction and social practices conveying 
goods and services), media for those transactions (such as money or favours, that represents rights to 
goods and services), and negotiated meanings. This approach emphasizes the importance of the 
connotations of economic activities for the agents and the creation of meaning that is driven by the 
social interactions between the economic agents.   
51 Zelizer’s definition of the ‘economic actor’ is the socially connected human beings. The concept is 
not completely the same to the ‘market actor’ in Callon’s approach. For her, the meanings of 
economic activity are produced in the interaction between the economic actors who are involved in 




To document the information and trading devices andmeanings of trade with risk 
within the agencements of lay market actors is the aim of this study. Studies about 
professional economic actors in financial markets have provided helpful examples of 
the construction of an analytical framework, though the research scopes are not the 
same as this study’s (Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger 2002; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; 
Beunza and Stark 2004; Zaloom 2006; Muniesa 2008; MacKenzie and Hardie 2009; 
Preda 2012). In particular, MacKenzie and Hardie’s 2009 study of the agencement in 
the hedge fund industry renders a clear model. In addition, a number of social studies 
of non-professional stock traders in the US, Britain, Australia and China have 
suggested some common features of lay stock investors (Gamble 1997; Hertz 1998; 
Barber and Odean 2000, 2001; Mayall 2006; Roscoe and Howorth 2009). Several 
sociological and historical studies of Taiwan’s stock market have offered useful 
information to this study as well (Chiang 1991; Wu 2005; Qian 2008; Peng 2009). 
Interviews and documents are the main sources of the data for this study. The 
interviewees were recruited in 2010 and 2011, and include 28 lay stock investors, 
one mutual-fund investor who was ready to trade stock and nine professional 
practitioners. The summary of the interviewees is in Table 1.1 and 1.2. The data from 
this collection has its limitations as far as representation is concerned. However, the 
data is consistent with the information reported in other social studies of Taiwan’s 
stock market (Wu 2005; Qian 2008). The documents include newspaper archives, 
TWSE Monthly Review (the official journal published by the TWSE) and other 
publications from the exchange. 
Ethnographical observation is a common research method in a number of 
sociological and anthropological studies of economic actors in financial markets (e.g., 
Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger 2002; Beunza and Stark 2004; MacKenzie and Hardie 
2009). However, the majority of lay investors trade stock in everyday places, such as 
homes, offices, or schools, and are usually occupied w th other tasks at the same time. 
It is difficult for a researcher to make systematic participant observations in these 
fields. Brokerage offices perhaps are the only exception (see Chapter 5). 
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The analysis is presented in the following three sections: the development of 
information and trading devices, denotations of stock trading and configurations of 
lay market actors. 
 
3.2 Development of information and trading devices 
 
The dynamic arrangements of the lay market actors in Taiwan’s stock market 
correspond with the development of information and trading devices. In general, 
there are two fundamental requirements for any agent trading stock. The first is to 
access the accuracy and immediate market information. The other one is to deliver 
the trading order into the market instantly and correctly. For these two purposes, 
various information and trading devices have been introduced into stock markets 
ever since exchanges were formed (e.g., Preda 2009a, 2 09b). Technology fosters 
the development of these devices. When new technology is introduced into financial 
markets, the forms of the markets and the market devices usually, though not always, 
will follow suit (e.g., Zaloom 2006; Preda 2008; MacKenzie 2013). Taiwan’s stock 
market is no exception; the transformation of the market devices there is steered by 
technology as well. 
In this section, I review two types of market devics in Taiwan’s stock market: 
the information devices that are or were designed to deliver ‘real-time’ market 
information to lay investors, and the order-placing devices which used by the 
investors. An ‘external effect’ of these devices is that they allow lay investors to 
trade stock in everyday places (whether this functio  has been inscribed in the 
devices or not) (Akrich 1992). Without these devices, lay market actors would be 
hard to assemble at home, office, or school. The history of Taiwan’s stock market 
stretches over fifty years and the data of this section is mainly drawn from 
documents, historical books and some of the interviews. Due to the data’s limitations, 
I cannot guarantee all of these recorded devices are or were actually widely used by 
lay investors though they are or were available. However, the devices discussed 
below, which have been introduced into the market within the past twenty years, 
were often mentioned by the lay investors in the int rviews. Thus, at least, those 





Since the launch of the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) in 1962,52 investors have 
always been kept outside the exchange. Both market information and order-placing 
were delivered by phone between staff of brokerage companies inside the exchange 
and the staff in the company offices. The failures and inconvenience of this system 
were often complained about by the participants53 (TWSE Monthly Review 593: 17–
18, 2011). In 1964, the TWSE made a contract with the Broadcasting Corporation of 
China (BCC). The TWSE set up a small broadcasting room inside the trading hall 
and BCC announcers began a daily continual radio broadcast of up-to-date market 
dealing information from opening trading until the market closed. The transaction 
data was written on a blackboard (United Daily News, 17 November 1964: 5). 
Brokerage firms representatives crowded onto the trading hall floor and shouted their 
orders to the exchange clerks. Usually the representatives shouted very loudly, 
because they were afraid that the clerks would miss their offers. An offer included 
the code of the share, to bid or to ask, the quantity and the price. When the exchange 
staff heard the orders, they would immediately write on-the-spot bid-price or ask-
price on the large blackboard. Each column belonged to a specific share, while the 
digits on the blackboard were the trading information (United Daily News, 22 
December 1995: 39; TWSE Monthly Review 593: 23–4, 2011). The representatives 
saw the prices on the blackboard and decided to whether or not to make the deal with 
their counterparts. When both agreed on the deal, they simply filled out a form and 
gave it to the exchange counter (Peng 2009: 54–7). In the broadcasting room, the 
announcers read the columns on the blackboard in order. After recitation of the 
whole list, they would go back starting from the first column; they started from the 
opening of the market at 9 a.m., and only stopped when the market closed at 3.30 
                                                
52 The original abbreviation of the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation was “TSEC”. It had been used 
since the exchange opened. In 2008, the Taiwan Stock Ex hange Corporation claimed the “TSEC” 
was the same to the abbreviations of several other s ock exchanges in the world and it easily confused 
foreign investors. Therefore, the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation adopted “TWSE” as the new 
abbreviation. For consistency, I only use “TWSE” to refer the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation in 
this thesis. 
53 Before the introduction the broadcast in 1964, the brokerage firms hired several clerks to report the 
shares prices by telephone. It was inefficient and bolished after the radio broadcast launched (United 
Daily News, 22 December 1995: 39). 
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p.m. The up-to-the-minute market information was transmitted to audiences through 
a BCC radio channel; investors could listen to the radio and catch up on the on-the-
spot market trading situation. 
This live broadcast was the source of real-time market information for each 
brokerage office as well. Mrs Kuo, a senior individual investor, recalls the situation 
in brokerage offices in the 1960s. In the brokerage office, a blackboard was erected 
in the investing lobby. The brokerage clerks listened to the radio, followed the 
broadcast to erase the old digits, and write down the new bidding and asking share 
prices. This action was repeated until the broadcast finished. Brokerage offices, 
securities companies and investors all accessed the trading information through the 
radio. In other words, in practice, outside the exchange, no one could receive trading 
information earlier than anyone else. 
After the TWSE moved to a new building in 1972, the trading hall was 
redesigned. The exchange abolished the noisy central trading floor system and shares 
were not all simultaneously traded in the central point. Different categories of shares 
were divided into different trading counters. The representatives offered ask or bid 
orders to the staff inside the appropriate counter and the staff would match the deals 
(Peng 2009: 99–101). However, the market dealing information was still recorded on 
the blackboard, which was still the focus of the trading hall. In 1974, an electronic 
display panel replaced the blackboard (Economy Daily News, 5 January 1974: 7). 
The exchange staff no longer had to write the share pric s on the blackboard – now 
they just clicked on the keyboard inside their particular trading counter (United Daily 
News, 2 January 1996: 13). However, this change in the stock exchange did not 
immediately affect the market information display devices in the brokerage offices. 





The representatives in the stock exchange and the clerks in the brokerage offices 
were connected by telephone. Each brokerage firm had clerks inside the exchange 
whose task was handle calls from the firm. They recorded the offers from the 
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headquarters and gave the orders to the representativ s (Peng 2009: 100). In 
brokerage offices, the clerk would ring the exchange after individual investors filled 
in the trading order forms. Some investors were illiterate and the brokers would fill 
in the forms for them. However, mistakes and misunderstandings occurred 
sometimes and sparked off disputes between the clients and the companies. Mrs Kuo 
says she has witnessed several arguments in the brokerage office due to these 
mistakes. 
At that time, individual investors could stay at home, listening to market 
information on the radio and placing orders by telephone. However, some individual 
investors preferred to go to the brokerage offices. Mrs Kuo was an example. Before 
the 1980s, there was a limited number of brokerage offices, and none close to her 
home; it was a 30-minute bus ride to the nearest brokerage office. The ‘safety’ of her 
share dealing was what she took into consideration. At that time, the brokerage 
offices did not have a telephone recording system, and a dishonest broker would be 
able to ‘eat’ a client’s order. For example, a client might ring the broker to place a 
call market order of the XX share for $10 when the price was announced on the radio. 
Then, when the deal was done, the share price might go up to $10.50. An unethical 
broker might ‘steal’ the order and respond to the cli nt that the deal was undone, or 
denied that they had even received a call from the client. In this situation, the client 
suffered the loss, but usually lacked enough evidence to appeal. Mrs Kuo had 
experienced this situation once, and after that insisted on trading in person, in the 
brokerage office. The fraud might happen even when t  client was on the spot, but 
at least the client could monitor the broker’s behaviour. 
 
3.2.3 Electronic display panel in brokerage offices 
 
Starting in 1978, the blackboard began to disappear from the brokerage offices, to be 
replaced by an electronic display panel. Similarly, the electronic display panel was 
also erected in the investing lobby (Economy Daily News, 18 October 1987: 12). Via 
the phone connection, market information on the TWSE’s electronic display panel 
could almost immediately be transmitted to each brokerage office’s electronic 
display panel. The transmission only took 53 seconds (Economy Daily News, 24 
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January 1978: 10). The panel in the brokerage office could display all the share 
prices at the same time, though the information lag behind the TWSE was nearly one 
minute. On the other hand, the BCC broadcast would take minutes to report a full 
cycle of share trading. Investors waited minutes to renew the last prices of the same 
share and might miss price changes between the two rounds. Lay investors became 
more and more likely to trade in brokerage offices due to the electronic display 
panels (Peng 2009). 
 
3.2.4 Computerization  
 
In 1983, the TWSE planned to introduce an automatic-order-matching system. 
However, the process of ‘computerization’ was not gin  smoothly. Technological 
difficulties and limited funds became the major obstacles to achieving this goal. 
After over a year’s delay, the technical group still could not overcome the 
technological difficulties. The exchange was forced to modify their plans and 
adopted already existing ‘half-computerized systems’. In 1985, the computer-assisted 
order-matching system, which was already in use in some other exchanges, was 
launched in the TWSE (Chiang 1991: 164–70). The central trading hall was 
gradually downsized and the space used to store computer hardware. In 1991, the 
trading hall was totally removed from the exchange (P ng 2009: 123). 
In 1987, all listed shares had been included in the computer-assisted order-
matching system. Since then, brokerage representatives have disappeared from the 
exchange. The brokerage office clerks could simply type trading orders into the 
office computers which were connected to the TWSE (Economy Daily News, 30 
December 1986b: 7). These orders were sent from the brokerage firms to the TWSE 
and the TWSE’s staff would match the orders according to the prices and times. 
When the staff were matching the orders in the computer, all data was recorded at the 
same time (Peng 2009: 124). 
This digitalized data comprised a rich and deliverable transportable database. 
The TWSE was able to transmit more complete and instant market information to 
brokerage firms. In 1987, the information which was showed on the panels, screen, 
or monitors in brokerage offices included not only share prices, but also historical 
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market data and the data of each listed company (Chiang 1991: 170–71). Compared 
to the broadcast, brokerage offices could provide much more detailed and instant 
information through digital data transmission. With Taiwan’s stock market boom at 
the end of the 1980s, a rapidly increasing number of individual investors crowded the 
brokerage offices. The ‘trading crowd’ became an impressive social phenomenon, a 
hallmark of that era of Taiwanese society (United Daily News, 14 September 1989b: 
22). Mrs Kuo remembers crowded investing lobbies at th t time: ‘Some people 
brought their own stools to brokerage office, because all the benches were occupied 
instantly after the brokerage office opened the door. Many people [who came later] 
had to stand in the lobby.’ 
 
3.2.5 Cable television 
 
In 1986, the closing point of the TWSE Capitalization Weighted Stock Index 
(TAIEX) and each share’s closing price was reported on broadcast television daily 
(Economy Daily News, 30 January 1986a: 07). However, knowledge of immediat  
market changes is always important for stock investors and the televised information 
at that time was insufficient. An investor who was not in a brokerage office still had 
to rely on the radio to gain ‘delayed’ information. Real-time market information was 
not yet accessible outside the brokerage offices. 
In 1988, this situation started to change. The TWSE collaborated with the 
Telecommunications Bureau on the development of the C inese Videotex System 
(CVS). Through the CVS, real-time stock market information could be transmitted to 
investors’ homes or offices via telephone line (Chiang 1991: 170–71). The brokerage 
offices’ dominant position for being the real-time stock-market information providers 
was challenged. However, the CVS’s high service fee impaired its popularity, but, 
unexpectedly, it fostered the fast-growing market of cable television starting around 
1990 (Economy Daily News, 14 May 1990: 17). 
Cable television suddenly became very popular in Taiwan, from the end of the 
1980s. In fact, it was still illegal at that time, but its inexpensive service charge along 
with rich content attracted many households to takeup this illegal service. Although 
the government was busy trying to ‘cut’ the cable lin s everywhere, the result was 
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not obvious.54 The cheap real-time market information was a crucial reason for many 
people to adopt the cable service (United Daily News, 22 December 1990: 6). The 
cable TV business operators bought real-time market information from the CVS and 
transmitted it to their clients’ homes via the cable lines. Compared to the CVS’s fee, 
the cable TV companies might charge only less than a third of the original price and 
with additional channels (Economy Daily News, 14 May 1990: 17). 
After years of struggle, cable television became a l gitimate business in 1993 
(United Daily News, 21 September 1993: 16). The home penetration rate of cable TV 
in Taiwan grew rapidly. The figure was 26.5 per cent in 1992, which was on the eve 
of legalization, 45.7 per cent in 1993, and by 1997 had risen to 78.5 per cent (see 
Table 3.1). In the late 1990s, almost 80 per cent of Taiwanese households could 
access real-time stock information. 
Before the legalization of cable TV in Taiwan, there were only three television 
broadcasting channels. Two were directly controlled by the government and the other 
was owned by the ruling party, the KMT. Cable television in Taiwan was commonly 
called the ‘fourth channel’, and the cable system allowed many new channels 
providers to enter the television industry (United Daily News, 7 August 1989a: 13). 
UNIQUE TV (非 凡 電 視 ), formed in 1993, was the pioneer of professionally 
financial television channels in Taiwan. Indeed, the former company of UNIQUE TV 
had existed in the cable TV industry when cable was still illegal. The company 
focused on stock market analysis programmes. During that time, after market closing, 
the company would invite securities analysts to analyse that day’s market trends, 
then videoed the analyses as tapes and sent the tapes to community cable television 
companies for broadcasting. UNIQUE TV was the first legal channel to provide real-
time market information, without any lag, and with plentiful securities analyses 
programs (http://www.ustv.com.tw/). One housewife investor, Wuma, describes to 
me how cable television reformed her investing behaviour. When she traded stock in 
the early 1990s, she went to a brokerage office nearly very day. However, since 
she’s installed cable television, she just stays at home and rarely visits the office. ‘It 
                                                
54 Another possible reason allowed the illegal cable TV to exist for years. The martial law in Taiwan 
was removed in 1987. The government loosed strict con rol over the media and civil society. 
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wastes too much time to go to the brokerage office,’ she says, ‘I can use the time to 
do a lot of housework.’ 
 
Table 3.1: Home penetration rate of cable TV in Taiwan 







Source: National Communications Commission (TW) 
http://www.ncc.gov.tw/chinese/files/10052/1994_15319_ 00520_1.pdf. 
 
3.2.6 Telephone recording and reporting system 
 
Twenty-five years ago, the number of brokerage offices was limited and controlled; 
in 1977, there were only 28. A licence to set up a new brokerage office was difficult 
to obtain. In 1988, the government deregulated the securities brokerage industry. 
Only three years later, over 300 new brokerage firms had been established. The 
fierce competition among them pushed them to introduce new equipment to attract 
clients (Peng 2009: 129–31). 
The telephone recording system greatly enhances the reliability of telephone-
order-placing transaction. Beginning in 1988, brokeag  firms gradually set up 
telephone recording equipment on the phone lines in their offices (Economy Daily 
News, 29 August 1988: 23). Now, when investors called their brokers to place orders, 
their conversations would be recorded automatically. When the investors and brokers 
find themselves in dispute, both parties have the right to access the record as the 
evidence. The surveillance of brokers has been unnecessary for lay investors. 
Compared to staying in brokerage offices, staying at home has become a practical 
option for lay investors. To learn real-time market information by watching the stock 
market channel and to place trading order by ringing brokers could completely 
replace the ‘instrumental functions’ of brokerage offices. 
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Almost at the same time, the telephone automatic reporting system was 
installed in brokerage firms. An individual investor could ring the automatic answer 
system of the brokerage firm to find out the trading result (Economy Daily News, 29 
August 1988: 23).55 
 
3.2.7 The Internet 
 
In 1993, the fully automatic order-matching system was introduced into the TWSE 
(TWSE 2002: 156–9). The upgrade of the order-matching system did not affect most 
investors’ trading behaviours at that time, but it was the foundation of future online 
trading. In 1997, brokerage firms obtained permission from the TWSE to launch an 
online stock-trading system (Economy Daily News, 27 November 1997: 20). 
The connection between investors and the ‘market’ is not ‘directly’ through the 
online stock-trading system. The trading orders are first transmitted to the brokerage 
firms’ computers and then to the mainframe computer of the TWSE. The result 
would then be transmitted to brokerage firms immediately and automatically. The 
deal simultaneously becomes part of real-time market information and is shown on 
brokerage offices’ monitors, television and the Inter et. The whole process only 
takes seconds (TWSE 2002: 156–9). 
The online trading and information systems also fostered the development of 
stock trading gadgets on mobile phone and PDAs (personal digital assistants) 
(Economy Daily News, 24 June 1999: 25). Since 1999, several PDAs design d 
specifically for stock investment have been launched.56 They are commonly known 
as ‘gupiaoji’ (股票機, ‘stock gadget’) by lay investors. Stock gadgets’ functions 
include real-time market information, an order-placing mechanism and technical 
analysis software. People could access real-time market information and place 
trading orders wherever they were. 
                                                
55 To report the trading result was an important part of brokers’ work. Although the automatic 
answering equipment has been introduced into the industry for over twenty years, to date, many 
brokers still prefer to report the trading results to clients by themselves. As mentioned in Chapter 5, 
this behaviour is used to show their passion to servic  the clients. 
56  Both of Taiwanese large stock-gadget producers, the E-TEN Information Systems Co. 
(http://www.etencorp.com/) and the Fonestock Technology Inc. 
(https://www.fonestock.com/en/indexs.php), launched their first products in 1999.  
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By 2006, electronic trading (i.e., trading through the Internet and by mobile 
phone) accounted for 20 per cent of the TWSE’s entir  trading volume (Economy 
Daily News, 2 March 2006: C2). For up-and-coming brokerage firms, an extension 
into online trading service presented a great opportunity to take the market share 
from major companies. For example, Polaris Securities, which was the brokerage 
firm with the largest share in online trading service, was established in 1988. 
Electronic trading orders comprised 75 per cent of P laris Securities’ entire trading 
volume in 2007(Economy Daily News, 21 August 2007: C2). 
The Internet also has become one of the main channels for lay investors to 
access real-time trading information and listed companies’ data. A round of 
automatic order-matching of each share is executed approximately every 20 seconds 
in the TWSE’s current system. The real-time trading result and price information is 
automatically and immediately disclosed on the Market Information System 
(http://mis.twse.com.tw/), an affiliated website of the TWSE, and also 
simultaneously transmitted to the organizations that have contracts with the TWSE, 
including all securities companies, brokerage companies and a number of news 
media, e.g., Yahoo.tw. These organizations broadcast the information to their 
customers and audience. The trading information updates nearly simultaneously with 
the order-matching execution and renews on all the displayed media at the same time 
(http://www.twse.com.tw/ch/trading/introduce/introduce.php#1). Thus, an investor is 
able to receive real-time trading information through the Internet. 
In 2002, the TWSE set up the ‘Market Observation Post System’ (MOPS) 
website (http://mops.twse.com.tw/mops/web/index). The purpose of the website is to 
allow investors to freely access listed companies’ public information. All listed 
companies are required to upload their company profile and financial reports, such as 
income statements, balance sheets and cash-flow statements, and to disclose the 
company’s information immediately on the MOPS website. Data from the most 
recent years is available on the website as well (TWSE Monthly Review 596: 23, 
2011). 
In brief, technology and the transformation of the stock exchange’s dealing 
system foster the development of market devices. Brokerage offices, cable television, 
telephone, phone gadgets and the Internet have made available and affordable 
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information and trading equipment for contemporary Taiwanese lay investors to 
organize their own configurations of stock investment (also see Image 5.14). In 
collaboration with social connotations of stock trading, diverse and bricolage models 
of lay market actors would assemble in everyday lives. 
 
3.4 Social connotations of stock trading 
 
Various affordable and accessible market devices have been accessible to lay people 
in the pro-stock-trading environment and become available items of the 
configurations. The connotations of stock trading, on the other hand, are more like 
the statements of the agencements, which always interacts with the market action and
continues to shape and to be shaped by the action (Callon 2007).  
For lay investors, the connotations of stock trading are drawn from social 
conventions rather than economic doctrines or professionality. From a general 
perspective, these connotations compose lay investors’ principles and practices of 
handling the risk in the stock market. They ‘perform’ these social connotations as 
professional market agents perform economics. The connotations and their actions in 
the market are entwined together. 
In the field, as noted, the two informal phrases, to ‘do stock’ (做股票, zuo 
gupiao) and to ‘play stock’ (玩股票, wan gupiao), were frequently used by lay 
investors to refer to the action of trading stock, rather than more formal phrases, such 
as to ‘invest stock’ (投資股票, touzi gupiao), to ‘purchase-sell stock’ (買賣股票, 
maimai gupiao) and to ‘trade stock’ (交易股票, jiaoyi gupiao). To ‘do’ (做, zuo) 
stock (股票, gupiao) analogizes stock trading to ‘do business’ (做生意, zuo shengyi) 
or to ‘do a job’ (做工作, zuo gongzuo). On the other hand, to ‘play’ (玩, wan) stock 
(股票, gupiao) in stock trading is analogous to ‘playing a game’ (玩遊戲, wan youxi; 
比賽, bisai). The frequent interchanges of these two phrases, zuo gupiao and wan 
gupiao, in the lay investors’ conversations imply the conn tations of trading stock 
are drawn from the notions of ‘to do business’ and ‘to play a game’. In their 
perceptions, these two notions are not conflicting but instead are interlocking. Both 
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sets of the connotations of ‘stock trading as a sideline business’ and ‘stock trading as 
a hobby’ present and represent their practice in the s ock market. 
 
3.4.1 A sideline business 
 
In the fieldwork, ‘sideline business/side job’ (副業, fuye) is one of the common 
descriptions used by lay investors to define stock trading. The category of ‘sideline 
business’ infers that these investors have other main jobs while they are trading and 
that the earnings and losses from trading would not affect their basic livelihood (see 
Table 3.1). This sideline business functions as a way to increase savings or to extend 
investment capital for future business. Four notions are generally linked with the 
connotation of trading stock as conducting sideline business: to make use of spare 
time, to invest spare money, profit as extra income and restricted involvement. These 
ideas also represent many lay investors’ general princi les of stock trading. 
 
3.4.1.1 Savings and investment capital 
 
Some Taiwanese individual investors expect stock trading act as an instrument which 
would help them increase savings. For example, Guang chooses stock trading as a 
way to save money faster. He does not expect to make big money by stock trading, 
but ‘the savings interest [rate in banks] is too low’, he complains. Thus, he went to 
‘see [if there were] any chance [of increasing saving faster] in the stock [market]’. 
Mr Zhang has a similar idea: ‘[My] salary is not hig . I can only rely on this [stock 
trading] to manage money gradually.’ Even for some college students, stock trading 
is also regarded as a plausible and efficient method o save money. Cong-Ying, a 
student investor, says:  
 
Presently, [I am] a student. The capital thrown [into the market] is a little, 
not much, [but the income from stock trading would] have some help. 
Really, [the purpose of trading stock] is to save up, because [I] do not 
need to use the money now. 
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Similarly, for some other lay investors, stock trading is expected to be an 
instrument to raise capital for future business. In Mr Yan’s mind, ‘success’ in a 
person’s life is determined by their property holdings. Thence, for him, to engage in 
property investment is his goal and stock trading is regarded as an ‘interim business’. 
‘[B]efore I enter the property market,’ he says, ‘it [stock trading] is an instrument to 
“extend” my capital.’ Indeed, Mr Yan seems to be not the only person with this idea. 
Among the interviewees, several experienced lay investors, such as Sheng-Ji, Ms 
Zeng and Mrs Kuo, have successfully transferred their profits from stock trading to 
property investment. Purchasing property becomes th ‘vessel’ for ‘storing’ the 
fortune they made from the stock market. 
 
3.4.1.2 Spare time 
 
Either during work or in the intervals between jobs, people may have a little spare 
time. To trade stock, similar to having a sideline business, could be a way to make 
use of that time. As mentioned in Chapter 2, when Zhi-Chun changed jobs to become 
a flight attendant, her mother encouraged her to make use of the interim between jobs 
to trade stock. A-Liang, a self-employed worker, is another example. He outlines the 
reasons for engaging in stock trading:  
 
[The] main [reasons] were [that I] had a little cash and too much free 
time. Because of [my] job, often, [there] was too much free time and 
nothing [I] could do [between jobs]. 
 
Sometimes, trading stock would conflict with their main employment, 
particularly when the market is volatile. In this stuation, lay investors tend prioritize 
their main employment. Ms Hong, a partner in the family enterprise, describes this 
dilemma: 
 
[Trading stock] should not affect your normal [main] job. In the time of 
running cases [business], you leave it. You’re unable to handle [the 
trading]. You can’t know its situation. [Sometimes], ‘Wa’, today [the 
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market] is volatile, but you can’t grasp [the change] in time, [because you 
are in work]. 
 
         In Western stock markets, trade is usually described as a ‘masculine work’ both 
within the exchanges (e.g., Levin 2001; Zaloom 2006) and among non-professional 
traders (e.g., Barber and Odean 2001; Roscoe and Howorth 2008). However, this 
doesn’t seem to be the case in Taiwan. There is no apparent gender stereotype about 
stock trading in the market and female investors comprised half of my interviewees 
without intentionally selecting them. In particular,  popular slang word, cailanzu (菜
籃族, ‘vegetable-basket group’), is used to specifically refer to ‘housewife investors’. 
Combining the role of homemaker and lay investor probably is common in this 
society. For example, Wuma had not traded stock until she became a ‘full-time’ 
homemaker: 
 
In the past time, [we] ran a business. When running the business, [I] 
didn’t have time to do [stock trading]. Then, the business was closed … 
At home, you still have to do housework and other wo k. [I] am not [the 
person] who specializes in investment. [I] just have a little money [to 
trade stock]. 
 
Similarly, during a period of unemployment, some peopl  may take the opportunity 
to do stock trading. Shu-Ling, Wuma’s daughter, started trading stock twenty years 
ago, when she was a college student, but after she left her previous job, a year before 
I interviewed her, she stayed at home and made use of h r time trading stock, along 
with her mother. Another example is Ms Huang, who was a successful estate agent. 
Because of needing to care for her ill mother, she left her job and makes use of her 
spare time to trade stock. However, she thinks this is a temporary situation, and she 
says she will return to the property market in the near future. 
 
3.4.1.3 Spare money 
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In the field, there are two ‘rules’ in trading stock frequently mentioned. The rules 
seem to be acknowledged and adhered to by many lay investors. The first rule is 
‘Don’t borrow money to trade stock.’ The second is ‘Don’t live on the income from 
stock trading.’ The idea behind these two rules is interlinked with the connotations of 
stock trading as a sideline job. 
During the interviews, almost all the informants underline they only use spare 
money or personal savings to trade stock. To deal with the risk, ‘to be trapped up in 
the market’ is the reason. Shares prices often go down after purchase. ‘Even if [the 
stocks] don’t make a profit,’ Ms Liu says, ‘[it] is totally fine [for me] to leave 
[them].’ This connotation helps them deal with, or mitigate the mental and financial 
pressures of a loss in the market. Ms Hong says: 
 
[It] would be dreadful to borrow [money to trade stock]. [Investors] 
should [be able to] afford [the loss of] playing [stock]. Therefore, [they] 
should not borrow. Borrowing will produce [huge] pressure. [If they lose 
in the market], [they] would go crazy, would lose [their] reason. 
 
This might be the reason that some lay investors, f example, A-Liang and A-Zhen, 
did not go bankrupt after losing a huge amount of mney in the stock market. In both 
cases, when they got involved in stock trading, both of them only invested their spare 
money (the majority of their savings) into the market, and while they were trading 
stock, they continued to work in their main jobs. Thus, the subsequent failures 
caused suffering, but did not drive them into sever financial difficulties. 
 
3.4.1.4 Extra income 
 
As noted above, lay investors tend to emphasize that their own or their family’s 
living does not rely solely on income from stock trading. For example, Mrs Kuo, a 
homemaker investor, explains how money is managed in her family:  
 
Our living cost is totally irrelevant to [the income from stock trading] … 
I am the housekeeper of our family. One-third of myhusband’s salary 
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was taken [for living expenses]. The rest [of the salary] is [saved for] 
some occasion which needed money. 
 
Mrs Kuo’s words correspond to the studies of mental accounting in 
behavioural finance (see Thaler 1999). However, as M cKenzie’s study suggests 
(2008: 266–8), the shared social and cultural factors behind individuals’ economic 
behaviours should be concerned. Mrs Kuo continues to talk about the philosophy 
behind this method of money management: 
 
[The money] would be spent on necessities [and it] would not be spent on 
unnecessary things. The ancients had an adage: ‘Store grain when you 
are eating rice.’ If you have a ladle of rice, you should not eat all of it. 
You must leave a half-ladle or 80 per cent. Even if [you] only leave a 
little, [it] is still fine. Don’t finish it all. 
 
A similar idea to this is probably shared by most lay investors. People tend to 
consider the profit from stock trading as ‘extra’ income. For example, Ms Lin is used 
to dividing her stock-trading income into two parts: one part is her private ‘pin 
money’ and the other is added to the family travelling fund. If she loses, she tells 
herself ‘to stop playing [stock] for a period of time’. Similarly, Ms Hong regards the 
profit from stock trading as ‘pin money’ and any loss as ‘losing money carelessly’. 
These analogies helps her to face the market risk and still keep calm. The idea of 
extra income perhaps also affects the way lay investors use their profit from stock 
trading. Mr Yan explains the change in his consumption style when he earned 
substantial profits in stock trading: 
 
[I] bought a car, bought name brands. I felt nothing [when buying] these 
items … [T]his money was spare, [which was earned] from stock 
investment. How could [I] feel [it] painfully when I spent? [It] was 
completely not painful. There was no feeling. If I had to pay with my 
salary, as [you] see, I am a very thrifty person, it would be impossible 
[for me] to spend the money. 
 115 
 
3.4.1.5 Restricted involvement  
 
Among the interviewees, Sheng-Ji is the only investor who quit his job and devoted 
himself to stock trading57. All the other employed individual investors continue or 
had continued to work in their main jobs until they r tired. In Sheng-Ji’s mind, zuo 
gupiao (doing stock) is the same as creating a business:  
 
[It is] like we are going to do [establish] a business. You have to make a 
plan and follow your plan through to execution. Regardless of the 
[changing] situation of the market, you have to follow your plan through. 
 
Sheng-Ji thinks an advanced plan could help the invstor (trader) brave the 
vagaries of the changeable market. To be confident in your judgement of the market, 
to insist on sticking to your plan, and to remain uperturbed by the market’s 
temporary volatility are keys to success in stock trading, as they are keys to success 
in running a business. 
However, most lay investors are different from Sheng-Ji. They worry about the 
volatility of the market and deliberately restrict their involvement in the market. 
Indeed, they are aware of the risks involved in stock trading and often caution 
themselves when making profits in the market. Compared to the income from other 
jobs, the profit gained from stock trading is relatively ‘unstable’ and ‘unreliable’. 
Ou-Yang explains this kind of concern: 
 
[Stock trading] is really difficult to become a stable income, unless I 
retire … Because I have my own main job … Furthermore, I, this person, 
belong to the stable [prefer a stable situation] [and] tend to be 
conservative. In fact, [even if] my friend tells me [about a]‘mingpai’ 
[recommended stock], I only buy one [lot (1,000 shares)] at most. 
                                                
57 At present, Sheng-Ji still goes to the brokerage office and trades stock almost every day, but he 
claims he is what could be called ‘semi-retired’that is, the wealth he has earned from stock trading has 
been invested in property. The rent from a shop front, purchased with money he earned from stock 
trading, is enough to cover his living expenses. 
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For many lay investors, it is too precarious to live only on the income from stock 
trading. The risky nature of this business deters them from throwing all their money 
and time into the stock market. Ms Hong views stock trading as a sideline business, 
mainly due to the risk:  
 
If I could anticipate [the result of] each transaction precisely [to succeed 
in every transaction], [I would] take [the income from stock trading] as 
the main income definitely. [I] wished, but [I] found it was not as easy as 




In this field, phrases such as ‘like an entertainmet ’, ‘for fun’ or ‘like playing a 
game’ are widely used by Taiwanese lay investors to describe their feelings when 
trading stock. Indeed, Australian and British lay investors seemingly share a similar 
feeling: they describe trading as a ‘game’ and themselves as ‘players’ (Mayall 2006; 
Roscoe and Howorth 2009). As the phrase ‘wan gupiao’ (play stock) implies, stock 
trading for these lay investors is like taking part in a leisure activity or joining a 
game. When the investors only use their spare time and money to trade stock and 
cover their living expenses with other incomes, it implies that the investment results 
would not directly affect their current living conditions and therefore they can take a 
relatively relaxed attitude to stock trading. It suggests the principle that lay investors 
deal with the market risk with a certain frame of mind. This connotation is fully 
compatible with the idea of stock trading as a sideline business. For lay investors, 
stock trading can be thought of, on the one hand, as a sideline business, and as a 
hobby on the other. 
To separate stock trading from earning a livelihood is a prerequisite for some 
lay investors. For example, Mr Yang, a retired junior high school head, clearly 
defines the position of stock trading in his life: 
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[The money used to trade stock is] spare money, [thus there is] no 
pressure. [Stock trading can be] considered as a pastime. [Because of 
playing this], [I] would not get the Alzheimer’s disease … I still have 
other income from rent … [Even] the rent is not used up. 
 
In this situation, the incentive to trade stock is not just to gain economic reward. As 
with other games, the amusement and the psychological satisfaction gained in the 
process may enhance the investors’ motivation, and is an important reason for Mrs 
Kuo to trade stock:  
 
[The] stock market is fun for me. A kind of [game] experience … I have 
a kind of fulfilment … I don’t take my fixed income deposits to invest 
[trade stock]. I certainly don’t do that. 
 
3.4.2.1 A game with learning 
 
If stock trading can be considered as a game, then, t is ‘game’ probably not only 
provides entertainment, psychological satisfaction and economic benefit, but also 
offers an opportunity for ordinary people to gain fancial knowledge. Zhi-Chun 
thinks this is a benefit of trading stock: ‘[Stock trading] is a nice entertainment. Then 
[it] is a good way to kill time. Furthermore, [I can] feel the progress of [my] 
knowledge.’ 
In particular, due to its long history (compared to other financial markets in 
Taiwan, such as the futures market), the stock market is the most acknowledged and 
familiar financial market in the society. Thus, for some lay investors, the stock 
market is a way to increase their knowledge of finance. Mr Zhan says: 
 
[Stock trading] is more like [a practicable way] to earn extra income and 
an opportunity to learn … [To learn] how to view the market value; then, 
[to learn how] to access financial products. To understand [them]. To be 




3.4.2.2 Game feelings 
 
When individual investors are trading stock, several motions are often involved in 
the process. These emotions, commonly shared by lay investors, are a key element of 
the idea that trading stock is a game-like activity. Excitement, fulfilment and passion 
are words frequently used by lay investors to describe their mood while partaking in 
trading stock. In Callon’s discussion of the market (1998, with Çalışkan 2010), the 
emotions of human individuals engaged in economic activities have not been 
included. However, in this case, emotions apparently play an important role in the 




In the field, excitement is one of the feelings expr ssed when people describe 
themselves trading stock. This feeling is usually intense in their early experiences of 
trading stock. Guang describes his mood when he commenced stock trading: 
‘Excitement, in the time of early beginning … In tha  time, the feeling was a little 
close to the feeling of gambling and the feeling of playing [other games].’ 
This feeling is difficult to sustain without frequent stimulus. For example, Ms 
Wu also felt excited when she first started trading, but the feeling was gone after the 
first two months. ‘Now, [I] don’t have that feeling,’ she says. 
After the early stage, the sense of excitement is maintained by positive trading 
results. Wuma says: ‘If [it is] making money, [I] feel excited. If [it is] not making 
money, [I] feel listless, have no mood.’ 
Ms Lin admits she feels enthusiastic only when ‘[the profit] continues to enter 
the account’, and has no mood when ‘[the results] are constantly not good.’ The 
sense of excitement in trading stock is analogous t that felt when gambling. Mr 
Zhan says:  
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[The result of trading] is difficult to predict. Then, the mood of operating 
[trading] is similar to gambling. I am a normal person. I really appreciate 
the people who are not normal people. Their hearts are super strong. 
 
The exciting feeling could decline for other reasons as well. Mr Liu felt excited 
in trading stock. However, he feels ‘less excited’ after he started to trade futures. 
Compared to futures, the ‘game’ (stock trading) is not been ‘thrilling’ anymore. Still, 
some lay investors try to refrain from getting too excited, because they are afraid 
their emotions will cloud their judgement and affect their performance in the market. 
Just like professional traders, the goal is to be a rational economic agent. ‘[A]fter [I] 
read several investment psychology books,’ Yi-Hong says, ‘I [am ready] to do my 




In the stock market, no matter how much prior information and advice an investor 
has received, they still must make their trading decisions themselves. Thus, their 
trading results suggest the degree of ‘wisdom’ of their judgement. As in other games, 
positive results always are an index to prove that t e participant is an excellent player. 
For lay investors, to make a profit in the stock market is similar to winning a game. 
The fulfilment of winning is an important mental reward. Mrs Kuo, who has been 
mentioned above, is an example and Mr Yan is another: ‘If you make money [in 
trading], you would feel, it seems that, I am a giant. You would feel it seems to 




In any game, some participants are always more enthusiastic than others. ‘Passion’ 
perhaps is the right word to describe this enthusiasm. Some lay investors admit that 
they have been overly preoccupied with stock trading. For example, Ms Huang 
admits that stock trading has dominated her life:  
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[Y]our full spirit is caught up in. [The situation] is not it catches you; [the 
situation] is [that] yourself cannot leave [it]. Your mind would always be 
there.  
 
For her, stock trading has been an exhausting activity. The market information has 
taken up almost all her attention, and she cannot give it up: ‘[I] can’t sleep well. I 
feel [it is] not worthy.’ This is the main reason tha  Ms Huang is going to return to 
the property industry in the near future. 
This passion sometimes crosses the line into addiction. Rou-Zhu admits she has 
become a ‘trading’ addict: 
 
 [T]hat is, you are addicted to … Sometimes, you would do [trading] 
because [you] want to … Buy, because you want to buy, even if [you] 
don’t have a clear intuition of the [market] trend … . 
 
The passion for stock trading often occurs in a cycle, repeatedly appearing and 
disappearing, in a lay investors’ mind. For example, Ou-Yang feels the periodic 
change of her passion in trading stock:  
 
[I]n some period of time, [I am] passionate and buy a lot [of stocks]. 
[However,] in current, [I] don’t have mood to buy. I am different in each 
period. 
 
In general, excitement, fulfilment and passion are the emotions lay investors 
experience when trading stock. These feelings probably re shared by professional 
traders as well. However, a distinction between these two groups is that the 
professionals tend to suppress their feelings and seek to be a pure economic figure in 
the market (Zaloom 2006). By contrast, the majority of lay investors do not 
consciously detach themselves from these feelings (except for a few exceptions, such 





The money, the speculation and the feelings of excit ment, fulfilment and passion 
reasonably cause some lay individual investors to view stock trading as analogous to 
gambling. Nearly half of my informants think that,  least sometimes and in some 
aspects, trading is like gambling. For example, Ou-Yang sometimes equates the idea 
of gambling with the act of trading:  
 
Sometimes, that feeling is like buying a lottery ticket. That feeling, 
honestly, is like gambling. [I trade stock] just for un, [and expect it] can 
make some money. I sincerely feel [stock trading] iteresting … . 
 
On the other hand, the majority of the interviewees mphasize that trading 
stock is not equivalent to a casino game. A key difference is that stock trading is not 
a double-or-quits game. Mr Zhang says:  
 
‘[I] think [gaming] in casinos [is only] double or quits. However, when 
you play stock, [if you] don’t borrow money to play, use [your] own 
money to ‘run’. In fact, [if you] only choose stable [companies’] stocks 
[to trade], you will not lose everything in the end.’ 
 
Dividends give lay investors the feeling of ‘safety’ and reduce the feeling that 
they are ‘speculating’. Receiving dividends distinguishes stock trading from 
gambling. Mr He explains: 
 
You buy good stocks. [Even if] you are trapped up at th t time, it still 
provides dividends every year. Thus, I don’t think [trading] is the same 
as gambling. 
 
3.4.2.4 Simulation game 
 
In Taiwan, several financial websites and brokerage companies occasionally hold 
stock trading simulation competitions. Usually, these competitions are open to the 
 122 
public and the top ranks gain monetary prizes. This kind of simulated game to some 
extent supports the social connotation of trading stock as playing a game. Before Mr 
Liu was twenty, the eligible age for an individual to open a brokerage account, he 
joined this kind of competition several times. Once he even came fourth place in a 
game, when he was a junior high school student. For Mr Liu, trading stock in the 
simulation games and in reality are somewhat similar. From the virtual to the real, he 
continues to enjoy the feeling of ‘playing’. 
Furthermore, many business schools in Taiwan provide stock market 
simulation programmes to their students. These programmes teach the students about 
the actual environment of Taiwan’s stock market andhelps them to learn and practise 
trading skills. Like the trading competitions, the information in the programmes is 
real-time market information from the TWSE, but theparticipants use virtual money 
to trade. At Yi-Hong’s university, the lecturers strongly encouraged the students to 
take part in the simulation programmes. Some of Yi-Hong’s classmates performed so 
well that they became famous amongst the students; to achieve good results in the 
programme was seen as means to gain respect from colleagues. 
Another informant, Shan-Zhu, who is a securities analyst, also had a similar 
experience when he was in college. At that time, he was a student investor and was 
well-known in his department because of his outstanding performance in the stock 
market. Some colleagues who were also student investors often discussed trading 
strategies with him. This phenomenon perhaps results from the structural feature of 
Taiwanese society: that is, a high proportion of the adult population is involved in 
stock investment. Thus similarly, when a group of friends play the same game and 
one performs better than the others, this person is likely to earn social honour within 
the group. 
 
3.4.2.5 Future career 
 
In general, student investors tend to adopt only a game-playing attitude to trade stock. 
Among the interviewees, all student investors define stock trading as a contemporary 
hobby, but expect it to development further. For example, both Ms Wu and Cong-
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Ying consider trading stock as a present-day hobby and a plausible sideline business 
in the future. Cong-Ying explains the reason: 
 
For me, presently, [stock trading] is a hobby. In the future, [it] probably 
will become [my] sideline job. The [average] salary in Taiwan is 
relatively low. If [people] do not ‘trans-invest’ [to use their salary to 
invest], it is difficult to accumulate fortune only b  the salary. 
 
Due to the game-like emotional pleasure (e.g., fulfilment) that they get from 
trading, some student investors are determined to enter the securities industry and 
become professional traders. Mr Liu has made such a decision: 
 
 [I] consider [stock trading] as [my] pastime and the future career … I am 
very interested in that … Even when [I] lost money, [I] still felt … How 
to say … [I was] not frightened by the loss and wanted to continue. 
 
In summary, their ideas of trading as ‘a sideline business’ and ‘a hobby’ reveal 
that lay investors tend to construct another mental mechanism, unlike the 
professionals’ one, to deal with the risk factor in trading. They also suggest the 
meanings within the configurations of lay investors are drawn from social 
conventions rather than economics. Various market devices and alternative sources 
of meanings of trading imply the variety and bricolage of the models of agencements 
of lay market actors. 
 
3.5 Assembling lay market actors 
 
When lay investors define stock trading as a sideline business or a hobby, it suggests 
that their trading activity is woven with other activities in their lives. In other words, 
the agencements of lay market actors would assemble in different daily-life 
environments. The occupation of a lay investor roughly represents this person’s main 
daily-life environment; for example, the occupation somewhat determines a person’s 
timetable, content of work and places furnished with market devices. I roughly 
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divide the configurations of lay investors into four models according to the spatio-
temporal characteristic of their occupations: student, mployee, self-employed and 
brokerage-office attender. The data is mainly drawn from the interviews and 
collaborated with the observation of the last category. These models just suggest 
some popular models in Taiwan and do not encompass all configurations of lay 
investors. The function of the construction of these models is to underscore the 




The TWSE’s daily session lasts from 9:00 to 13:30. The trading hours clashes with 
students’ morning classes. In order to catch the immediate changes of shares prices 
without interruption, Mr Liu usually carries his laptop into class. He listens to the 
lecture while at the same time giving some attention o his laptop screen, which is 
displaying real-time stock market information transmitted via the Internet. 
Sometimes, when market fluctuation is particularly active, he will skip class and 
concentrate on trading. Mr Liu probably is an extreme case. The other student 
investors rarely watch the real-time market information while in class. Instead, they 
usually make use of their lunch break to check share prices and collect general trends 
of that day’s market. In most Taiwanese universitie, no classes are held during the 
lunch break, and the computer laboratories are openfor students to use freely. This is 
convenient for student investors, who want to watch the last-hour trading. The last 
trading hour is usually considered an important hour of the trading session, because 
shares prices or the general market trend sometimes dramatically change just before 
the market closes. For many student investors, checking the market situation at lunch 
time has become a habit. Furthermore, some informants, e.g., Yi-Hong, tell me they 
would use a little time to read the review of the day’s stock market on the Internet 
and put the next day’s limit price order into the online trading system before going to 
sleep. 
The computer is the main market device for student investors to trade stock. 
They tend to use computers to read analysts’ reports, collect data of listed companies, 
learn about the market, put trading orders, access real-time market information and 
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exchange opinions about the market with others. They usually don’t watch the stock 
market television channels, read financial newspapers, or go to brokerage offices. 
Computers connect them with the world of stock trading. In addition, a common 
feature of the student investors is that they frequently visit online stock trading 
forums to read information and other investors’ opinions of market trends. Among 
the many large stock trading online forums in Taiwan, the forum which is commonly 
visited by these student investors is the Ptt. The Ptt is the largest Bulletin Board 
System (BBS) in Taiwan, which is supported by the non-profit BBS student 
association of the National Taiwan University. While the trend of BBS usage is 
declining, the number of the Ptt users is growing.58 Its 20,000 message boards cover 
nearly all the popular topics in Taiwan. Not surprisingly, the Stock board is one of 
the hottest boards. The Stock board’s contents include news, listed companies 
information, knowledge of the stock market, analysis kills, personal opinions of 





During the daytime, most employees are in their offices and their actions are usually 
supervised by company managers. Several informants told me that a number of 
Taiwanese companies block their office computers’ Internet connection to 
‘distracting’ websites, such as Facebook and online stock trading sites. In addition, it 
is also difficult for employees to use office phone lines to place trading orders, 
because the boss often patrols around. In this situation, employee investors tend to 
use their cell phones to place orders. They either call brokers or connect to online 
trading systems via the 3G network. In the past, before the widespread use of cell 
phones, Ms Zeng used to go out of the office and place orders by calling her broker 
on a public phone. 
Reading the newspaper in the morning, watching stock television channels or 
browsing the Internet news at night to collect the market information is a common 
pattern for employee investors, e.g., Mr He, Mr Zhang and Ou-Yang. The market 
                                                
58 The Ptt has over a million registered members, above 20,000 message boards and around 150,000 
visitors constantly on line in daily peak hours (http://www.ptt.cc). 
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hours overlap with most employer investors’ working hours. It is inconvenient for 
them to keep up with real-time market information, though the information is 
important for stock trading. Some websites which provide real-time stock market 
information, such as Yahoo (http://tw.stock.yahoo.cm/), are usually also blocked in 
companies’ computers.59 
 
3.5.3 Self-employed, family-owned business members and homemakers 
 
It would be expected that homemaker investors are expected to have the most 
‘freedom’ for trading stock during working hours, because their workplace is their 
home. They are able arrange their working schedule to some extent and are not 
supervised and regulated by other people during their work. Wuma’s life schedule is 
an example of a homemaker investor’s model. She is used to turning on a real-time 
stock market television programme when the market opens. Usually, she does 
housework, e.g., cooking, and watches the market simultaneously. When she thinks 
the share prices have hit her target prices, she will call her broker and place an order. 
However, sometimes she is unable to immediately respond to market changes. For 
example, in the middle of the market’s opening hours, she will need to go shopping 
at the food market. After the market closes, she will continue to watch market-
analysis television programmes for one to two hours. 
In the past, Wuma traded stock in a brokerage office. This was very 
inconvenient for her, because she had to travel between the brokerage office and 
home and could not do housework and stock trading at the same time. The rise of 
cable television in the late 1990s seemed a key factor in freeing many homemaker 
investors like Wuma from the brokerage office. Cable television conveys 
inexpensive real-time trading information into the ome. In addition, the telephone 
recording system is another supporting device for homemaker investors trading at 
home. The system enhances investors’ confidence in placing trading orders by 
telephone, as it assures investors that their trading orders will not be ‘eaten’ by a 
dishonest broker. The Internet is also used by some homemaker investors to browse 
                                                
59 Although some employee investors’ office computers are allowed to access these websites, e.g., Mr. 
Yan, they usually cannot concentrate on the information. They have to handle their work and the 
manager dislikes employees watching the real-time stock market in the office. 
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the data of listed companies and access real-time pric  information. However, in 
general, when using a computer, the person must sit a a desk. It is not as ‘flexible’ as 
watching the television, which you can do while also doing housework. Thus, 
homemaker investors tend to access the market information via cable television. The 
computer with Internet connection is a kind of ‘assistant’ calculative device for 
homemaker investors. 
The trading behaviour of investors who are a partner of a family-owned 
business, or who are self-employed, is somewhat similar to that of homemaker 
investors. Many of them often do work and trade stock simultaneously. Family-
owned small and medium enterprises play an important role in the Taiwanese 
economy.60 The line between business and family life and the boundary between 
office and home are blurred, because most of the staff and shareholders are family 
members (see Chapter 1). Thus, people who work in their family enterprises tend to 
consider their workplace as a ‘semi’-home. 
For example, Ms Lin is a partner and the bookkeeper for her family’s 
enterprise, a small construction company. In the office, she occasionally keeps an eye 
on real-time market information via the Internet and trades stock by telephone. She 
trades stock overtly during working hours, because sh  is a main shareholder of the 
company. This is different to many employee investors, who must be more stealthy 
when trading stock in the office. Ms Hong is another example. She is a member of 
her family’s business and usually the only person who stays in the office (other 
members usually work in the field and sometimes she works in the field as well). 
Thus, she is used to switching on a real-time stock market television programme 
when she enters the office. When she stays in the office, she usually does the 
company’s work principally and occasionally pays attention to the television and 
calls the broker to place orders. 
 
3.5.4 Brokerage-office occupant 
 
                                                
60 According to the government’s survey, there were ov r 1,200,000 SMEs that occupied nearly 78 per 
cent of employment in Taiwan in 2011 (SMEA 2012). The majority of the SMEs are conjectured to be 
small and medium-sized family businesses (Chen 1994; Sheih 1997). 
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The development of technology has eliminated most crporeal reasons for individual 
investors to trade stock in brokerage offices, as mentioned above. Real-time market 
information and the reliable order-placing systems are accessible and often cheaper 
outside the brokerage offices; thus, there must be oth r reasons for these people to 
stay in there. This issue and the configuration of lay investors there will be elucidated 
in Chapter 5. 
 
3.5.5 Discussion: integration of stock trading into daily life 
 
According to Zelizer’s (1978, 2000) assertion, economic activities must be integrated 
into ordinary people’s existing webs of meaning and solidarity; otherwise, they 
would hardly be popular in society. Her study of the diffusion of life insurance in 
North America is one of the most perfect examples. The popularity, sociality and 
social connotations of stock trading in Taiwan seem completely consistent with 
Zelizer’s claim. However, the role of technology and the effect of social networks in 
the process should not be ignored. As shown above, the development of information 
and trading devices and the impacts of existing social relations are also crucial for 
the diffusion of stock trading in society and the integration of stock trading into 
people’s daily life. It suggests that Zelizer’s cultural approach, Granovetter’s social-
network approach and Callon and MacKenzie’s technological approach can 
complement each other and all are useful to illustrate the accomplishment of the 




This chapter aims to examine the two characteristics of the agencements of lay 
market actors: the diverse and bricolage models and the social connotations of trade 
with risk. The technological and institutional transformation of the market have 
produced various available information and trading devices for lay investors and 
therefore have allowed them to trade in everyday plces, though some of these were 
unintentionally products of the exchange, technicias, or other organizations, e.g., 
the illegal cable television companies. The connotations of ‘trading as a sideline 
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business’ and ‘trading as a hobby’ present and represent lay investors’ mental 
mechanism and physical practices in dealing with the market risk. The sources of 
these connotations are drawn from social conventions rather than economics or 
professionality. The agencements of lay market actors are diverse, bricolage, non-
professional and correspond with alternative connotations of trade, compared to the 
agencements of professional market actors. However, in the fiercely competitive 
financial markets, would the differences between the two sets of the agencements 
determine the power relation between professional ad l y market agents? This is 
































































The power of professional practitioners and lay investors in financial markets are 
conventionally believed to be asymmetric. Financial studies have provided some 
empirical evidence to support this idea. For example, Barber et al. (2007, 2008) have 
systematically examined the performances of different categories of investors in 
Taiwan’s stock market and found professional practitioners, such as institutional 
investors, generally outperform lay investors. The researchers argue that the result is 
attributed to the psychological differences between these two groups. From a 
behavioural financial perspective, both professional and lay investors do not act 
completely rationally in the market. However, some studies (including Barber et al.’s 
studies) argue that lay investors’ decisions, compared to professionals’, are more 
likely to be driven by overconfidence, heuristics, framing effect, etc., and thus lay 
investors are more likely to make ‘irrational’ market actions, such as overtrading, 
which severely damage the investment result (Barber and Odean 2000; Allee et al. 
2007; Barber et al. 2007, 2008). In other words, these studies tend to believe that the 
advantage of professional investors in the market results from their relatively solid 
economic rationality, though they claim that, in general, all market participants do 
not act fully rationally. 
Sociologists tend to take another viewpoint to examine the relation between lay 
and professional investors in financial markets. In general, they believe the 
disadvantage of lay investors stems from the hierarchical market structure (Wu 2005; 
Harrington 2012a). The uneven distribution of knowledge and information between 
classes of market participants is conjectured to generate the hierarchy in the markets 
(Preda 2009b).61 Wu’s (2005) study of the informational structure of Taiwan’s stock 
                                                
61 The argument that the hierarchical structure of the market produces unequal positions for market 
participants have been discussed in economic sociology (e.g., Podolny 1993). Preda (2009b) further 
examines the relation between market structures and information. He categorizes market structures 
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market and Harrington’s (2012a) study of the power relations of US stock markets 
both take this perspective and gain similar conclusions. They assert the knowledge 
and information of the stock markets are controlled by professional practitioners, 
because the professionals have the advantage to access the latest market information 
and also have better knowledge to interpret the information. Lay investors, on the 
other hand, generally are excluded from the centre of information production and 
knowledge transmission. These studies’ viewpoints are similar: information and 
knowledge equate to ‘power’ in the stock markets and lay investors are powerless 
due to insufficient information and knowledge. 
Although behavioural finance and sociology seemingly reach different 
conclusions about the causes of the asymmetry, I think these two viewpoints 
complement rather than displace in illumination of this subject and both of them can 
be incorporated into Callon’s (1998, 2008) theory of market actors. The concept of 
agencement is the core of Callon’s theory and has been introduce  in Chapter 3. In 
brief, from the agencement approach, the market actor is a socio-technical 
configuration with calculative capability which performs economics (in a broad 
sense, also including accounting, finance, etc.) in the market. The market actor is 
constituted of human beings and non-human entities. Thus, economic rationality, 
knowledge and information all are elements of agencement and they compose part of 
the market actor’s calculative capability. In other words, resulting from the different 
configurations of agencement, professional practitioners are capable of performing 
better than lay investors in the stock market. 
A contribution of the agencement concept is that it renders a broad scope with 
which to examine asymmetrical relations in financial markets; it also indicates 
another crucial cause which is less emphasized by behavioural finance and sociology: 
the difference of market devices. 
‘Market devices’ refer to ‘the material and discursive assemblages that 
intervene in the construction of markets’ (Muniesa et al. 2007: 2). The concept 
includes information systems, trading tools, evaluation models and all other non-
human entities which are necessary or helpful for agents to calculate and exchange in 
the market (Callon et al. 2007). Furthermore, Ismail Erturk and his colleagues (2013) 
                                                                                                                                
into three categories: networks, groups and communities, and argues the different structures would 
create different mechanisms of informational flow and knowledge distribution. 
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point out market devices are not always neural and purpose-designed tools but 
instead the uses and results of the devices vary with the contexts. Particularly, market 
devices (e.g., financial innovations) might be used by agents in a ‘dark’ way 
(immorally). 
Different classes of market agents tend to use diffrent market devices, and the 
functions, qualities and costs of these devices are not the same. Thus, the 
agencements of market actors are less likely to be identical. Sometimes, the different 
configurations generate the asymmetry of calculative capabilities between market 
agencies and become a cause of the inequality in the market (Callon 2008). 
For example, after automated order-matching systems were introduced into 
stock markets, the configurations of the markets have been substantially reformed. In 
these stock markets, to keep one step ahead of other participants by both accessing 
share prices and putting trading orders more rapidly, even within only milliseconds, 
would create an arbitrage opportunity (MacKenzie et al. 2012). Thus, the market 
practitioners have an incentive to reduce the time of data transmission between their 
computers and the server of the exchange. One of the feasible means to save time is 
to ‘cut’ the physical distance of the transmission by placing the company’s 
computers as close as possible to the exchange’s server. This plan has been carried 
out by large securities companies in the US and the fierce competition for the 
advantage locations has triggered soaring rents in the area around the computer 
server of the New York Stock Exchange (Financial Times 2010, 15 January: 18). In 
other words, the location itself has become a market device, which facilitates the 
market agents in strengthening their calculative capability; thus the agents who can 
afford the expensive rental rate assemble ‘more powerful’ agencements in the market. 
The asymmetry of calculative capabilities between lay investors and 
professional practitioners is expected to be larger than the gaps among different 
professional agencies. Normally, professional agents are members of organizations 
and they represent these institutions to act in the market. Supported by these 
organizations, professional agents are given plenty of resources and time to perform 
their market activities and achieve the maximum economic results. These 
organizational resources could transform into advanced and specialist devices and 
arrange powerful market agencements. On the other hand, lay investors tend to be 
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limited to devoting their individual time and resources to the market, because they do 
not control organizational resources. Normally, they cannot afford the advanced, but 
expensive, market devices as those used by professinal practitioners. Therefore, the 
calculative capabilities of lay investors are more lik ly to be inferior to professional 
practitioners’. 
 
4.1.1 Asymmetry of agencements 
 
Following the idea of agencement, Callon examines the market agents without 
sufficient calculative devices from another aspect: what helps them survive in the 
market? In a competitive market, if there is no additional support, the majority of 
disadvantaged agents are expected to ‘rapidly sink into exclusion’ or generally ‘cease 
to exist’ in the market. This idea indeed includes a et of questions: Who are the 
sources of support? What is the supporting equipment? How do disadvantaged 
market agents adopt and adapt the equipment? In Callon’s works, he concisely 
elucidates the ideas of sources and the supporting equipment by giving examples 
(governments, NGOs and international organizations as the examples of the sources; 
policies, micro-enterprise and micro-debits development programmes, information 
and communication devices as the examples of the equipment) and focuses on the 
adoption and adaptation of the equipment. In order to illuminate the different models 
of the integrations, Callon proposes the concepts of prosthesis and habilitation as the 
analysis framework (Callon 2008; Caliskan and Callon 2010). 
Inspired by Ingunn Moser’s (2005) and Myrian Winance’s (2006) works in 
disability, Callon cites the market agents without correct and sufficient market 
devices as analogous to ‘disabled people’ and the agents with proper equipment to 
the ‘able-bodied’. He argues that ‘disabled people’ would become ‘autonomous 
individuals’ (as the able-bodied) after overcoming maladjustment. The 
configurations of readjustment are classified as the prosthesis model and the 
habilitation model. The concept of prostheses is used to ‘describe a strategy of filling 
the gaps between unequal agencies’ and it refers to providing disabled people with 
the equipment which is deliberately designed and has inscribed in it the course of 
actions (Callon 2008: 44–6; Caliskan and Callon 2010: 13). However, prosthesis is 
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not always necessarily helpful. In a disadvantageous environment, new devices such 
as online trading systems might provide lay people with more opportunities to lose 
money in the market (see below). 
The alternative idea of habilitation is used to account for the environment that 
‘shapes devices, procedures, and forms of organization, aiming for the inclusion of 
the disabled person in an interactive diagram’. ‘Habilitation’ is a French word that 
means ‘to proffer a capacity to act to someone who lacks it’. The notion of 
habilitation is ‘to put the disabled person in a position to define her own projects by 
constructing the agencements enabling her both to conceive them and accomplish 
them’ (Callon 2008: 44; Caliskan and Callon 2010: 13). For Callon, these two 
concepts indicate two distinct approaches for analysing market agencements: 
 
In the prosthetic conception, individual agency is embedded in devices 
which define possible scenarios of action in a fairly rigid and restrictive 
way. In the habilitating conception, the entities involved (be they humans 
or non-humans) are more numerous, more diversified, more autonomous, 
and less disciplined, while the individual is put in a position to be able to 
interact with them in order to define projects. (Callon 2008: 45) 
 
Callon’s idea provides an insightful perspective to examine the devices which help 
lay investors overcome their disadvantages and to analyse the different integrations 
of the agents and the devices. In the literature, technical analysis skills (Mayall 2006; 
Roscoe and Howorth 2009), investment clubs (Harringto  2008, 2012a, 2012b) and 
online investment gadgets (Roscoe 2013) have been indicated as crucial market 
devices for lay investors’ stock-trading activities and seemingly match up with either 
Callon’s prosthetic or habilitation model. 
However, the difficulties of the application of Callon’s approach to the present 
study is that the ‘utilities’ of those various devices are difficult to assess and less 
evident; the reason perhaps also accounts for why the use of these devices is limited 
in some specific groups of lay investors. Particularly, the market devices which 
enable lay investors to calculate in the market and the devices which enable them to 
reach professional practitioners’ level of calculative capabilities are essentially 
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different. Almost all the market devices which are pproachable to lay investors are 
accessible to professional practitioners as well, but not vice versa. 
It also tempting to focus on specific tools from the large pool of market devices 
and attribute the survival of lay investors to them. Online trading systems are an 
example. Almost without doubt, online trading systems are considered a crucial 
supporting trading device for the majority of contemporary lay investors. However, 
Barber and Odean’s studies (2001, 2002) point out tha online trading systems’ 
convenience and low transaction fees incite lay investors to overtrade, and indeed the 
overall performance of online stock investors is sever ly damaged (worse than 
phone-based investors) due to the accumulative trading costs on the contrary. 
In order to deal with these difficulties, I develop an alternative strategy to study 
the asymmetry: that is, to begin my investigation from the perspective of the 
professional practitioners. First, I seek the critial and exclusive devices (and 
resources) which bring about the general advantage of professional practitioners over 
lay investors in the market. Secondly, I examine th ‘restraints’ which universally 
contain the power of professional agents to some ext nt and thus the gap of 
calculative capabilities in the market are not extended between the professionals and 
the lay investors. Third, I examine lay investors’ perceptions of the asymmetry and 
their responses to this market structure. 
This strategy is designed to analyse the maladjustment and readjustment of lay 
market agents from the agencement approach, but also avoid the nearly impossible 
work of encompassing and evaluating all market devices which have been adopted 
by lay investors. 
The data sources drawn on in this chapter are the same interviews and 
documents cited in Chapter 3. 
 
4.2 Advantages of the professional practitioners 
 
Mr Wang, a stock analyst of a large insurance company in Taiwan, lists the most 
important advantages of institutional investors (one type of professional practitioners) 
in the stock market: 
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[An institutional investor controls] a large amount of capital, so it is able 
to build a more comprehensive [investment] portfolio … In addition, an 
institutional investor has more resources … [Such as] information [and] 
instruments, more investment instruments, more available investment 
instruments … data sets [and] [market] devices are more … [Furthermore, 
it] has more people. 
 
In other words, the advantage of institutional investors in the market is generally 
attributed to the configurations of more devices, information, investment capital and 
personnel. The contribution of the assemblage of peple (professional practitioners) 
within a financial institution probably stems from the synergy of the division of 
labour and exchange of ideas between peers. The combination of this synergy and 
specific market devices (e.g., office layouts) has been discussed in Beunza and 
Stark’s (2004) work. In this section, I will focus on the first three factors: devices, 




In December 2010, I went to interview Wei-Qian, an insurance company trader, in 
his office lobby. In the interval (of only a few minutes), I was allowed to enter the 
office, a trading room pertaining to the investment department. The trading room is 
located in the headquarters building of the insurance company. The time was during 
the market hours. Dozens of traders with suits were sitting in the room. Some traders 
were staring at their screens and some were talking to their colleagues at either side. 
Although the time was too short to observe the details, the first impression of the 
scene reminded me of the images of trading rooms describ d in ethnographic works 
in social studies of finance (e.g., Beunza and Stark 2004; MacKenzie and Hardie 
2009). 
In the trading room, desks are arranged in rows, with each row including 
several seats. Traders sit side by side. Each seat has two to three screens which are 
displaying real-time market information, the trading system, or some other 
information. A keyboard, a telephone and papers are scattered on the desk. Next to 
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this trading room is a meeting room, which is used as the venue for the whole 
department’s daily morning meeting. Sometimes, some traders use this meeting room 
to discuss their trading strategies as well. 
The trading room is a contrast to the places where most lay investors trade 
stock, as mentioned in Chapter 3. It is apparent that the room is a space specifically 
designed for trading. The information and trading systems inside the trading room 
are advanced and specialist market devices. However, as discussed below, these 
devices do not render exclusive services to professional traders. For example, the 
time-consumption of data transmission in Taiwan’s stock market (that is, to receive 
real-time market information from the exchange and to place trading orders to the 
exchange) is the same for all investors. Professional practitioners cannot take 
advantage of a reduction of time consumption. 
Financial models are one of professional practitioners’ prominent exclusive 
market devices. The financial models I discuss here are not academic works in 
economics and finance. Academic financial models are used to account for 
operations of the market by economic principles. Originally, this kind of model was 
not designed for industrial purposes, though some of them are popularly used by 
practitioners in the financial industry (MacKenzie 2008). In the Taiwanese securities 
industry, financial models are thought of as an assistance tool to predict the share 
prices of listed companies. The disposition of these models is to associate share 
prices’ volatility with various economic and industrial indices. This tool is popularly 
used by professional practitioners in Taiwan’s stock market, particularly stock 
analysts. 
Construction of specialist financial models requires the combination of 
advanced knowledge of finance and statistics, and data sets (including detailed and 
comprehensive industrial and economical statistics), a  well as specific software and 
computers. In brief, the models are a product of pressional works. In the fieldwork, 
no lay investor had told me that they had ever used financial models to analyse the 
market. In this context, financial models are one of professional practitioners’ 
exclusive calculative devices, and therefore the usof financial models is a 
distinction between the professionals and the lay investors in market analysis. Mr 
Wang explains the application and the restraint of financial models in his work: 
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[To build] a financial model is [to facilitate] you to understand the 
operation of the company further. Then, in a different scenario, how will 
the profit [and] operation of the company change? … For example, you 
predict [the company’s profit] in next year … You may have some idea 
about the trend of the market environment … the trend of [the] 
economy … Through a model, you are able to … quantify [the facts] that 
affect the profit … The figure [the predicted profit] is outputted. 
[However,] does it reflect the share price [in the next year]? … [You just] 
conjecture the share price through the [predicted] profit. [Even if] your 
prediction of the profit is one hundred per cent accurate, the [prediction 
of] share price may be not. Because, in the end, [what determines] the 
share price is related to the evaluation [of the stock] from the whole 
market. 
 
Indeed, Wei-Qian has a similar comment on professional stock analysts’ forecast of 
the share prices: 
  
[An analyst] can know the company. He [is able to] estimate the earnings 
and other [company figures] in [the] next year, butcan he estimate how 
much [is the price] that people are willing to purchase the stock? 
 
The answer is ‘no’. All financial models or other tools are unable to precisely 
predict the market, no matter how sophisticated the equipment. The collection of 
powerful calculative devices, e.g., financial models, tends to give professional 
market actors an advantage in the competition of the market, but not the power to 




Professional practitioners tend to have the advantage in collecting market and 
industrial information (Wu 2005; Preda 2009b). For example, they are more likely 
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than lay investors to receive listed companies’ update  information (e.g., Yang 2003; 
Wu 2005). However, in this case, this information sharing is not an outcome from 
advanced equipment but from social networks. In Taiwan, visiting a listed company 
is a common way for professional practitioners, particularly analysts and fund 
managers, to access that company’s latest information (interviewing data). Their 
status as professional agents allows them to frequently visit the listed company, talk 
with the financial managers and investor relations (IR) personnel, and view 
manufacturing operations. Listed companies tend to welcome them and arrange 
private visits for them, because they represent large financial institutions and their 
decisions will substantially affect the companies’ share prices. 
On the other hand, individual investors rarely have this privilege. For example, 
Sheng-Ji, an experienced lay investor, is used to calling listed companies to ask 
information about their latest policies. Most companies would answer his questions 
as clearly as possible over the phone. However, these companies have never arranged 
a visit for him. 
Mr Wang is used to visiting listed companies and agrees his visits are a helpful 
tool for collecting information: 
 
More or less it is still somewhat [useful]. You would know the 
companies better … [I]n fact, mainly when you visit a company, [it] is 
less possible to view the factories … Frankly speaking, for example, 
[even if you were allowed] to view the manufacture of the Taiwan 
Semiconductor (TSMC), can you catch on [anything ofthe 
production]? … [Thus, the main purpose of visiting a company] is to 
build renmai [人脈, personal network], to build a communicative channel. 
Then, you can update information of this company somewhat [quicker]. 
[The channels usually] are the Chief Financial Officer [and] the IR 
[Investor Relations of the company]. 
 
Indeed, among the professional practitioners, the asymmetry of social status still 
exists. Steven, an analyst from a securities company, points out the issue of 
discrimination. Some large listed companies only arrange private visits for agents 
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from large (influential) financial institutions. Ifthe agent’s company is not large (not 
influential) enough, the agent must wait until a scheduled group visit is arranged (for 
professional practitioners only). 
Furthermore, Steven emphasizes that the information pr vided by the company 
managers is sometimes not reliable: 
 
For example, when we write an analysis report, we still follow the 
guidance provided by the company’s [informant] to write … [If] 
generally he deceives us … The situation happens frequently that the 
analyst is deceived [by the company’s informant]. Many times you would 
find later that the trend of the share prices completely differs from what 
the analyst writes. 
 
In Callon’s discussion of agencement and the asymmetrical power between the 
market actors, the effect of the social network is not emphasized. However, the social 
network’s influence in individuals’ economic performances has been underscored by 
many studies (see Granovetter’s review 2005). In this case, a listed company’s most 
recent information, which is transmitted through the personal network, is valued 
dependent on the informer’s status in the market, and thus it an obvious advantage to 
be a professional practitioner. The networks somewhat strengthen professional 
agents’ calculative capabilities. However, as Steven emphasizes, the information 
from this type of personal network is not always reliable; fraud and failure occur 
sometimes. As sophisticated market equipment, the social network is helpful but still 
unable to let professional investors always make profits in the stock market. 
 
4.2.3 Investment capital 
 
Professional investors trade organizational proprietary capitals or collective capital of 
clients’ assets in the stock market. Essentially (or strictly speaking), the managed 
investment capital is not a part of market devices (the investment capital is not a 
component of the calculative capabilities of professional market agents). However, it 
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fosters the performance of the agencements of professional market actors in two 
aspects. 
First, the large size of investment capital is a necessary element for 
constructing some trading strategies. For example, Wei-Qian, the insurance company 
trader, is in charge of managing an approximately US$100 million investment fund 
in the stock market’s financial sector and a US$16.5 million investment fund in the 
futures market; the other five traders in his ‘financial stocks’ team all manage 
similar-sized investment funds. The size of the investment funds allows Wei-Qian to 
hedge (reduce risk exposure of) the equity in the portfolio by taking an opposite 
position in futures. He often uses this means to reduc  the asset portfolio’s volatility. 
The size of investment capital is a marked distinctio  between institutional investors 
and lay investors. Normally, hedging is not a feasible strategy for most lay investors, 
due to their limited amount of capital. 
Secondly, the investment capitals are not these traders’ own money, and it is 
helpful for them to insist upon economic rationality in their decision making. Like 
most traders in the market, Wei-Qian’s salary is linked to the performance of the 
investment portfolio. However, he thinks the feeling s still different to trading one’s 
own money in the market: 
 
You are not very afraid of losing money, so your investment [decisions] 
are more likely to go back to [follow] rationality … [For example,] a 
sanhu [lay investor] has [a total of] 100,000 dollars asset and takes 
500,000 dollars to play [trade stock] … [That person] will have large 
pressures. …The money [investment capital] of institutional investors is 
companies’ money … Because [it is] not my own money … [it] doesn’t 
mean [I] don’t care … [but I] can make decisions more rationally … I 
think even the most excellent professional trader can’t keep the same 
[rational] mood when the investment capital is his own money. 
 
This idea is consistent with the findings in behavioural finance and elucidates one of 




4.2.4 Further discussion: insider information 
 
The ‘advantageous’ market devices reported in this section are all ‘legal’ ones. These 
devices tend to facilitate professional practitioners in frequently outperforming lay 
investors in the market, but not always. However, as underscored in Erturk et al.’s 
article (2013), the dark side of market devices should not be overlooked. A powerful 
but infamous device in stock markets should be included in this discussion: insider 
information. 
Nowadays, insider trading is a universally illegal conduct, because the activity 
undermines the fairness of the market. However, it was not the case before the 1980s. 
Insider trading was not prohibited in many countries and to profit from it was treated 
as a form of compensation for managers and employees.62 The number of countries 
which set insider-trading laws increased obviously from the 1980s and these laws 
quickly became common in stock markets worldwide (Nwkirk and Robertson 1998; 
Kitch 2000; Bhattcharya and Daouk 2002). 
Though both professional practitioners and lay investors have chances to 
access insider information, professional practitioners probably have more 
information channels and earn more profit from insider trading, due to their social 
connections inside the industries and large amounts of investment capital in general. 
For example, SAC Capital (the US$14 billion Wall Street hedge fund) was recently 
accused of insider trading. According to the Financial Times, SAC has regularly 
maintained 30 per cent annual returns since the 1990s and seemingly confounded 
efficient-market theories. The government alleged the astonishing overperformance 
of SAC was partially attributed to insider information (Financial Times, 26 July 
2013). 
With regard to Taiwan’s stock market, almost all lay investors agree insider 
information is one of the most powerful market ‘devic s’ and incidents of insider 
trading are often heard about in the market, though insider-trading regulations were 
                                                
62 In 1934, the US first set insider-trading regulation. The next country to do so was France in 1967, 
Britain followed in 1981. In 1989, the European Community Insider Trading Directive was passed, 
and all EU countries were required to establish insider-trading regulations. For example, Germany and 
Italy established the laws in 1995 and 1996 respectively (Newkirk and Robertson 1998; Bhattcharya 
and Daouk 2002). 
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set in 1988 and the first prosecution took place only a year later (Bhattacharya and 
Daouk 2002). The circulation of insider information by lay investors has been 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
Similarly, the professional practitioners also think insider information is 
powerful and commonly used in the securities industry. For example, both Shan-
Zhou and Zong-Wei (a financial adviser) consider insider information is much more 
useful than other analytic devices and trading strategies. Steven conjectures that 
insider trading remains popular inside the industry because the regulations are not 
strict and comprehensive enough and thus the perpetrators can easily find loopholes. 
However, the situation may start to change. In 2013, several fund managers were 
sequentially prosecuted for insider trading and some pleaded guilty (China Times 
2013, 9 April), suggesting that the use of insider information, the most powerful 
market ‘device’, is becoming ever more risky. 
Unfortunately, due to the limitation of the data, this study is unable to examine 
the circulation and popularity of insider information amongst professional 
practitioners, and therefore the possible asymmetry in this aspect between the 
professionals and lay investors cannot be analysed. However, it is worth exploring 




Analysis devices, information networks and investment capital facilitate professional 
practitioners to occupy an advantageous position in the market. However, the 
advantage is restricted. Several ‘restraints’ confine the professionals’ superior 
calculative capabilities to some extent and therefore the gap between professional 
practitioners’ and lay investors’ calculative capabilities remains but is not necessarily 
widening. 
 
4.3.1 Market system 
 
A reduction in the time consumption of data transmission, particularly incorporated 
with high-frequency trading systems, is one of the most powerful market tools for 
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professional practitioners in the US stock markets (Financial Times 2010, 15 January: 
12). However, this is not the same case in Taiwan. According to the interviews with 
traders, brokers and analysts, professional investors have not been able to take 
advantage of this aspect. That is, the time consumption of data transmission between 
the exchange and each investor, whether professional or lay, is practically the same. 
A contingent factor which produces this equilibrium is the design of the 
TWSE’s automated order-matching system. The TWSE introduced the computer-
assisted order-system in 1985 and then upgraded the syst m to the fully automated 
order-matching system in 1993. Indeed, it was one of the earliest in the world (Jain 
2005; TWSE Monthly Review 595: 14, 2011). Due to technological restrictions at that 
time and in order to maintain the consistency of the trading pattern between the two 
systems, the exchange decided not to adopt a ‘fully’ continuous trading model in the 
new system (TWSE Monthly Review 595: 14–16, 2011). In the beginning, a round of 
each match was 90 seconds. During this 90 seconds, the matching execution did not 
follow time priority but price priority. In other words, within the time period, 
whether the order arrived at the first second or the last second, it would not affect its 
sequence in this round of matching. With the improvement of the computer system 
and the increase of trading volume, the time of order-matching has gradually been 
reduced until it is at the present time 20 seconds per round (TWSE Monthly Review 
595: 14, 2011). 
Under this condition, there seems no room for time arbitrage. To place an order 
‘physically’ quicker does not gain any advantage in the market, which may be the 
reason that the high-frequency trading system based on the advantageous speedy data 
transmission, as found in Wall Street (Financial Times 2010, 15 January: 12), has not 
been introduced into Taiwan. At least, it has not been heard by any of the 
interviewees that any market participant in the industry has established the high-
frequency trading system.63 
In fact, to reduce the processing time of order-matching from 20 seconds to 
milliseconds has not been a technological problem for the exchange. Since 2010, the 
warrants trading in the TWSE has shifted from 20-seconds-a-match to the completely 
continuous trading system (a match within milliseconds). It was an experiment for 
                                                
63 In the interviews, the professionals in the securities industry have a rough idea of high-frequency 
trading systems, but they usually know about them through foreign financial news reports. 
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the exchange. ‘Public reaction’ about the new warrants trading system would 
determine the date when the exchange will introduce the completely continuous 
trading system into the stock market. According to news reports, it is expected to be 
introduced in the near future (Economy Daily News, 28 June 2010; Wang 2011). 
 
4.3.2 The government’s attitude 
 
‘Public reaction’ is a crucial concern of the TWSE’s decision making. The lay 
investors’ opinions seem to be the main ingredient of ‘public reaction’. Like many 
stock exchanges formed after the Second World War, the establishment of the TWSE 
was directed by the government and its main purpose was to promote economic 
development (Chiang 1991; Lavelle 2004). To date, th  government is still the 
largest shareholder, has the right to appoint the CEO and directs the TWSE’s policies, 
though the TWSE is in name a ‘private’ corporation (Peng 2009: 281–2). For 
Taiwanese people, the TWSE is more like a public institution rather than a private 
company (interview data). On the other hand, the TWSE’s employees seem to 
consider themselves as civil servants rather than working for a private company, and 
‘to implement government policy’ is often mentioned in the oral history of the 
TWSE staff (TWSE Monthly Review 593–7, 2011). 
 Another reason that the TWSE is thought to be concerned about lay investors’ 
reactions to any new policy, such as the introduction of new trading system, is drawn 
from conventional political interventions in Taiwan’s stock market. The huge 
number of stock investors in Taiwan (almost half of the adult population) has 
determined this group would be an influential ‘class’ in politics. The government 
seems to want to please (or at least not alienate or anger) the sanhu (small, lay 
investors). A prominent example is the conventional hupan policies (Hsu 1999; Deng 
2001; Huang 2001; Lu 2003).64  
                                                
64 Hsu (1999), Deng (2001) and Huang (2001) all argue that the KMT party endeavoured to maintain 
their position as the ruling party after democratization, so the government intervened in the stock 
market and raised share prices to please individual investors. In other words, the intervention was a 
strategy for election mobilization for the KMT party. However, these researchers only study Taiwan 
in the 1990s, the early years of the democratic regim . They do not mention that the intervention 
policies have not changed since the party rotations in 2000 and 2008. 
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The terms ‘hupan’ (護盤), is a very popular slang term in Taiwan’s stock 
market. ‘Hupan’ literally means ‘to protect, rescue or maintain the situation’. It is 
used to describe the action, ‘to intervene in the stock market for maintaining share 
prices, especially after a downturn’. This term often appears in the news and reports, 
and also has been used in academic financial studie (e.g., Ma, Zhan and Hu 2002). 
In general, the purpose for government intervention in the stock market is ‘hupan’.  
The first time that the Taiwanese government intervened in the stock market 
was in 1965, at the time of the plunge in world sugar prices. At the same time, 
Taiwan’s stock market crashed with the collapse of the Taiwan Sugar Corporation’s 
share prices. The government closed the market for ten days and instructed the state-
owned banks to purchase the shares until they recovered (Lu 2003: 55). 
To the present day, there have been dozens of hupan events in the history of 
Taiwan’s stock market.65 One, for example, took place in October 1988. Due to the 
continuous falls in the market, groups of lay investor  from all over Taiwan had 
planned to demonstrate in front of the TWSE building. The demonstration was 
postponed only the day before it was to be held, because the TWSE’s director 
privately passed on a message to key members of the groups in which he promised 
the market will ‘satisfy everybody’ soon (implying that the government will hupan 
on that day) and asking that the demonstration be cancelled. The market rebounded 
that very day and the demonstration was called off (United Evening News, 22 
October 1988: 3). 
 ‘Small-investor democracy’ perhaps is an apt term to describe the political 
power of Taiwanese lay investors. It seems less possible that the government 
(including the TWSE) apparently favours professional pr ctitioners in policy making 
or intentionally creates an institutional opportuniy which would allow professional 
practitioners to ‘overwhelm’ lay investors by superior calculative capabilities. The 
                                                
65 Lu (2003: 55–64) has compiled a list of the governme t’s main interventions (hupan) in Taiwan’s 
stock market from 1965 to 2000. According to Lu’s report, the Taiwanese government’s interventions 
in the stock market can be divided into two stages. The first stage is from 1965 to 1988, and the 
second one from 1990 to 2000. During the first stage, Taiwan was still an authoritarian regime. The 
government was used to instruct banks, especially state-owned banks, and push ‘big’ stock investors 
to enter the stock market to purchase shares. During the second stage, Taiwan has been a democratic 
state with liberalized, privatized and deregulated financial sectors. The government changed to 
instruct the state-controlled funds to enter the stock market to purchase shares. The foundation of the 
National Financial Stabilization Fund was an important occasion. The function of this fund is to 
‘stabilize’ Taiwan’s stock market; in other words, it is a professional ‘hupan’ fund. 
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relations between politicians and financial elites in Taiwan remain close, and as 
evidence, a number of political corruption scandals in ecurities industry have been 
reported, as in many other countries (Peng 2009; Harrington 2012a). However, the 
voice from lay investors (representing half of the otal amount of votes) cannot be 




Compared to institutional investors, ‘trading under less regulation’ is an advantage of 
lay investors in the market, though most lay investors seem not aware of this. In 
general, institutional investors’ market activities are under stricter regulations. Take 
the case of Wei-Qian, for example. As a trader for a listed insurance company, his 
investment portfolio cannot include the stock of this insurance company and other 
companies of the same conglomerate because of a conflict f interest. 
In addition, he and his colleagues’ trades are likely to conflict with each other’s 
action and they always must negotiate and reach a joint agreement. In this company, 
six traders are in charge of financial stocks investm nt and each trader manages an 
independent portfolio. The investment of the whole company on each stock has a 
legal cap: 10 per cent of the overall shares. When t  company holds over 5 per cent 
shares of a financial company’s stock, the company must announce to the public 
every 1 per cent increase in the share value. Thus, t e traders must always add up the 
shares of each stock of each person’s portfolio for conformity to regulations and 
negotiate who can purchase more when all the traders have a similar positive idea 
about investing in a certain company. 
It is impossible that they always have the same visions of shares prices of 
stocks. However, they belong to the same institute, and an institutional investor is 
forbidden to do reverse trading of the same stocks in one day. It means they must 
choose only ‘on the buy side’ or only ‘on the sell side’ of each stock in one day. If 
coincidentally some traders plan to purchase some stock  but other traders plan to 
sell the same stocks from their portfolios, they have to negotiate whose trades will be 
active on that day and whose trades will be on another day though each of them think 
the same date is the best timing for their transaction. Sometimes share prices change 
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dramatically between the two days, and thus postponing the trade will probably have 
hurt at least one of these traders’ performances.  
Furthermore, most institutional investors are not allowed to ‘leave’ the market 
completely even if the assets managers expect the market is going to decline. The 
proportions of cash in their assets are regulated and c pped by the companies and the 
government. For example, the proportion of cash in assets of mutual funds is not 
allowed to exceed 20 per cent.66 Shan-Zhu, a securities analyst and former fund 
manager, cites the 2008 stock market crash as an example: 
 
In [20]08, the most awkward thing which [I] encountered was that [I] had 
known it [the market] would fall, but you could not [had to buy]. [I] had 
to select the one [whose price] would decrease less from a hundred, a 
thousand stocks. Those stocks, [I] had known [the trades] would lose 
money. [I] had to buy [them]. It was very painful …just because of the 
contracts of the mutual funds … . 
 
In Wei-Qian’s department, conventionally, the cash proportion of the managed assets 
is around 10 per cent. In a market plunge, they cannot sell all the stocks, keep the 
cash on hand, wait for the rebound and then enter the market again. In contrast, lay 
investors are able to freely convert all their stocks into cash if the market plunges and 
reduce the damage of their asset prices’ decline. 
Institutional investors’ actions are under more rigo ous regulations and 
sometimes this affects their performances. This is one of the reasons that a number of 
the professional interviewees insisted that lay investors still have opportunities to 
‘compete with’ institutional investors in the market. 
 
4.3.4 Market efficiency 
 
The inequality in professional and lay market actors’ calculative capabilities in a 
financial market is linked to the discussion of both random walk theory and efficient-
market theory. The core idea of these theories is that if the market is efficient, then 
                                                
66 The percentage is inscribed in ‘Regulations on the Management of Collective Investmn  Trust 
Funds’ (http://www.selaw.com.tw/Scripts/newsdetail.asp?no=G0060910). 
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securities prices should always fully reflect all available information and that 
therefore price movements can only be caused by new i formation which makes the 
price changing unpredictably or randomly (Fama 1965, 1970).67 In other words, any 
analysis skill or any analysis tool should not enable market participants to 
continuously defeat others in a stock market. Thus, if the professionals own 
obviously superior calculative capability, no matter due to calculative devices, 
knowledge, or information, does it suggest that the market does not work efficiently 
and the professionals could always overwhelm the lay investors and that the latter 
would drift out of the market? 
An interesting contest held by the Wall Street Journal perhaps provides a 
useful clue about the evaluation of professional prctitioner’s calculative capability. 
To slightly test the efficient-market hypothesis, the journal held a game to compare 
the performances of a small number of stocks selected by the professionals and a 
similar number of stocks selected by randomly throwing darts. From 1990 to 2002, 
the professionals defeated the darts 87 times in 142 contests. In 1999, the 
newspaper’s readers had also been invited into the game. Overall, the professionals 
outperformed the readers as well (Jasen 2002). Obviously, the game is not a robust 
academic research study. In the academy, the overperfo mance of a number of ‘hot-
hand’ mutual fund managers is somewhat evident, but the ‘reasons’ for their  
superior performance are still under debate (e.g., Carhart 1997; Wermers 2000; 
Malkiel 2003). 
The result is somewhat consistent to the argument of this study. Professional 
market actors tend to posses superior calculative capability in the market, but the 
advantage is not ‘strong’ enough to allow them to ‘win’ (outperform) every time in 
the market. In other words, the market remains ‘effici nt’ to some extent. Wei-Qian’s 
comment on his job elucidates a professional practitioner’s idea of the ‘efficiency’ of 
the market:  
 
[T]he characteristic of [stock] investment is that it is very hard in the first 
year when you enter [this job]. After you have done [trading] for ten 
                                                
67 Indeed, the debate about the existence of the efficient-market hypothesis in the market still 
continues in academy. Particularly, the attack from behavioural fiancé is very fierce (e.g., Shiller 2003; 
Malkiel 2003). 
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years, [the work] is still as hard as your first year … [You would get] 
more experience if you have done [it] for a longer time, but it does not 
ensure that you, the experienced [person], would earn more than the less 
experienced person … So the thing [performance] is very unsecured [the 
experience is no guarantee of the performance]. Today, you do well, do 
smoothly. What you do is completely correct. [However,] the same 
strategies may not work in the next year … Because share prices are 
share prices, stock analyses are stock analyses. 
 
The market is still somewhat efficient and fair. All market participants are destined 
to face market uncertainty, and professional investors’ decisions and strategies are 
not always ‘right’. This is another restraint of the calculative capabilities which is 
underscored by professional practitioners. 
 
4.4 Lay investor’s perceptions and responses 
 
Rational individuals will not enter a stock market when they expect they almost 
surely will lose money. If the inequality of professional actors’ and lay actors’ 
calculative capability is so overt, why are so many lay people willing to engage in 
stock trading rather than investing mutual funds (the funds managed by professional 
practitioners)? Lay investors’ perceptions of the institutional investors’ advantage in 
the stock market perhaps give us a clue. These perce tions are not necessarily fully 
consistent with theories and findings of academic studies or professional 
practitioners’ understandings, but the perceptions must render lay investors 
somewhat confident in the market competition and facilit te them in developing 
useful strategies to respond to the advantage of institutional investors. Otherwise, 
they would not have thought of entering the market (b cause it seems impossible to 
compete with professional investors) or would have left the market already (because 
their strategies were not at all workable). 
  
4.4.1 Perceptions of the advantage 
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In general, lay investors do not consider professional practitioners to have superior 
trading skills in the market. For example, Sheng-Ji asserts this argument by his 
observation of professional practitioners’ trading i  the market:  
 
Institutional investors are not always right. Someti s, [they] sell [stocks] 
at the lowest points [lowest prices] and buy [stocks] after [the prices] 
have grown a lot. 
 
In Taiwan’s stock market, the daily statistic report announces the sum of each 
stock’s trading volume. The report discloses the changes of shareholdings of the 
three categories of institutional investors: dealers, securities investment trust 
companies, and foreign investors. The data does not reveal the sum of the shares of 
each stock held by each institutional investor. However, the data seems enough for 
many lay investors to interpret institutional investor ’ trading strategies and to 
evaluate the overall performance of this group. In many lay investors’ perception 
(though it does not mean their perception is correct), the calculative capabilities of 
institutional investors don’t seem to be outstanding. Professional market actors’ 
sophisticated devices and professional financial knowledge are not considered by lay 
investors as super-powerful weapons in the market competition. For example, Ms 
Zeng is inclined to suspect the expertise of professional practitioners:  
 
Their expertise is financial expertise. All [these] experts do not conform 
to the expert in the stock market. I think there ardoctors of science, 
engineering and medicine, [but] there is no doctor of stocks. I really think 
so. 
 
Her suspicion also suggests that many lay investors are somewhat confident 
about their trading decisions. At least, they tend to consider their capability for 
market analysis is not inferior, even if not superior, to professional practitioners’ 
analyses. Sheng-Ji elucidates the ‘reason’ for his confidence in his securities analysis: 
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[If] it [the institutional investor] employs ten [an lysts] … [there are] 
2000 stocks [in the market] [and] he [an analyst] has to study 100 stocks. 
[Would my understanding of the stocks] be inferior to his [the analyst’s] 
if [I] only [study] one [or] two stocks? Is it reasonable? Even I am not as 
clever as him [the analyst], [but] I only study one [or] two stocks. Who 
will win? Even [if] I am not as clever as him. 
 
On the other hand, most lay investors still concede that institutional investors occupy 
an advantageous position in the market. They argue the advantage does not stem 
from professional practitioners’ calculative capability (most lay investors seemingly 
deny it), but from their investment capital. Most lay investors agree that their huge 
amounts of investment capital are the institutional i vestors’ key advantage. ‘The 
stock market is still where who has more bullets [capital]’, Ms Qiu says, ‘[will easily] 
be the winner.’ In this situation, ‘we can’t play better than it [institutional investors]’, 
Ms Huang says, ‘its capital is [huge] enough.’ Particularly, the prices of many small-
cap (small-market-capitalization) stocks are easily affected by institutional investors’ 
trades. Ms Hong says:  
 
Because they [institutional investors] have more [investment] capital, 
[the institutional investor] may be able to make [the share price] up and 
make it down. It is powerful [for] this [reason]. The ‘powerful’ doesn’t 
mean it is really [any] good in analysis. 
 
Mr Yang suggests another benefit of institutional investors’ large investment 
capital: 
 
Usually [unfavourable] political factors would [impact institutional 
investors] as well [as individual investors]. However, their [institutional 
investors’] capital is abundant and [the money] can be placed in [the 





In lay investors’ eyes, huge investment capital is the main advantage of institutional 
investors rather than their calculative capabilities. In contrast, they believe 
themselves to be modest participants in the market, because the amounts of their 
capital are too small to affect the market trend. In order to survive in this 
‘unfavourable’ market structure (from the individual investors’ perspective), the 
adoption of proper trading strategies seems key. Mr Zhan says: 
 
I think the interesting part of [trading] stock is that sanhu [lay/individual 
investors] have sanhu’s strategy and dahu [big players]68 have dahu’s 
strategy. What you [sanhu need to] do is to grasp the best timing. 
 
The best ‘timing’ for lay investors is to precisely catch the rising ‘trend’ in the 
market. They tend to ‘sit on’ the ‘trend’ and take a little benefit from it. Mr Yan says: 
 
[We] just [want] to share a small cup of soup [a piece of the action]. [We] 
only follow the trend to act [trade]. [Lay investors] have to understand. 
Don’t think [misunderstand] yourself are very excellent. Don’t think [you] 
can act [trade] against the trend. [We] only can say when the wave is 
coming you are going to surf a section on the way. 
 
To make a profit by surfing on the ‘trend’ is not a rare strategy. The momentum 
effect (the tendency that rising share prices remain rising and falling prices keep 
falling) has been attested in finance (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman 2001). The similar 
strategies are popularly used by UK and Australian lay stock investors (Mayall 2006; 
Roscoe and Howorth 2009). However, from the Taiwanese lay investors’ perspective, 
the ‘trend’ is highly connected to big players’ actions in the market. The rising 
‘trend’ is created by ‘money’ and institutional investors’ trading is one of the main 
                                                
68 Dahu originally denotes the ‘powerful’ individual investors who have large amounts of money (see 
Chapter 2). However, with the growth of institutional investors in the TWSE, the connotation of dahu 
includes also institutional investors in some contexts, because both types of dahu control large 
amounts of investment capital. 
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sources producing the trend. Thus, to trace institutional investors’ trades has been a 
common trading strategy for lay investors. 
 ‘We follow others [institutional investors] to purchase,’ Wuma says. ‘[The 
strategy is to] ride on others’ [big players’] sedan chair.’ Mr Liu has a similar 
comment. Many analogies are used by lay investors to describe their relationship 
with the institutional investors. ‘[We] are somewhat similar to the small fish 
alongside the whales,’ Guang says, ‘[we] eat their leftovers.’ 
To follow institutional investors’ trades and take a piece of their action is what 
many lay investors expect. ‘[I] am satisfied with just picking the crumbs on the side 
to eat,’ Zhi-Chun says. In particular, they regularly remind themselves to be humble 
and not to be greedy. They are like a person sitting o  a walking ‘giant’s shoulder, 
taking advantage of his quick progress, but in danger of being injured if the giant 
makes an unpredictable move. Therefore, they shouldn’t sit on the giant’s shoulder 
for too long. Rou-Zhu says: 
 
‘[ S]anhu … have to ride on the right vehicle which is moving before the 
wind. Otherwise, [they] would taolao [be trapped up in the market] … 
When foreign institutional investors [start] to dump [sell shares], you 
start to be trapped … [If] you don’t take the profit [r ght away] … don’t 
flee, when others [institutional investors] start to sell, you are trapped up. 
 
4.4.3 Reasons to trade 
 
If lay investors agree institutional investors occupy an advantageous position in the 
market, why do they not invest mutual funds (a type of institutional investors) rather 
than trade by themselves? In finance, a number of efficient-market theorists have 
argued that passively managed index funds should be the best investment vehicles 
for individual investors (e.g., Malkiel 2003). On the other hand, some financial 
studies of market anomalies have suggested overperfo mance of some ‘hot-hand’ 
actively-managed mutual funds69 (e.g., Carhart 1997; Wermers 2000). However, in 
the interviews, most lay investors are less interesd in putting money into either 
                                                
69 From the interviewed lay investors’ perspective, credits is not given to the managers’ outstanding 
trading skills, but to the advantage of the huge amounts of funds. 
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actively managed stock mutual funds or passively managed stock index funds, 
though most of them think they are in a relatively disadvantageous position in the 
market. 
Actively managed stock mutual funds are commonly abbreviated to ‘gupaio 
jijin ’ ( 股票基金 ; stock funds) or ‘jijin ’ ( 基金 ; funds). The first four actively 
managed stock mutual funds were launched in 1986 (Peng 2009: 127–8). On the 
other hand, passively managed stock index funds do not have a long history is in 
Taiwan, and many of them are exchange-traded funds (ETF) as well. In 2003, the 
first index fund (also the first ETF), ‘Taiwan Top 50 Fund’ (usually called ‘台灣 50; 
Taiwan 50’), was listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (http://www.p-
shares.com/page2.htm). To the present day, the ‘Taiwan 50’ is the most well-known 
index fund in Taiwan. In January 2013, there were a tot l of 172 domestic actively 
managed stock mutual funds and 16 domestic passively managed stock index funds 
in Taiwan (http://www.sitca.org.tw). 
High cost, slow return and the feeling of insecurity are the three main factors 
that impede the popularity of actively managed mutual stock funds. In Taiwan’s 
stock market, trading costs are not high. Brokerage firms charge individual investors 
normally 0.07–0.1425 per cent of the value per trade nd 0.1425 per cent is the 
maximum cap. In contrast, the cost is much higher in investing actively managed 
stock mutual funds. The purchase fees are normally 0.4–1.5 per cent of the value. 
Furthermore, the fund companies would charge approximately 1.5 per cent of the 
value as the annual management fees. In summary, the fees that mutual fund 
companies charge are normally several to ten times th  cost of stock trading fees. 
Thus, the funds are not attractive to many lay investors. For example, Guang thinks 
trading stock is a more ‘economic’ means to invest: 
 
Funds … [The] administrative fee is [an additional cost] … It [the value] 
is possible to drop as well. Indeed, its investing objects [the stocks] are 
similar to your [portfolio]. [You should] invest by ourself rather than 
you give [money] to him [the fund manager] to invest … [I] don’t say 
[the investment] controlled by myself [traded by myself] would be 
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[surely] better. [I] just say [the fund] charges [you] an additional cost but 
it doesn’t guarantee you a profit. 
 
The slow return on stock funds is another concern. ‘I feel [the values of] funds [grow] 
very slowly,’ Rou-Zhu says. A diverse portfolio of stock funds could reduce risk but 
also reduces the potential return of investment. This is a reason Sheng-Ji declines to 
invest mutual funds:  
 
I just concentrate ‘firepower’ [money]. [The portfolio which is] too 
diverse can’t make money. [An investor] should concentrate firepower 
on one to two [stocks]. Eggs [should] be put in onebasket. However, you 
have to watch out. Don’t let it fall down. 
 
Emotional insecurity is the other factor. Lay investor  tend to feel secure when 
they can ‘fully control’ trading. ‘Fully control’ means that they can decide the 
amount of capital and the objects (stocks) in each transaction. In particular, few 
individual investors have direct personal relations with the fund manager. For some 
individual investors, the manager is just an ‘unknow  stranger’. Cong-Ying says: 
‘[The speed] of earning is too slow [mutual funds]. In addition, [I] don’t feel secure 
giv[ing] money to a stranger to invest.’ 
Furthermore, the incomplete transparency also hinders some individual 
investors’ trust of the stock funds. The portfolio of mutual funds are only fully 
disclosed in seasonal or annual reports. Mrs Kuo dislikes this feature of mutual funds:  
 
Because, funds, we don’t know them. They, funds, [invented] by the 
American, are not good. Funds are always packages. The fund packs it, 
and packs that, and packs that … We don’t know what are really 
purchased inside [the fund]. 
 
For the same reasons, some interviewees do not choose index funds as their 
investment vehicles. For example, Mr Liu is not interested in index funds, because 
‘the volatility is too small … the movement [growth] is too slow.’ Similarly, Yi-
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Hong, one of a few informants who ever invested in the ‘Taiwan 50’, has already 
shifted the capital back to stock investment. ‘I think it [the growth] was a little slow,’ 
he says, ‘although its risk was really lower.’ 
Furthermore, insufficient knowledge of the concept and how the products 
probably is another crucial reason which hinders the popularity of index funds 
among lay investors. Compared to trading stock, to which lay investors are 
accustomed, investing index funds is a brand-new idea for most of them. The 
majority of the informants hesitate to invest in this kind of product due to that. ‘[I] 




Based on the agencement approach, this chapter aims to investigate the asymmetry of 
professional practitioners’ and lay investors’ calculative capabilities in the market. 
Advanced and specialist equipment, the latest information of listed companies 
transmitted through social connections and a large amount of managed capital 
strengthen professional practitioners’ calculative capabilities and facilitate them in 
occupying an advantageous position in the market. However, their superior 
calculative power is restrained by the market system, the government’s attitude, 
regulations and the market’s efficiency. Thus, the gap between professional 
practitioners’ and lay investors’ calculative capabilities remains but does not expand 
any further. In lay investors’ perceptions, the advantage of professional practitioners 
in the market is mainly drawn from the large amounts of investment capital available 
to them rather than superior analysis skills, which enable them to influence shares 
prices to some extent. Following this belief, a strategy popularly taken by lay 
investors is to ‘track’ professional practitioners’ trades and follow the rising trend 
created by their trading. Though lay investors consider they are in an inferior 
position in the market, they are less interested in investing actively managed stock 
mutual funds (managed by professional practitioners) due to their high cost, slow 
return and emotional insecurity, and passively-managed indexes funds due to 
insufficient knowledge about them and slow return. Market devices are always in 
progress with technological development and rooted in psychical places. The shift in 
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the social meanings of financial places is somewhat associated with market 
technology. The socio-technical dynamics of brokerag  offices, which are the most 






































































In Taiwan and China, where individual investors dominate the stock markets (see 
Chapter 1), brokerage offices are the key places design d for lay investors to trade 
stock. Symbolically, brokerage offices work as a node connecting ‘virtual’ financial 
markets and lay people’s daily lives. Practically, they provide an exclusive and 
specialist financial space for lay investors. In some ways, they are arguably one of 
the most important financial market places. 
Financial market activities are rooted in physical space and social context, 
whether in exchanges or securities companies. A number of anthropological and 
sociological studies focusing on trading floors and trading rooms have provided rich 
information regarding professional agents’ understandings of finance, market actions, 
social norms and personal relations, which comprise parts of financial market 
activities (e.g., Baker 1984; Abolafia 1996; Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002; Preda 
2012). Financial market activities are conducted by ‘market actors’, that is, the 
configuration of human beings and equipment, and the market actors are embodied in 
space and shaped by that space. Through ethnographic observation, the crucial links 
between financial practitioners, technological facilities and layouts of trading rooms 
have been recorded and reported in social studies of finance (e.g., Beunza and Stark 
2004; Zaloom 2006; MacKenzie 2009: 10–12; MacKenzie and Hardie 2009). 
Compared to the number of studies of trading floors and trading rooms (the 
professional practitioners’ market spaces), as seen above, brokerage offices have 
received limited attention in social science. Gamble’s (1997) and Hertz’s (1998) 
ethnographies of the Shanghai Stock Market are two exceptions. Though the 
structural characteristics of China’s stock markets are the focus of both studies, they 
record first-hand information of Shanghai’s brokerage offices in the early 1990s. For 
the researchers, the crowded brokerage offices (full o  lay investors) represent the 
unique stock market culture of China. Both Gamble’s (1997) and Hertz’s (1998) 
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reports provide plenty of data about how Chinese brokerage offices operated over 
twenty years ago and help us analyse the socio-technical changes of the markets. 
Brokerage offices are one of the best fields to study the interplay between lay 
investors, market devices, activities and space in financial markets.70 The reason for 
this is not only because brokerage offices are practically open to the public and thus 
it is feasible to make ethnographic observations there, but also because the offices’ 
characteristic as a ‘semi-public’ space make these places a particular socio-technical 
constellation with blurred boundaries between social/fin ncial spheres, a situation 
which is rarely observed in other financial spaces. 
The intention of this study was to examine the blurred social/financial 
boundaries and the repeated shifts between social and market activities in 
contemporary Taiwanese and Chinese brokerage offices, and to discuss the 
connections between these phenomena and the dynamic configurations of market 
participants, devices and space. This study argues that the socio-technical 
configurations ‘inside’ brokerage offices are associated with the technological 
development of market devices ‘outside’ these places. In the past, the brokerage 
offices were the places exclusively equipped with superior information and order-
placing systems, and almost all classes of lay investors were used to trading there. To 
date, the transmission of real-time market information and trading orders are no 
longer tied to brokerage offices. The lay investors who tend to trade in brokerage 
offices have been a specific social group. Blurred social/financial boundaries and 
repeated shifts between social/market activities have become a highlighted 
characteristic of brokerage offices. 
The data mainly was drawn from observations and interviews (see below). An 
additional contribution of this study is to provide ethnographic data of contemporary 
Taiwanese and Chinese brokerage offices, including first-hand recordings of on-the-
spot lay investors’ market actions and social interactions, and brokers’ work. To my 
knowledge, this is the first ethnographic study of Taiwanese brokerage offices and 
the most recent ethnographic work of Chinese brokerage offices within the past ten 
years. 
                                                
70  In addition, some social studies of lay investors with ethnographic observations have been 
conducted in investor clubs (Harrington 2008) and investor exhibitions (Roscoe 2013). 
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. The rest of this first section will 
summarize the concept of boundaries in social studies of finance, the Shanghai and 
Taiwanese brokerage offices of twenty years ago, and the fieldwork. The second 
section will then introduce the layouts, devices and facilities of contemporary 
brokerage offices. The following two sections will focus on the main actors in 
brokerage offices – brokers and lay investors – and alyse their work, activities, 
interactions and properties. The shifts and boundaries between social and market 
activities in this space will then be discussed in Section 5. 
 
5.1.1 Social/financial boundaries 
 
Is there any distinct boundary set between financial and social spheres? From a 
broader perspective, boundaries are often set and designed to segregate financial and 
social activities. For example, the boundaries betwe n the stock exchanges and the 
outside world of society are though of as a means used by groups of professional 
financial practitioners to maintain the exclusivity of the market trading, according to 
Preda’s (2009a) work. These boundaries occur in various aspects: geographical 
boundary – buildings whose purpose is exclusively for market exchanges; network 
boundary – closure status groups of exchange members; knowledge boundary – 
financial profession; information boundary – market information accessibility. Due 
to these boundaries, lay people are prevented by professional practitioners to directly 
access the markets to do deals. To engage in stock trading in the US in the early 
twentieth century, lay investors had to rely on both information mediators, such as 
tickers in brokerage offices, and human mediators, such as brokers (Preda 2009a). In 
other words, boundaries facilitate professional practitioners in strengthening their 
domination of the financial sphere. 
Furthermore, the boundary between the economic space and the social space 
tends to be consistent with professional financial agents’ mental separations between 
economic and social actions. In order to maintain their professionality, boundaries 
are often used by traders to exclude social activities (social life) from financial 
activities, e.g., trading (their jobs), through denoti g each space. The strategic set 
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includes defining market space, setting boundaries and separating economic and 
social activities. 
In Zaloom’s (2006) study, she finds traders tend to define trading rooms or 
trading floors as a ‘pure economic’ space for market actions only. When traders enter 
this ‘economic’ space, their perspective demands that they transform themselves into 
‘economic men’ or ‘market animals’, which means to devote themselves to 
maximizing profits in market transactions. Social interactions, social activities and 
personal relations among themselves would be suspended until they leave this 
‘economic’ space. In their minds, the ‘social’ belongs to the outside world and 
should not be ‘brought’ there. The lines are clear. In this financial arena, they would 
fight each other in order to get the best prices, and social attachments might cause 
them to fail in the market. 
Compared to professional traders, lay investors perhaps have another 
connotation of social/economic boundaries in brokerag  offices, because they are not 
expected to act in the market with an idea of maintaining financial professionality. 
To observe lay investors’ market and social actions in brokerage offices and to 
understand their definitions of the space would help us to give more detail to the 
concept of social/financial boundaries in this area. 
 
5.1.2 Trading crowds in the twentieth century 
 
In 1992, Hertz went to China and witnessed the early days of the Shanghai stock 
market. She was impressed by the groupings of individual stock investors there and 
applied the term ‘trading crowd’ to describe them. According to her, this ‘crowd’ 
mainly consisted of two categories of individual investors: sanhu (small players) and 
dahu (big players). The brokerage office lobbies are th main places where sanhu 
gather: 
 
Long lines of people waiting to buy and sell stocks spilled into the streets 
outside the many stockbroking offices scattered throughout the city … 
large crowds straining to catch a glimpse of computer screens in the 
brokerage lobbies, smaller crowds gathered in circles discussing the 
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market’s activities, and other even smaller groupings engaging in various 
forms of deal-market. (Hertz 1998: 71). 
 
Gamble (1997) provides other ethnographic data about individual investors and chao 
gupaio (stock investment) in the 1990s Shanghai stock market. In his article, he gives 
a detailed description of the Shanghai brokerage office lobbies at that time: 
 
The crowded ground floor of each securities trading centre was where 
‘small hu’ chao gupiao, unheated in the freezing winter, stifling in the hot, 
humid summers. The latest share prices were displayed on a large black 
electronic screen, the audience peering anxiously at the constantly 
changing red figures, making careful notes and computations. Shares 
were bought and sold over a counter. These places had all the noise, 
bustle and excitement (re’nao) of more traditional markets. (1997: 190). 
 
Indeed, in 1980s Taiwan, a similar scene was to be witnessed in brokerage office 
lobbies. A contemporaneous Taiwanese newspaper reported: 
 
‘Share people’ who come early can occupy seats. The latecomers have to 
stand up. Some carry their own chairs into the lobby. Some look at the 
screen through telescopes. Share people’s facial expressions change with 
the figures on the market screen. When stocks hit the upper limit, they 
cheer and clap. Their happiness express apparently. Some concentrate on 
recording each market movement on their notebooks. Some use 
calculators with pout. (United Daily News, 14 September 1989b: 22) 
 
In addition to lobbies, VIP rooms are another important space in brokerage offices 
where individual investors would gather. As the word ‘VIP’ indicates, this place 
was/is for dahu (big players). Dahu can ‘watch market movements on computer 
terminals directly linked with the Exchange’ and ‘place their buy and sell orders 
directly with brokers assigned to the room’ (Hertz 1998: 136). Gamble also described 
a typical VIP room having ‘comfortable seating, air conditioning, individual 
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computer terminals loaded with systems to analyze and trace share movements, and a 
receptionist who used a “hot line” to phone direct to the SSE [Shanghai Stock 
Exchange] to buy and sell shares for members’ (1997: 1 1). 
In Taiwan, VIP rooms became popular towards the endof the 1980s. 
Originally, the provision of these rooms was a marketing promotion used by newly 
established brokerage companies to attract the clients with high trading volumes. VIP 
rooms were not always ‘uncrowded’ places. A VIP room with a reputation for great 
fengshui might attract dozens of dahu to sit in a tiny space (Economy Daily News 
1988, 28 November: 9). 
Why do Shanghai lay investors prefer to trade stock in brokerage offices rather 
than choosing alternative trading systems? Hertz does not directly discuss this issue 
in her book. However, she views in parallel crowded brokerage offices with other 
cases of lay investors’ groupings, such as crowd clusters and informal groups (1998: 
155–62). Following the theme of her study, cultural factors seem to be answer to this 
question. The Chinese characteristics, which stem fro  China’s specific history, 
seem to be the best explanation. Hertz thinks that eg litarian ideology which grew 
from social and political movements in Communist China fosters the fever for stock 
trading. Furthermore, guanxi, which means ‘relation’ or ‘connection’ between peo le, 
is an important component of traditional Chinese society, and is a main channel for 
the flow of information (Hertz 1998). Following Hertz’s thinking, the combination of 
these cultural factors is distinctly related to the p enomenon of the ‘trading crowd’. 
Gamble’s idea is similar to Hertz’s, but he thinks this phenomenon is mainly a 
result of the market’s characteristics. He explicitly claims that Chinese characteristics 
are the main reason why individual investors are willing to crowd into brokerage 
offices (1997: 188–9). According to Gamble, China’s stock market is a highly 
‘emotional’ market. Shiqi (energy of market) and renqi (popularity) of the stock 
market are the two main components. To feel the market ‘buzz’, which is created by 
the participants, is very important for stock investor . Attending the brokerage 
offices and catching the ‘talk of the masses’ is vital for stock trading in China. A 
news report in 1980s Taiwan also stated a similar idea: that to collect information 
and to feel renqi in the stock market were the main reasons why indiv dual investors 
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were willing to visit crowded brokerage offices on a daily basis (Economy Daily 
News 1988, 20 July: 9).  
However, do Taiwanese and Chinese brokerage offices retain the same picture 
after the introduction of new communicative technology in recent years? (See 
Chapter 3 and Appendix 5.1.)? Technology has been noted as a key factor in the 
transformation of the financial markets’ structures ( .g., Knorr Cetina and Preda 
2007; MacKenzie and Pardo-Guerra 2013). To compare the contemporary ‘trading 
crowds’ in Taiwanese and Chinese brokerage offices with the depictions in the 
earlier literature would help us to understand the impact of technological 
development in Taiwan’s and China’s stock markets. 
 
5.1.3 Entering the field 
 
The X branch is the place where I did most of my observation work. The reason I 
chose the X branch as my main field was simple. I am a client of this brokerage 
office and am acquainted with some of the employees th re. It seemed easier to 
explain why I was concentrating on writing notes in the brokerage lobby, if someone 
questioned my behaviour. 
This branch is a major branch of a total of 49 branches of the S brokerage firm. 
The S brokerage firm and the bank I worked for both belong to the S holding. There 
is a close business relationship between the X branch d the bank branch where I 
was. Therefore, I knew two brokers and a manager of the X branch and I opened my 
stock account there. 
Afterwards, I found out there are several advantages to make my detailed 
observations in the X branch. First, I was able to collect data about the activities in 
this place from both observations and interviews. The interviews with the broker and 
manager enriched my knowledge of the lay investors who are accustomed to 
spending time there and the social relations among them. Another advantage is that I 
could use the X branch as a model to compare with other brokerage offices. It helped 
refine my awareness of the subtle but substantial differences between each brokerage 
office. 
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When I informed my broker and the manager that I would sit in the investing 
lobby to make some observations, they immediately to d me that this is not a 
problem and I could stay there as long as I needed. In their words, brokerage office 
lobbies are a kind of public space and almost everyone is welcome to visit. Normally, 
people are allowed to stay there during market hours, even if the person is not a 
client of the brokerage firm. They are not required to produce an identity or 
membership card, or any other document in order to come through the office door. 
This is consistent with my understanding of a brokeag  lobby; that is, it is a quasi-
public space. 
Although I am a client of the X branch, I had never b en to their offices before 
beginning my observations. The first time I entered the offices, my first impression 
was how small was the investment lobby. After several days’ observations, I found 
the total number of lay investors there averaged around 15, and did not reach 20 
during my fieldwork. As well as the X branch, I also visited other three brokerage 
offices in Taiwan (two in Taipei and one in Tainan,  city in southern Taiwan) and 
two in China (one in Shanghai and one in Hangzhou, a city 200 km south-east of 
Shanghai). Indeed, in another brokerage office in Taipei, I was also surprised by the 
narrow space of the investment lobby. The lobby size of the third brokerage office I 
visited in Taipei was a little larger, but like the other lobbies in Taipei, only several 
people were in attendance. 
Mrs Kuo, a lay investor in Taipei, told me that only ‘three, four, to five’ people 
usually sit in the investing lobby of her brokerage office and she is one of them. 
Presently, the most crowded brokerage office in Taipei of which she knows is a 
major branch of a brokerage firm close to her home. Most of the time, there are 
around fifty people there. 
In contrast, the sizes of the brokerage offices in Tainan (Taiwan), Shanghai and 
Hangzhou (China) are more spacious. The lobbies of these brokerage offices still 
retain a kind of hustle and bustle. However, there were no queues around the 
counters and the lobbies were not always full when I visited. In general, the scenes of 
brokerage offices in China now differ from Hertz’s (1998) and Gamble’s (1997) 
descriptions of earlier times. 
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During the fieldwork, whether in Taiwan or China, I seemed to be a stranger 
and attracted many other people’s attentions in the brokerage offices, which are 
supposed to be open to all stock investors. However, I was apparently different from 
others. I am too young, compared to them. Most of the lay investors that I met in 
these brokerage offices were between 50 and 60 years old. The obvious age gap 
between us highlighted the difference between them and me. Most of the time, 
people just looked at me for a moment and then continued with their business. 
However, some people came very close to me, watched w at I was doing and their 
facial expressions revealed their curiosity. According to their expressions, it seemed 
that someone like me was not expected to be in this place. 
In Hangzhou, twice people directly asked me, ‘Who are you?’ and ‘What are 
you doing here?’ One was the security guard with a strong Mandarin accent. I told 
him that I had come here to visit the branch manager. The second time I was 
questioned by two female lay investors. While I was photographing the investing 
lobby’s facilities (having received permission from the branch manager), the two 
women nervously asked me, ‘Are you a journalist? Why are you taking photos? Will 
you put the photos on the newspaper?’ It turned out that they were housewives and 
did not want their husbands to know that they frequented the brokerage office. Their 
anxiety eased after I explained the purpose of my photos: that they would be used 
only for academic purposes and people’s faces on the photos would be covered. 
In brief, my fieldwork experience went beyond my previous expectations. I had 
rarely visited brokerage offices before this study. Although I had not had extensive 
personal experience of them, the term ‘brokerage offices’ was a familiar one for me 
as it would be for most Taiwanese people. As a child, I didn’t grow up in the 
brokerage office, but both of my parents are lay investors. My image of such a place 
was formed by dramas, news stories, books, people’s talk and my limited experience, 
and in my mind was close to Hertz’s (1998) and Gamble’s (1997) description: a 
crowded, noisy large space. 
Mrs Kuo remembered the scene in her brokerage office twenty years ago: 
 
[At that time], all [the brokerage offices] were full [of people]. [Many 
people] had to stand [in the lobbies] … Some people, because there were 
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not enough chairs there, brought their own chairs … In the past there 
were many [people] in our place [the brokerage office she usually stays], 
crowded with people. Now all [the people] are gone.  
 
The contrast between the contemporary situation and the description of previous 
brokerage offices suggests the essential transformation of this field. 
 
5.2 Office layouts, devices and facilities 
 
As many previous studies have emphasized (e.g., Beunza and Stark 2004; Zaloom 
2006; MacKenzie and Hardie 2009), financial activities are strongly associated with 
the architecture of market places. Partitions and fcilities of a market place determine 
the disposition of financial activities held there. The allocation of space and facilities 
in contemporary Taiwanese and Chinese brokerage offices can give us an impression 
of these places. During my fieldwork, I sketched the layouts of three brokerage 
offices. Here I only use the layout of the X branch as an example (see Image 5.1), 
because the principles of allocating partitions andsetting facilities were similar in all 
three offices. The meaningful differences between each brokerage office will be 
discussed in the following section. 
As will be seen, the configurations of brokerage offices are associated with lay 
investors’ market actions and social interactions. I formation devices allow lay 
investors to access real-time market information. Open-plan space designation 
facilitates the exchange of information and opinions among lay investors, and 
between lay investors and brokers;71 row-seats and supplementary facilities favour 
lasting intensive social interactions among them (Beunza and Stark 2004); by 
observing, participating in and talking about the stock market spatiotemporally, the 
offices’ occupants become a temporary community (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 
2002; Preda 2009a). 
 
                                                
71 It is not difficult to replace these two functions of the brokerage offices with communicative media, 
such as online trading systems and Internet forums (see Chapter 3). However, as will be seen, for 
some groups of lay investors, other communicative tools are no substitutes for the social functions of 
brokerage offices. 
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5.2.1 The X branch 
 
The X branch is located on the first floor of a commercial building. As the office 
layout shows, the X branch does not have a large inv stment lobby. There are only 
six benches with 24 seats in the hall. The benches face a white wall upon which real-
time market information is projected from 8:50 a.m. to 1:35 p.m. This covers all of 
TWSE’s trading hours, which are from 9:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m., and nearly all of 
TWSE’s futures market’s trading hours, which are from 8:45 a.m. to 1:45 p.m. 
During market hours, the lights in the lobby are dimmed. It feels as though you are in 
a theatre and watching a play on the screen (see Image 5.2). When the lights come on 
and the projection becomes blurry, it is similar tohe end of a show. 
‘Shanchanghuijia’ (散場回家) means ‘the show is over and the audience is ready to 
go home.’ This term is used by some lay investors in the lobby to describe the feeling 
when the lights are switched back on and people are preparing to leave (see Image 
5.3). 
To prevent last-minute market manipulations, the TWSE stops delivering real-
time trading information during the last five minutes of trading and collects all orders 
during the time to do call auction trading. The purpose and mechanism are similar to 
the call auction when the Paris Bourse closes (Muniesa 2007). The information on 
the screen is frozen from 1:25 p.m. to 1:30 p.m., and t 1:30 p.m., it shows the final 
market result. When the time is entering the fifth minute prior to the last five minutes, 
the branch begins to broadcast a talking-clock on loudspeakers in the office. This 
broadcast lasts five minutes, until 1:25 p.m. and is similar to hearing the time count-
down on New Year’s Eve. This countdown is to remind on-the-spot investors how 
much trading time they have left. ‘Zuihouyipan’ ( 最 後 一 盤 ) means ‘the last 
game/round/bet’, and is a popular phrase used by both lay investors and brokers 
during the count-down. ‘Kaijiang’ (開獎) means ‘the lottery result is announced.’ 
This term is used by lay investors to describe the rel ase of the closure market 
information, which is the result of the last five minutes of trading. Both metaphors 
are adopted from gambling terms, implying the similarities between gambling and 
trading stock in some individual investors’ consciousness. Several interviewees 
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subsequently taught me similar phrases: the stock market is like a legal casino; the 
government, who charges stock trading tax, is like the casino owner. 
Two other signals remind lay investors about the closure of that day’s market. 
First, when the lights come on, the cleaner begins to sweep the lobby and empty the 
dustbin. During this cleaning process, the people seated on the benches are forced to 
move. The cleaner would have usually cleaned up other areas in the brokerage office 
earlier, and now he pauses to give his attention to the final minutes of the market, 
like the other investors. Afterwards, he goes back to continue cleaning.  
Another signal is the loud hum from the printers. After the market closes, 
brokers need to print records of all their clients’ transactions, which will be edited 
and reported to the headquarters. The noise from several printers simultaneously lasts 
for minutes and can be heard in every corner of the office. The lights-on, the clean-
up and the noise are the three signs which indicate the close of the day’s stock 
market trading in the brokerage office. 
The information on the projection screen includes share dealing prices, dealing 
volumes, bid prices, bid volumes, ask prices and ask volumes. It also displays the 
points of stock-index futures, TWSE levels, overall market trading volume, the 
current largest dealings, and the chart of index level and volume that day. The 
information rotates by in seconds. 
In contrast to many Western stock markets, in Taiwan and China, rising share 
prices are shown in red and falling share prices in green. This is because red in 
Chinese culture is considered a lucky colour and a symbol of good fortune. At 
Chinese New Year and in wedding ceremonies, red decorations are used in people’s 
houses, in order to bring fortune and luck to the home. On the other hand, a person 
whose face has a greenish tinge is usually considered a person with an unhealthy 
condition or in a bad mood. Therefore, a sentence su h as ‘all sanhu’ faces turn iron-
green after the whole stock market becomes green’ is often heard from the television 
when the market drops. 
There are ten open-access computers in the X branch’s lobby for individual 
investors to access market information. Two computers are close to the door, three to 
the right of the south-facing counter, and the other five to the left of the counter. 
Only three colours – black, green and red – are displayed on the monitors (see Image 
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5.4). These computers’ programmes are fixed and the content is provided by an 
information service company. The computers only supply information about 
Taiwan’s stock market. As well as real-time market information (which is also 
shown on the projection screen), the computer user can also search for information 
about each listed company. The data include company b ckgrounds, finances, related 
news, share price histories and the proportion of main shareholders of listed 
companies. As for information about the TWSE, histor cal indexes prices, trading 
volumes, breaking market news and prices charts are available on the computers. 
This information is also easily accessible outside the brokerage offices. Two 
financial channels on cable TV provide real-time information about Taiwan’s stock 
market. The televised market information is similar to the information shown on the 
projector screen in the investing lobby, but much more detailed. There is not only the 
silent rotation of share prices on the screen, the television anchors narrate breaking 
news and highlight significant changes in share prices or indices during live 
broadcasts. In addition, the television channels invite different stock analysts to 
comment on contemporary market trends, provide immediat  trading suggestions and 
report their recommendations of listed-companies shares for that day’s market. This 
type of market analyses, due to during trading hours, are called ‘panzhongjiepan’ (盤
中解盤), or ‘panzhongfenxi’ (盤中分析). There are many televised panzhongjiepan 
during the limited 4½-hour market time. As well as the mid-market analyses, the 
television channels also provide pre-market and post-market analyses. 
On the other hand, the data which is accessible from the brokerage office 
computers can be accessed through the client’s online stock account as well. After 
the clients open their online stock accounts and sign in, the same data is accessible 
on the brokerage firm websites. Furthermore, yahoo.tw. and other financial websites 
provide the same data and information. People can access them without any 
difficulty even if they have never opened a stock acount. 
As well as the main service – that is, the delivery of real-time market 
information – the brokerage office also provides many other facilities for its clients. 
Two financial newspapers, several of the latest investment magazines and some 
vouchers are available, displayed on a rack. Next to the rack sits a drinking water 
dispenser, with free tea bags and disposable cups on top. The toilet is open to the 
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public in every brokerage office. Moreover, at the X branch, the kitchen is open not 
only to the staff, but also to clients. Everyone is allowed to store their lunch boxes in 
the refrigerator and to use the microwave oven, a service which is very convenient 
for lay investors, especially after the extension of trading hours in 2001. 
On 2 January 2001, the TWSE extended its market hours, which had been 9 
a.m.–12 p.m., to 9 a.m.–1:30 p.m., due to the impleentation of ‘two-day weekend’ 
system in Taiwan. The additional trading hours on weekdays were used to 
compensate for the cancelled Saturday trading hours (Economy Daily News, 3 
January 2001: 3). After this institutional change, the market hours overlap with 
Taiwanese people’s conventional lunch hour, which means the brokerage companies’ 
employees and lay investors now have lunch together inside the brokerage offices. 
Starting at 11 a.m., some employees and lay investors begin to leave the office 
to buy lunch to bring back to the office. The market can fluctuate very rapidly, so 
these people usually spend very little time buying lunch. Others queue in front of the 
microwave oven to heat their lunch. Some lay investors leave the office, while others 
stay put and probably have lunch after the market closes. 
Most Taiwanese people are used to having hot rice or no dles for lunch. Rice, 
noodles, soup, dumplings, bread and other snacks can be found on the staff tables, 
the counter and the benches. At noon, the brokerage office is full of mixed food 
smells. Some brokers answer clients’ phone calls, while eating rice. Some clients 
stare at the screen with a bowl of noodles in their and. During these moments, the 
investing lobby seems more like a canteen than a fiancial market space. 
In Taiwan and China, most brokerage offices have spcial VIP rooms. 
However, the form and size of the VIP rooms in each brokerage office are hugely 
divergent. In the X branch, there are only three separate VIP rooms. Each room is 
only allocated to one dahu (big player). My broker told me that one of the three is 
not only a substantial individual investor, but also a professional investment 
consultant. He uses the VIP room as his office and ru s his business from there. In 
fact, these VIP rooms are just like ordinary partition rooms in an office. Inside the 
VIP room, there is only a table, some office chairs, a computer and a phone. The 
programmes of the computers in the VIP rooms are the same as those in the lobby, 
though there is an exception in the dahu’s VIP room at X branch: he has cable TV 
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where he can watch other investment consultants’ and alysts’ mid-market 
comments. This television is inaudible in the investing lobby. 
The staff space in the brokerage office is separated into three small areas. The 
staff area located on the south side of the investing lobby is the ‘broker area’. 
Brokers and order clerks sit in this area. Another staff area on the west side of the 
investing lobby is the ‘administrative area’. The cl rks here are in charge of clients’ 
account opening, changing and closing. The employees who handle accounting and 
general services also sit in this area. The northern staff area, which is next to ‘VIP 
room 1’, is allocated for the brokers who are stationed in the cooperative bank 
branches. Usually, they only stay in the office for the morning meeting, so this area 
is quite often empty. 
Although the distance between these staff areas is only several metres, the 
atmosphere of each area is visibly different. The ‘broker area’ and the investing 
lobby seem to belong to the same space. During market hours, investors and brokers 
in these two areas frequently interact and share the market atmosphere together. 
When the market closes, most brokers leave the office only a quarter of an hour after 
their clients. The lights in these two areas are usually switched off at the same time, 
and by 2:30 p.m., both areas have fallen into darkness. 
In contrast, the employees belonging to the ‘administrative area’ seem to be 
insulated from the market. They deal with paperwork steadily through the office 
hours, and their calm attitudes never seemed to be influenced by the market 
participants’ emotions, no matter how excited or depressed. 
 
5.2.2 The differences between the brokerage offices 
 
Including the X branch, I visited six brokerage offices for my fieldwork. These 
offices share many similarities in their designated layouts and their facilities. 
However, some of the differences are obvious and worth discussing. 
The devices used to display real-time stock market information are the focus of 
investing lobbies. Compared to the projector screen in the X branch, in the brokerage 
offices in Tainan, a combination of tens of CRT monit rs comprise a large screen to 
show market information. Some of the monitors display live broadcasts of stock 
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television channels. In another brokerage office in Taipei, information display is 
mixed, with both a projector screen and CRT monitors (see Images 5.5 and 5.6). In 
Shanghai and Hangzhou, large electronic display panels are erected in the investing 
lobbies (see Images 5.7 and 5.8). The panels make them looks like the brokerage 
offices in Taiwan decades ago (see Chapter 3). 
When I visited the brokerage investing lobbies in Shanghai and Hangzhou, a 
device there really drew my attention. They looked like ATMs and a large number of 
them were located in the corners of investing lobbies (Image 5.9). I had never seen 
these machines in Taiwan, and had never come across any mention of them in books 
and articles which I’d read. Liu-Ji, a client manager of a Shanghai brokerage branch, 
was surprised that I had not known what these machines were. They are called 
‘zizhuweituoji’ (自助委託機, self-service order-placing machines) or ‘P.O.S.’ (Point 
of Sale). They are designed so that lay investors can place on-the-spot trading orders. 
A client inserts/swipes their magnetic account card into the machine, enters their 
account pin number and types on the keyboard to place an order. According to 
Hertz’s (1998: 71) and Gamble’s (1997: 190) descriptions, in the 1990s, long queues 
in front of the counter were common in Chinese broke age offices. Lay investors had 
to wait in the investing lobby to hand their stock trading orders. However, in current 
Chinese brokerage offices, there are only a few people to be found leaning against 
the counter. After the introduction of zizhuweituoji into the brokerage offices, lay 
investors would receive their magnetic account card when they opened a stock 
account. The invention of this automatic order-placing machine is an example of the 
technological development of market devices in China’s stock markets. 
In general, the number of lay investors in each Taiwanese brokerage office is 
obviously less than the number in each Chinese brokerage office. For example, only 
10–15 people at any one time would be in the X branch during my fieldwork period. 
Even in the brokerage office in Tainan, the most crowded investing lobby I have 
witnessed in Taiwan, the number of people was still not as many as in any of the 
Chinese brokerage offices. The size and number of VIP rooms in China is also much 
more than in Taiwan. In Chinese brokerage offices, there are ‘super’ VIP rooms for 
the dahu (those individual investors who bring in the highest monthly income for the 
branch) and ‘middle’ VIP rooms for the zhonghu (those individual investors who 
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bring in the next highest monthly income). The brokerage offices I visited have many 
dahu rooms and a large zhonghu room. A dahu room is shared by several people. 
The equipment there is similar to the equipment of a VIP room in the X branch, that 
is, they are furnished with desks, office chairs and computers. The zhonghu room 
looks more like a university computer laboratory. Dozens of people sit one by one 
and each person has a computer which is allocated to him or her. Each seat is 
separated by a low board on the desk (see Image 5.10). On the other hand, in a 
brokerage office I visited in Taipei, there is no idependent VIP room; instead, there 
is a VIP area in a corner of the office. The allocation is like the allocation of a 
zhonghu room in China, but there are no borders between seats (see Image 5.11). 
The affiliated facilities in each brokerage office are also slightly different. For 
example, in the Hangzhou brokerage office, the branch set up a large open cupboard 
in the investing lobby for their clients. Lay investors put their tea cups and shopping 
bags in the cupboard (see Image 5.12). In a Taipei brokerage office, a multi-
functional slow cooker is provided (see Image 5.13). I saw a dahu cooking her lunch, 
some soup, at the cooker and then sharing with other dahu. In China, the brokerage 
offices do not provide a microwave oven or a steamer to lay investors. The trading 
hours in China’s stock markets are divided into twosections. The first section runs 
9:30–11:30 a.m. and the second runs 1–3 p.m. The break in the middle is lunchtime, 
and people are used to going out or going back home f r lunch. During the break, the 
staff turns off the screens and lights in the investing lobbies. However, many dahu 
still stay in the VIP rooms, because the brokerage companies offer free lunch to these 




In Taiwanese brokerage offices, brokers and lay investors are the main actors. The 
interactions among lay investors and between investors and brokers compose crucial 
market and social activities in investing lobbies. The data about Taiwanese stock 
brokers’ daily work is not too difficult to collect. First, the interviews with brokers 
are a substantial source of my data. In addition, the observation data of brokers’ work 
in brokerage offices is approachable. No matter which Taiwanese brokerage office, 
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the ‘broker area’ is always next to the investing lobby, so it is easy to observe the 
situation inside the broker area from the investing lobby. Furthermore, my own 
personal experience of being inside the broker area, h lps me to depict a vivid picture 
of the brokers’ work. In 2006, I got a job interview for a stockbroker’s position. The 
brokerage firm required me to do a whole-day internship in a brokerage office. On 
that day, I was asked assist brokers when they were v y busy. For example, I 
represented them in answering their clients’ phone calls when they were on other 
clients’ calls. The branch manager and brokers had clearly explained to me the 
details, requirements and challenges of a stockbroker’s work. That day, I sat in the 
broker area with all the brokers and observed/experienced a stockbroker’s working 
day. This unusual experience provided me with a fundamental understanding of a 
stockbroker’s job and the operation inside the broke  area. It is very useful when I 
later did the fieldwork. 
 
5.3.1 Brokerage industry 
 
In order to trade securities in Taiwan’s stock market, an investor (whether the 
investor is an individual or an institution) must open an account in a brokerage firm. 
According to TWSE requirements, all trading orders into the market must be placed 
through the investor’s broker (TWSE FAQs)72. In other words, each stock investor 
has to ‘contract’ with a specific broker belonging to a brokerage firm. However, the 
investor can easily change their broker or brokerag company, or open an additional 
account in another brokerage company. 
In the brokerage industry, the client’s trading fees are calculated into their 
broker’s sales performance, whether the investor uses an on-the-spot, telephone, or 
online trading system to place orders. Therefore, to maintain good relations with 
clients is vital for a stockbroker, especially their relationships with important 
investors. For example, during market hours, brokers actively give information and 
investing suggestions to clients and patiently respond to clients’ enquiries. As 
lunchtime draws near, when some brokers order a meal delivery or go out to buy 
something for themselves, they will ask their clients if they’d need something to eat 
                                                
72 Available at: http://www.twse.com.tw/en/investor/faq.php. 
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as well. After the market closes, brokers often visit important clients. This kind of 
socialising is not directly related to business, which is almost all conducted on the 
phone or the Internet. The purpose of brokers’ visiting is to send a message to their 
clients: that they are very important people and their brokers really care about them. 
The combination of the characteristics of Taiwan’s stock market, the huge number of 
lay investors, and the legacy of small-and-medium size enterprises (SMEs) – that is, 
business relationships mixed with social relationship  (see Chapter 1) – easily fosters 
strong personal relationships between brokers and their clients. 
The securities brokerage industry is very competitiv . In 2010, there were 125 
brokerage firms with around a thousand brokerage offices (Taiwan Securities 
Association Annual Report 2010: 37, http://www.sfb.gov.tw). However, the service 
provided by each firm is almost the same. The ‘54 per cent discount’ of the standard 
broker’s fee (the standard fee is 0.1425 per cent of trading value) has been common 
in this industry. In other words, the charge of brokerage firms is usually around 0.07 
per cent of the trading value. To attract clients, every brokerage firm offers similarly 
low fees and attempts to provide extra services, such as a daily free analysis 
newsletter or a monthly report. 
The competition among brokers is also fierce. In December 2100, there were 
nearly 40,000 employees in this industry, the majority of them brokers 
(http://www.sfb.gov.tw). In addition, a substantial number of new brokers are 
recruited every year which only intensifies the competitive pressure in this field. For 
example, in 2005, nearly 9,000 people passed the qualification examination and 
received a broker’s licence (http://www.csa.org.tw/A02/A026.asp). Although not all 
those who qualified would take up brokerage positions, the figure gives an idea of 
the size of the supply of broker labour. 
Thus, if a broker could not provide 100 per cent correct trading information 
(which almost no broker could do), why are clients willing to retain their contract 
with this person? For many lay investors, having a ood personal relationship with 
their broker is a main reason. Sheng-Ji, an experienced individual investor, told me 
that the reason he continued to deal with his current broker was that this young 
person gave him a good impression, even though Sheng-Ji is more experienced in 
investing stock. He claimed that he does not need any investment advice from his 
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broker nor does he think that his broker’s information will be useful. However, he 
appreciates his broker’s attitude and manner. 
Thus to maintain good social relations with clients is the main strategy for 
survival in this industry. My broker, Chun-Shen, told me that usually there are two 
types of brokers who survive. The first type has a ‘ mall-quantity-but-good-quality’ 
group of clients. For example, a top broker in Chun-Shen’s branch has less than 
thirty clients, but his clients are all ‘good-quality’ clients, whose daily trading value 
is high enough to cover his sales performance goal. This type of broker is able to 
give a lot of attention to their limited number of clients and make them feel they are 
valuable friends. 
On the other hand, the second type of broker is like Chun-Shen, whose clients 
are all retail investors but there is a great number of them, over hundreds. It is 
impossible for him to visit most of his clients frequently, or even remember their 
faces and names. However, he still attempts to give his clients a warm greeting when 
they come to the office. He was going to build a profile file which included 
important information for each client, such as their photo, name, phone number, etc., 
and would help him recognize each client’s face. He would make the clients 
surprisingly happy when he directly greeted them before they identified themselves, 
because many retail investors do not expect their brokers to remember their names 
and account details. 
The number of male and female brokers seems roughly equal. In the field, I did 
not observe any substantial gender disparity between brokers in a brokerage branch. 
Sometimes, female brokers are more popular among clients, because they are 
expected to be more ‘soft’ and sociable and usually know better than their male 
colleagues how to maintain good relationship with clients. For example, in the late 
1980s, there were four famous female brokers, called ‘sidajinchai’ (四大金釵, the 
Four Ladies). ‘Jinchai’  is used to refer to girls from rich families in classical Chinese 
literature, though none of the four female brokers were reported to be from rich 
families. The Four Ladies are a legend in the brokerag  industry. At the height of 
their fame, the sum of each ‘Lady’s’ daily trading value from their clients often 
reached US$30,000,000 (China Times 2008, 7 July). 
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Having more opportunities to access first-hand profitable information is a 
crucial incentive for brokers to be successful. Many employees in the Taiwanese 
securities industry trade stock as well. My broker, Chun-Shen, frankly told me that 
the main reason for working in the brokerage industry is to catch beneficial 
opportunities for his own stock investment. Furthermo e, this job can help sharpen 
his investing skills. As a broker, he is ‘inside’ the securities industry and must give 
his time and attention to the market. ‘If you need to spend many hours per day in 
analysing the stock market and predicting the market t end, why not just to be a stock 
broker?’ he says. In addition, the data of his hundreds of clients’ trades have been a 
large ‘data set’ that helps him to rethink the advantages and disadvantages of 
different trading strategies. ‘Why do some specific clients often make profit but 
others often lose? To learn experience from the clints’ trades,’ he says, ’they are 
like a “living textbook”.’ One day, when he has enough confidence in his trading 
skills and the profit is enough to be a reliable income, he will quit the job and 
become a professional individual investor. 
 
5.3.2 A broker’s workday 
 
Typically, brokers come to the office at 8 a.m. to a tend the morning meeting in the 
branch’s meeting rooms. At the beginning of the meeting, all the brokers concentrate 
on listening to the daily analysis which is transmitted from the headquarters by 
telephone and relayed over loudspeakers. The broadcast is edited by the company’s 
analysts, and its structure is always the same. Contents includes selected crucial 
economic and financial news, predictions about thatday’s market trend, the list of 
stocks that are worth the brokers’ attention and other market information. After the 
broadcast, the branch manager may discuss branch operations and sales goals, and 
sometimes review each broker’s performance. 
Around 8:30 a.m., some futures-market clients start to call into the office to 
place trading orders or ask about the latest market information. At 8:45 a.m., the 
Taiwanese Futures Exchange opens. Brokers begin to take their seats, watching real-
time market information from their desktops while waiting for clients to phone. 
Close to 9 a.m., lay investors begin to enter the office one after another, some 
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bringing breakfast with them. Many lay investors are cquainted with one another 
and greet each other ‘good morning’. In Taiwan, clients need to place orders to the 
stock exchange through their brokers, either by phone r on the spot. After brokers 
receive their clients’ orders, the broker passes th order to the clerk in the brokers’ 
area. Then, the clerk types the client’s order intothe computer, which is connected to 
the TWSE’s electronic trading system. 
The first half-hour of market time is often very busy. Brokers receive many 
orders and respond to clients’ enquiries over the pone or in person. Last night’s 
international and national news strongly influences the market’s opening trend. The 
situations of the US and European stock markets, oil and gold prices, and the 
TW$/US$ [Taiwan new dollar/US dollar] currency rates are popular topics for 
discussion among lay investors, and sometimes between brokers and investors. The 
many and frequently ringing telephones provide the ‘background music’ for the 
brokerage offices at that time of the morning. 
After the first thirty minutes, the market usually has reacted to last night’s 
information and brokers can be more relaxed. However, th y still stay at their seats 
most of the time, because it is better for them to speak personally with their clients’ 
calls, as this implies that they are hard-working people, which gives a good 
impression. This is especially so, in case any huge change of the market suddenly 
occurs. Clients can get angry if the market quickly plunges or rises but they cannot 
find their brokers. ‘Remember the market is always unpredictable’ is the brokers’ 
first rule. Therefore, during market hours, brokers go to the toilet or go out to buy 
lunch in a hurry, as they are afraid of missing anyclient’s call. This is another reason 
why some brokers bring lunch boxes to work, or order m als to be delivered, as it 
reduces the time away from their desks. 
The last half-hour of the day is usually like the first half-hour: brokers are 
again busy answering phone calls or receiving the on-the-spot clients’ orders. The 
intensive work continues till the start of the last five minute, when the real-time 
market information is frozen. Most investors stop trading then, because no one can 
really know the market situation. When the final market information is disclosed, 
brokers fall busy yet again. Out-of-office clients are calling in to ask the result of 
their orders, such as ‘have their orders been dealt or not’. Several minutes later, the 
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lay investors begin to leave. Brokers say goodbye to the clients who’ve been in the 
office that day, and review the records of the day’s transactions. Many brokers leave 
the office around 2:30 p.m. and might visit clients, or contact new clients, or go back 
home – they are free, after the market closes. 
 
5.3.3 Brokers in China’s stock markets 
 
In the past, in the Chinese securities industry, there was no position which was the 
equivalent of a broker’s job in Taiwan. According to Ms Yuan, a branch manager in 
Hangzhou, when Chinese people began to trade stock in the 1990s, they just came to 
the brokerage offices and the offices’ administrative clerks would handle the stock 
account opening. When investors wanted to place trading orders, they just came to 
the brokerage offices and handed their orders to the clerks. Today, investors use the 
on-the-spot automatic order-placing machines in the brokerage offices, or 
alternatively place orders through the online trading systems or by calling the service 
centre. The interactions between the clients and the staff tend to be less intensive. 
Ms Yuan explained to me the probable reason for this. The securities brokerage 
industry was a less competitive industry in China. The number of branches was 
restricted by regulations, but the number of investors was not controlled by the 
government and was rising quickly. Thus, the brokerag  industry was a demand-
over-supply market. The companies were not as focused on attracting new clients or 
maintaining old clients as the companies in Taiwan. 
However, after several stock market crashes and the liberalization of the 
brokerage industry, the market has become more competitive. Recently, a new job 
position, the ‘client manager’, has been introduced into most Chinese brokerage 
firms. Like brokers in Taiwan, client managers aim to bring new clients into the 
company, though there is still a subtle difference between these two areas. In Taiwan, 
brokers have a duty to receive clients’ trading orders and respond to clients’ 
enquiries either at the office or by phone. It is apart of their work. By contrast, client 
managers are not obliged to deal with this work. A client manager’s salary is totally 
linked to how many new clients they bring into the company and how much money 
their clients invest. They actively give investing advice to clients in order to 
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encourage them to trade and endeavour to maintain good personal relation with them. 
Like brokers in Taiwan, social capital is the key for them to survive.  
 
5.4 Lay investors 
 
Lay investors are the soul of the brokerage offices. Both Hertz (1998) and Gamble 
(1997) emphasize their important role in China’s stock markets. In the past, a group 
of lay investors in a brokerage office probably represented the characteristics of the 
majority of lay investors. However, the situation perhaps is different now. As seen in 
Chapter 3 and Appendix 5.1, the technological development of market devices is 
thought to have reshaped many lay investors’ trading behaviours in Taiwan and 
China. To date, the lay investors who are accustomed to trading in brokerage offices 
probably have been a ‘specific’ social group rather than a random sample of lay 




In all the brokerage offices I have visited, the ages of the lay investors there were 
similar, in their fifties or above. When I did my participant observation in the X 
brokerage office, I found a female client who looked much younger than the others. 
However, my broker told me that in fact she was nearly 50 years old as well, but that 
she had an age-defying face. Young clients seemingly have seldom ‘showed up’ in 
brokerage offices. Mrs Kuo ever told me: 
 
I have spent time in the brokerage office so many years. In the past, 
while some old people were ‘graduating’ [meaning ‘leaving both the 
market and the brokerage office’], some young people were entering at 
the same time. However, in recent years, I only sawold people leaving 
but rarely saw young people entering. 
 
In contrast, the majority of employees in brokerage offices, including brokers and 
clerks, are obviously younger than their clients. Even the two branch managers, 
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whom I interviewed, are only in their forties and thirties, which could indicate that a 
lay investor could possibly be more familiar with the brokerage office than the staff. 
Sheng-Ji told me that he has traded stock in his brokerage office since this branch 
was launched. Over the years, he has become the most seasoned broker in the place, 
watching while newcomer employees have been promoted to managers and the 
clients have come and gone. 
It is possible that some lay investors are more experienced in investment rather 
than their brokers. Some lay investors consider the ‘experts’’ (the brokers’) 
suggestions and regularly query them about the best trading timing, but some lay 
investors have never asked for their brokers’ opinions. Several lay investors told me 
that they do not think brokers’ advice is useful and will help them make a profit: 
‘How old was he when I started to invest stock? He might have just entered 
elementary school.’ This attitude is very popular among lay investors. Some brokers 
also admitted that some lay investors’ trading strategies are quite good. Brokers will 
clear all clients’ daily transactions after the market closes, so they know their clients’ 
investing results. Brokers and clerks usually know who are the ‘masters’ of trading 
among their clients. 
The age gap between clients and staff in brokerage offices implies two facts 
about this field. The first is that the brokerage industry is highly competitive and 
novice brokers possibly leave this industry before gaining seniority. The other is that 
young lay investors have become ‘extinct’ in brokerage offices. 
The age gap somewhat influences the model of interaction between brokers 
and lay investors in brokerage offices. In East Asian societies, due to Confucianism, 
people’s social status would be somewhat determined by their age. Older people 
normally have more life experiences and convention says that the juniors should 
respect their elders (Fei 1992). This traditional thought is strengthened by a part of 
brokers’ work – maintaining good personal relation with clients – and further shapes 
the interaction between lay investors and brokers. 
Thus, financial professionality sometimes does not effectively underpin 
brokers’ status in front of their clients. According to the regulations, brokers must 
take financial courses, pass qualified exams and receiv  professional training. Most 
lay investors have never achieved one of these. However, the interaction between 
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them in brokerage offices is not like the interaction between experts and laymen, 




In brokerage lobbies, the numbers of male and femal are almost equal. Sometimes, 
the there are more female lay investors than male. This impression is consistent with 
the statistical data of gender distribution of stock a counts in Taiwan (Barber et al. 
2007). The term, ‘cailanzu’ (菜籃族), became a popular slang phrase in Taiwan’s 
stock market in the 1990s. ‘Cailanzu’ literally means the ‘vegetable-basket group’, 
and is used to refer to lay investors who are housewives. Typically, cailanzu go to 
the morning markets with their baskets to buy vegetabl  and meat; on the way there 
or back home, cailanzu stop at the brokerage lobbies with their baskets. 
During the fieldwork period, I saw many lay investor , both male and female, 
bring bags containing vegetables, meat, cooked food, r groceries into the brokerage 
offices. Some stayed for hours; some stayed for only a few minutes; some of them 
came, left and came back again several times. In Chi a, some housewives tend to 
keep their stock trading a secret. My fieldwork exprience, mentioned above, is an 
example. 
Gender stereotypes, like masculinity and femininity, seem less important in 
Taiwanese lay investors’ consciousness. Lay investors face an anonymous stock 
market. When I asked lay investors and professional pr ctitioners about their 
opinions of the necessary characteristics of successful tock investors, masculinity or 
femininity was never mentioned. 
This is different from the research findings about US stock markets. According 
to Levin’s description (2001), masculinity is considered by traders to be an important 
requirement for success in the trading pits. The diff rence may be caused by the form 
of trading. In the pits, traders must use their heig t, gestures and loud voices to 
attract counterparts to trade with them (Zaloom 2006). Though lay investors do not 
physically struggle in the pits to get better prices, Harrington (2008) finds gender 
stereotype is observable as evidenced by the smaller number of female investors and 





People’s dress in the brokerage offices somewhat reflects their ideas about these 
places. The dress code for the employees is almost the same in each brokerage firm. 
Usually, they wear suits, shirts and ties, or company uniforms during the market 
hours, as maintaining a professional image is considered important by the companies 
and staff. However, after the market closes, some brokers would take off their 
uniform or suit, and change to their private clothes, ven if ‘officially’ they are still 
‘working’. 
On the other hand, the lay investors’ dress is varied, and slight differences exist 
between areas. Most lay investors wear very casual clothes. Wearing a suit or tie is 
rare. Street-wear is very popular in Tainan brokerag  offices. Many people wear only 
tank tops, shorts and flip-flops, though this is perhaps influenced by the tropical 
weather. Generally, what lay investors wear in broke age offices is similar to what 
they wear in the food markets or night markets. In short, dress is informal. This 
informal dress code in the brokerage offices implies that this financial space is 
included, not excluded, in the investors’ daily-life space. They do not intentionally 
dress up, like businesspeople, to enter this space. In other words, they seem not 
strongly aware of the financial ‘professionality’ of brokerage offices. As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, this is consistent with Taiwanese SMEs culture. The border between 
factories and homes/private and public spaces remain blurred. 
Furthermore, there is no obvious difference between dahu’s and sanhu’s dress 
in general. Their dress styles are similar. The difference in size of their investment 
portfolios cannot be discerned from their ‘appearances’ (that is, their clothes and 
behaviour). For example, a woman whom I often met in he X branch during my 
fieldwork always wears normal street dress. Chun-Shen, my broker, told me that she 
is a rich dahu and her son is the head of a large hospital. However, her dress just 
looks the same as other old female investors’ in the lobby. This phenomenon is 
consistent with a convention in Taiwan: ‘You cannot distinguish how rich a person is 
by their dress and manner.’ There are two possible reasons of this phenomenon. First, 
the rapid economic growth of Taiwanese and Chinese societies only started in recent 
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decades. The speed of accumulation of cultural capital, following Pierre Bourdieu’s 
idea (1994), is possibly slower than accumulation of economic capital. In other 
words, many new rich are still used to their original habitus of dress and manner. 
Secondly, many dahu perhaps believe a traditional proverb: ‘to flaunt your fortune is 




The languages which lay investors choose to communicate in brokerage offices also 
reveal their perceptions of the degree of formality of these places. Both the 
Taiwanese and Chinese governments adopted the same language, Mandarin, as their 
official language sixty years ago. Most people in these two areas are familiar with 
Mandarin. In China, Mandarin is called ‘Putonghua’ (普通話 Standard Chinese). In 
Taiwan, it is called ‘Guoyu’ (國語 National Language). However, there are dozens of 
popular regional dialects in China and two main loca  dialects in Taiwan. Usually, 
the type of occasion determines whether people choose Mandarin or one of the 
dialects to communicate. In general, people prefer to talk in dialect with their family, 
relatives and friends. On the other hand, Mandarin is usually used in formal 
occasions.73 
In the brokerage offices in Taipei, most of the time I heard people using 
Mandarin. On the other hand, in the brokerage office in Tainan, the majority of 
people used Taiwanese to communicate, though. Mandarin w s still sometimes heard 
there. In the brokerage office in Shanghai, I felt myself to be an outsider. Everyone 
spoke only the Shanghai dialect and I could not understand a word. The situation was 
similar in the brokerage office in Hangzhou, where people spoke the Hangzhou 
dialect all the time. They only used Mandarin when I spoke to them in Mandarin. 
This suggests that some lay investors probably consider brokerage offices are a type 
of public place for the local community. 
 
5.4.5 Seats 
                                                
73 I am used to speaking Mandarin in daily life. I also can understand both major Taiwanese dialects: 
Taiwanese and Hakka, although I cannot speak them wll. 
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During the fieldwork in the X brokerage office, the numbers of lay investors in the 
lobby remained stable, usually around ten. These people became familiar faces, as 
they appeared there almost every day. Interestingly, their seats were almost fixed. 
The computers on the counter were always occupied by the same people for the 
whole market opening time. These investors who sat on the stools traded large-size 





The seating allocation implies the unequal status among lay investors in the 
brokerage lobby. A person’s status in the lobby is built on two elements: one is the 
amount of trading capital; the other is their investing skill. In the X branch, one man 
who always sits on his stool is called ‘Shifu’ (師傅 Master) by other investors and the 
staff. According to the size of his portfolio, he would be eligible to occupy a VIP 
room. However, he has refused this benefit and insists on sitting in the lobby. As 
well as his large amount of investment capital, his trading skill is appreciated by 
other investors and staff. He is one of the most profitable clients in the X branch, and 
he does not rely on insider information or complicated analysis skills. ’Strict self-
discipline is the reason why Shifu can earn money’, Chun-Shen says. ‘It sounds easy, 
but it is difficult to achieve.’ Shifu only buys the shares which almost hit the up-price 
limit, because the growing tendency of share prices usually lasts only one to two 
days in the market. If the price tendency converts to the other direction after he’s 
made a purchase, he would stop loss instantly. By contrast, most lay investors, even 
some professional investors, cannot stop loss as quickly as him. Chun-Shen explains 
Shifu’s strength: 
 
It is against human nature. When the market trend is opposite to your 
expectation and you are losing money, most people tend o wait a period 
of time, at least a short period of time, and wish the market will go back 
to their previous expectation. His strong self-contr l is his weapon. 
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Shifu gains a lot of respect in this brokerage office. H usually talks loudly (his voice 
is loud enough that every one in the lobby can clearly hear him) to other investors in 
the lobby about his current trading orders, and they pick up on what trades they 
should make. His followers always place the same trading orders immediately. He 
also mocks brokers sometimes, when he knows they have made incorrect trading 
decisions. Chun-Shen guesses why S ifu insists on staying in the lobby. ‘He seems to 
really enjoy the bustling atmosphere in the lobby and the ability to influence other 
people’s decisions.’  
 
5.4.7 Losing Face 
 
To avoid ‘losing face’ is another view of keeping the status in brokerage offices. Mrs 
Kuo has experience of shifting between the investing lobby and the VIP room. In the 
beginning, she traded stock in the investing lobby like most lay investors. In her 
brokerage office, three people were allocated to a VIP room. One day, her friend, 
who had been a member of a VIP room, invited her to accompany her because there 
was a seat available. She knew this friend in this brokerage office. First Mrs Kuo 
refused, because she had not wanted to go through the pressure of reaching the 
monthly minimum trading volume required for VIP room membership. But her 
friend told her that she really needed an acquaintance to help her manage her 
portfolio, which was very complicated and at the same time, she was also trading 
through another stock account in a different brokerag  firm. Finally, Mrs Kuo was 
persuaded by her friend and she joined the VIP room. Due to several serious failures, 
her friend ‘graduated’ and left the VIP room. Mrs Kuo lost contact with her friend at 
this time, because her friend seemed to feel that se had ‘lost face’ and wanted to 
avoid her ‘investing friends’ finding her. After a while, Mrs Kuo decided to go back 
to the investing lobby, citing mental pressure as the main reason:  
 
In the same room, every time you did a decision, other wo people knew 
[about it] very clearly. It was fine when you made a smart deal. However, 
 191 
when you had the wrong strategies and lost money, [those] other two 
people were watching you. 
 
Making a mistake or being a loser in front of other p ople is very stressful for her. 
Therefore, she asked the brokerage office to allocate a computer to her in the 
investing lobby and she left the VIP room. When she’s in the investing lobby, she 
can keep a low profile while trading. Her belief is that no one always ‘wins money’ 
in the stock market and she does not have to be seen to ‘fail’ in front of other people. 
She is also afraid that other investors will follow her trading orders and then lose 
money. For her, that is another kind of ‘losing face’. Her experience is very different 
to Shifu’s story. However, ‘to avoid losing face’ and ‘to gain respect’ are linked ideas. 
 
5.5 Economic/social space 
 
Although brokerage offices are not the exchange floor f Taiwan’s stock market, 
they are the main places where lay investors experience the atmosphere of the stock 
market. The shouting, the phones ringing constantly and people’s emotional 
expressions are the elements that make up the thrilling market atmosphere in the 
investing lobbies. However, this feverish market atmosphere is not always sustained 
through all of the market’s opening hours. 
When the share prices are changing rapidly, lay investors and brokers not only 
stare at the screens. Some lay investors shout and reveal strong emotional 
expressions, depending on whether they are gaining or losing money. Some are quiet 
and concentrate on recording the quick changes of the market on investment notes. 
At the same time, the non-stop ringing phones streng hen this intense atmosphere. 
Brokers are hurrying to finish the calls on hand, because other callers are waiting on 
the lines. The constant noisy phone traffic ‘reminds’ the on-the-spot investors of the 
‘existence’ of lay investors outside the brokerage offices. 
If the market trends stabilize for a while, then peo l  shift their attention from 
the market to other affairs. They start to chat. Discussions between lay investors and 
brokers are also common. Some lay investors may walk around the lobby, read 
newspaper, have tea, go out to buy breakfast, or leave. In other brokerage offices, I 
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saw some investors lying on the bench for a quick nap while some women were 
knitting. Usually the phones become quieter. The ‘economic’ space temporarily 
transforms into a ‘social’ space. 
When the market starts to change again, people’s attentions are attracted back 
to the market. People concentrate on the volatility of their investment portfolios and 
quickly place the orders to the brokers. The swings between ‘economic’ space and 
‘social’ space usually take place several times a day in the brokerage offices, and I 
have mapped them out as part of my field notes in Appendix 5.2. The notes records 
the detailed timeline of a day in the brokerage offices which clearly displays these 
swings. 
 
5.5.1 Discussion topics 
 
To chat with other lay investors is the most popular social activity during the 
market’s opening hours. Although the topics are various, they can be roughly 
categorized into two groups. The first group is relat d to the stock market. Many lay 
investors like to exchange comments about the day’s market trend and the changes in 
share prices, and to discuss the ‘real-life’ factors which influence current market 
changes. Personal investing experiences and their fam liars’ stories are often used to 
support their opinions. 
Exchanging market information is common as well. The information includes 
‘publicly available information’, which can be read and seen on newspaper and 
television, and ‘non-publicly available information’, which is not easy or impossible 
to confirm. Sometimes the information they talk about is closer to ‘rumour’ rather 
than ‘information’; for example, advice from ‘secret’ xperts, the leaked information 
of listed companies, etc. The sources of this kind of information are usually from 
their acquaintances or their acquaintances’ acquaintances.74. 
Family affairs are another group of popular topics to chat about, possibly 
because many of the lay investors are around the sam  age, i.e. in their fifties and 
sixties. Both males and females are very involved in talking about their children: 
their children’s education and career developments, and how to get along well with 
                                                
74 A detailed discussion of the information which layinvestors are used to exchanging is in Chapter 2. 
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them are hot topics. In addition, sometimes female inv stors are eager to discuss their 
relationships with their husbands and mothers-in-law. Men don’t seem to be 
interested in this kind of topic. 
 
5.5.2 Playing games 
  
In the Chinese brokerage lobby which I visited in Shanghai, a group of people were 
sitting in a circle and playing poker in front of the projection screen. I asked the 
client manager: is it normal to play games in the investing lobby? He told me that as 
long as they didn’t bet cash, in general, the securities guards would not stop them. 
Indeed, these people play poker frequently and the o r people in the brokerage 
office have become used to them. ‘You, know, the markets are not always changing 
quickly’, the client manager says, ‘sometimes it is very boring and investors need 
some activities to kill time.’ In another Chinese brokerage office in Hangzhou, I saw 
lay investors playing poker, PC games and majiang/mahjong (麻將) in the VIP 
rooms. The branch manager also told me that it is very normal here. All the 
brokerage staff and lay investors whom I interviewed in China agreed that doing 
these kinds of social activities, such as playing poker, is very normal here, and seems 
to have been so ever since China first opened up its stock markets. Hertz (1998) 




Playing games, like poker or mahjong, has not been s  and heard of in Taiwanese 
brokerage offices. When I told Taiwanese interviewes (both lay investors and 
brokers) about the games played in Chinese brokerage offices, they were very 
surprised. Although most of them agree that the brokerage offices are a kind of 
public social space, they still consider that brokeag  offices are purpose-built 
financial places and different to the ‘completely’ public social places, like public 
parks or community centres. According to their words, these ‘purely’ social activities, 
such as poker games, should not be played in this professionally financial space. In 
general, all these Taiwanese market participants think that playing games in 
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brokerage offices is a ‘profane’ behaviour that betrays the ‘professionality’ of this 
space. The line between ‘accepted’ and ‘unaccepted’ social activities in brokerage 
offices demarcates the maximum degree of ‘socialization’ of these places. 
The consensus is generally shared by both the investors and staff: the social 
activities in a brokerage office should be seen as somewhat inconsistent with the 
purpose of the place. The layouts of brokerage offices perhaps facilitate this 
consensus. Take the X branch as an example. The offices are an open-plan space. 
The investing lobby, the brokers’ working area and the clerks’ working area are 
proximate and set apart by partition walls about 1 metre high. In practical terms, 
these areas compose a common space (see Image 5.1). Thus, investors and brokers 
are able to have intensive interactions and talks (see Appendix 5.2). The investors in 
the lobby probably feel that they share the same space with the staff, and therefore 
they should somewhat respect the working code of this financial place. Lay investors, 
even as they sit in the brokerage offices, are probably aware that the brokers and 
clerks are working. Although the investors are chatting, joking, cursing, eating their 
lunch and drinking tea or coffee in the lobby, they are also exchanging information, 
watching the real-time share prices and trading stock. What the lay investors do there 
is somewhat similar to what some clerks do in a relx d office. In other words, they 
seem to consider themselves as much ‘members’ of the office as are the staff. 
The basic principles of the other brokerage offices’ layouts in Taiwan are 
similar. The investors, brokers and clerks share a joint open-plan space, there are low 
partition walls between the investing lobby and thestaff area, and the independent 
VIP rooms (if there are any) are next to the staff area. 
In contrast, the two Chinese brokerage offices’ layouts are different from the 
Taiwanese ones. In China, the staff areas and the inv stor areas are completely 
separate. The investor lobby, the VIP rooms and the s aff areas are independent and 
usually located on different floors. Because the lay investors do not share the space 
with the staff, they rarely see clerks or customer anagers in the investing lobbies 
and VIP rooms. In other words, during market hours, the lobbies and VIP rooms 
belong to the investors only, and they do not need to concern themselves about the 
working codes in these financial offices. 
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In brief, the different social standards of what are ‘acceptable activities’ in the 
brokerage offices in Taiwan and in China are conjectur d to be partially shaped by 
the layouts of the brokerage offices. The standards lso refer the different boundaries 
between social/market spheres in these places are socio-technical constructions. 
 
5.5.4 Social activities outside brokerage offices 
 
Ever since the TWSE’s market hours were extended to 1:30 p.m., most lay investors 
have been used to having lunch in the brokerage offices. Sometimes, the lay 
investors in the same brokerage office still have a late lunch or dinner together. It is 
also the usual practice for brokers to have dinner with their important clients in the 
end of the year. Sheng-Ji told me, social activities in the VIP area of his brokerage 
office are held frequently. In the VIP area, there a dozens of people, whose ages 
and economic conditions are similar, and relationships amongst them are close. 
Every two or three months, they have dinner together in a restaurant. Several months 
ago, they went on a trip together. He emphasized that these social activities are not 
related to brokers and the brokerage firm, and that t ese ‘business-relation people’ 
are not included in these activities. Mrs Kuo’s situation is similar: after the market 
opening time was extended, she and other investors in the investing lobby have 
meals together sometimes. 
 
5.5.5 Meanings for contemporary brokerage offices 
 
The lay investors who are used to trading in brokerag  offices presently make up a 
specific social group. As mentioned above, most are in their fifties or sixties. Sheng-
Ji told me about his perception of this group of peopl : ‘I believe most people whom 
you’ve seen here [in the brokerage offices] have the same idea as me. The brokerage 
office is a kind of nursing home for the elderly or an office for the retired.’ 
In his view, there is no huge difference between broke age offices and nursing 
homes. Like nursing homes, brokerage offices also pr vide facilities (chairs, 
newspapers, tea, air-conditioning), meal delivery (like the staff, investors can order 
lunch to be delivered), an engaging activity/work (stock investment), social 
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interactions and similar-age companions (other lay investors). However, compared to 
nursing homes, these services are almost free (excluding the trading fee). For many 
lay investors, this place is the focus of their daily life. The activity (stock investment) 
is considered a proper way to kill time (see Chapter 3). One investor says: ‘Stock 
investment pushes the elderly, like me, to continue using our brains. As you know, if 
the brain stops being used, it will degenerate very quickly. To continue trading stock 
is a useful way to protect against Alzheimer’s disease.’ 
Some investors are used to trading stock in brokerage offices and are unable to 
adjust to trading at home. Mrs Kuo is an example:  
 
I only know how to trade in the investing lobby. Ofcourse, I also have a 
computer in my home like the ones in the brokerage offices. However, 
when I stay at home, I do not have any intuition and do not know how to 
trade. 
 
On the other hand, the branch managers also claim that providing investing 
lobbies is a kind of responsibility to their long-standing clients, and not for profit. Ms 
Yuan, the Hangzhou branch manager, frankly admits: 
 
The trading fees from the clients on the spot (in the investing lobby) only 
make up 15 per cent of the income of this branch. However, the cost of 
maintaining this large space and the facilities is much higher. Especially, 
the rent is going up every year. For the company, this is almost a ‘pure’ 
service for our old clients. 
 
In her words, the company is waiting these long-standing clients to ‘gradually retire 
from brokerage offices’. 
Indeed, when the manager first introduced the brokerage office to me, she had 
emphasized that the recently opened branches of the brok rage company have much 
smaller investing lobbies. Because this branch was established at the early stage, it 
was equipped with an unusually large investing lobby. A Chinese news report in 
2007 also reports on this phenomenon:  
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During the recent years, China’s stock markets were booming, but the 
scene of crowded lay investors in brokerage offices ha  not existed as in 
the past. Conversely, some brokerage branches have removed their 
lobbies completely. [In] some others, only several screens are retained in 
the passageways. An investing lobby full of lay investors has become a 
memory. (Qianjiang Evening News 2007, 1 September: B1). 
 
Similarly, Mr. Lee, the brokerage branch manager in Taipei, told me that the 
investing lobby of this branch has been downsized three times that he knows of. He 
predicts that the investing lobby and VIP rooms will become a part of history in the 
next few years. 
According to the observation, interviews and newspaper report, the 
phenomenon of the group trading crowd is gradually f ding away in both Taiwanese 
and Chinese brokerage offices. In Hertz’s and Gamble’s studies, the trading crowd is 
a characteristic of China’s stock markets and represents the culture of contemporary 
China. Both of them tend to attribute this phenomenon to cultural and historical 
factors of Chinese society. The technological development of market devices and its 
impact are not emphasized in their studies. 
However, in social studies of finance, a number of studies have pointed out the 
importance of technology in shaping market participants’ behaviours (e.g., Beunza 
and Stark 2004; Zaloom 2006; Preda 2009a). In particular, Zaloom’s study (2006) 
has described the transformations of the trading pits and the traders’ behaviours 
which occurred when electronic trading systems were int oduced into the exchanges. 
In this aspect, lay investors are not that different to the traders and the brokerage 
offices are not that different to the pits: all these configurations of people and places 
are strongly influenced by technology. 
As Chapter 3 and Appendix 5.1 elucidate, in 1990s China and 1980s Taiwan, 
brokerage offices nearly monopolized real-time market information and the order 
placing mechanism. The situation is somewhat similar to Western brokerage offices 
which monopolized real-time stock market information as it was transmitted by the 
ticker-tapes in the first half of the twenty century. To access the latest shares price is 
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very helpful for making trading decision. Thus, many lay investors tended to spend 
time in brokerage offices to trade stock (Preda 2009a). 
To date, the ways of taking part in the stock markets and receiving real-time 
market information in Taiwan and China have evolved and become diverse with 
technological development. Some lay investors have altered their trading behaviours 
with the transformation and some have not. Image 5.14 and 5.15 displays the 
transformation in Taiwan’s and China’s stock markets. Trading crowds continue to 
congregate in contemporary Taiwanese and Chinese brokerage offices, but their 
motivations for staying in these places cannot be explained by financial reasons only. 
For many investors, stock trading, brokerage offices and trading companies have 




This chapter aims to investigate the interlocking of devices, actors and space in 
contemporary Taiwanese and Chinese brokerage offices. Through observations and 
interviews, this study records the market actions, social activities, interactions, works 
and properties of lay investors and brokers in broke age offices. The layouts, market 
devices and facilities of brokerage offices are also reported. With the development of 
market technology, brokerage offices have lost their monopoly on providing superior 
information and trading systems. To date, these places have been a particular socio-
economic space for a specific group of lay investors, and the configurations of 
people, activities, devices and space there have comprised a main part of these 
investors’ daily life. During the market hours, social and market activities 
continuously alternate and the social/economic boundaries remain blurred in 
brokerage offices. The types of social activities in these places are thought to be 























































Appendix 5.1 Changes in communicative media in China’s stock markets 
 
Compared to the technological development of Taiwan’s stock market (see Chapter 
3), the change in China’s stock markets seems an inte sive process. In 1990 and 
1991, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange were built 
and China’s stock markets began to operate (Liu et al. 2010: 315). In the beginning, 
real-time market information was transmitted only to local brokerage offices and 
several neighbouring regions. The area which was covered by the transmission of 
real-time market information was extended gradually. With the improvement of 
equipment, the situation was improving very quickly (Liu et al. 2010: 194–5). In 
1997, a national transmitting and trading system was in operation. Real-time market 
information could be transmitted to all brokerage offices around China and trading 
orders could be sent to the stock exchanges immediately from each brokerage firm 
(Liu et al. 2010: 257). Besides brokerage offices, some local radio stations broadcast 
hourly latest share prices on an hourly basis and other radio stations and television 
channels reported closing share prices daily (Gamble 1997: 197; Hertz 1998: 154). 
The online trading system was gradually adopted by brokerage firms towards 
the end of the 1990s (Shanghai Securities News, 27 May 1999). For most Chinese 
brokerage firms, the company website, the online trading system and the online real-
time market information system were constructed simultaneously. The online stock-
trading population is growing very quickly with a rpidly growing number of 
individual investors. As the majority of individual investors entered the stock 
markets, the online trading system has become very popular. To date, the brokerage 
fees from the online trading systems is the main source of income for most Chinese 
brokerage firms. For example, a brokerage branch manager in Hangzhou told me that 
the brokerage fees from online trading usually accounts for around 85 per cent of a 
company’s gross income in this industry. Another informant, an IT worker of a 
brokerage firm, also provided me with a similar figure. 
The income from on-the-spot trading fees is the second most important source 
of income. At present, each brokerage office still eems full of people. According to 
the branch manager’s knowledge, strict government co rol regarding the number of 
brokerage offices in each area is the main reason that there remains a kind of bustling 
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atmosphere in the brokerage offices. The regulations freeze the number of brokerage 
offices in each area and prevents any new offices to open in the ‘saturated areas’.75 
On the other hand, telephone trading doesn’t seem very popular in China. The 
branch manager told me that under 3 per cent of their customers use telephone 
trading. The reason might be that the telephone trading usually has to pair with the 
delivery of real-time market information. However, the broadcast of real-time market 
information on the national television channel started almost simultaneously with the 
launch of the online trading system and online real-time market information 
broadcasts (Shanghai Securities News, 27 May 1999; Li 2011: 138–9). 
 
Appendix 5.2 A day at the brokerage offices (field note) 
 
Brokerage office lobby, X Branch, Taipei, 22 February 2011 






















I enter the brokerage office. Eleven individual investors have been 
there. Two women sit on a bench. A man and a woman are using east-
side computers. Another man and five women are using the computer 
on the south-side counter. Some of them discuss the trend of today’s 
market and express their nervousness. 
 
I sit on the bench and have breakfast. The stock mar et starts. At the 
same time, the futures market, which opened 15 minutes before, 
continues to go down. A broker shouts: ‘The arrow of the futures 
market [technical analysis] tends to fall.’ Phones in the office are busy 
ringing. Many calls seem to be for cancelling orders. A woman eats 
her breakfast [rice ball]. A woman says: ‘Zhiyuan [a listed company] 
is hitting the down limit.’ Another woman replies: ‘Just keep it’. A 
woman and man talk about Yitong [a listed company]. 
 
Calls are less than earlier but the phones still ring very often. The 
purpose of most calls is to ask brokers about share pric s. A female 
investor walks into the office. Two women talk about solar energy 




















                                                










































Phones ring only a few times. Shifu (a well-known male individual 
investor in this brokerage office) asks a broker whether he makes 
money for himself. One man curses a stock. Some othr people regret 
why they didn’t buy a stock which has been growing for several days. 
Since the market opened, the stock market is declining. All investors 
seem in sombre mood and talk less. Two men walk into the office and 
a man walks back and forth inside the hall. A woman c lls a broker’s 
nickname (an indication of how familiar they are). Two women chat 
on the bench. A man and a woman on the left-side counter chat as 
well. Two women on the east-side counter talk about the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. 
 
A woman shakes her head several times. Shifu says: ‘XX [a listed 
company] is hitting down limit, great! When the foreign capital 
[foreign institutional investors] continues buying a stock, it must be 
dead.’ One person says: ‘IC design stocks stop declining.’ Two 
women discuss about whether or not they should invest in solar energy 
stocks now. A broker says: ‘The futures market is breaking [the 
support] (technical analysis). Many people are forced into liquidation 
now.’ A person says: ‘Zhongmeijing [a listed company] is reaching the 
highest price. Due to the Middle East, oil stocks are growing so much.’ 
A man says: ‘XX [a listed company] is changing to hit upper limit. Is it 
tricking us?’ A woman says: ‘An analyst is saying Zhongmeijing is 
going up to 150. It’s almost this price. Can we invest now?’ 
 
A person went to buy breakfast and comes back to the ffice. A person 
talks to a broker: ‘Zhongmeijing’. (It means a call-order). 
 
Shifu shouts: ‘Yeah, I knew Hejiang [a listed company] would hit the 
upper limit.’ A person talks to a broker: ‘Buy 2 XX (a listed company) 
without margin.’ A woman walks out from a VIP room and talks to a 
broker: ‘OO (broker’s name), I’m going to the United States tonight. 
Please pay attention to Guotaijin [a listed company] for me.’ Another 
woman says ‘Goodbye’ to her. A broker complains and says: ‘The 
futures market is falling again.’ One person starts to eat breakfast. 
 
Someone takes a newspaper from the rack. Phone calls increase again. 
 
So far, all 
investors on the 
spot seem over 
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Some people talk about the Jasmine Revolution in Middle East. Shifu 
says: ‘Wa, there are 188 units short of XX [a listed company].’ One 
woman always goes out of the office to talk on her c ll phone. One 
person says: ‘The Central Bank [TW] can’t resist the growth of oil 
cost [it refers to airline stocks].’ Two women talk about industries. 
Someone calls into the office to ask a broker about the index pattern 
[technical analysis]. One man says: ‘Wa, the Hong Kong market is 
falling 400 points.’ A man who came here yesterday as well uses the 
east-side computer (I have never seen him talk to other people). 
 
A man and woman discuss ‘Why has Changlong [a listed company] 
hit the down limit?’ Personal income tax becomes a discussion topic 
on the right-hand seats of the south-side counter. 
 
Most people start to walk around and chit-chat (the opics are 
irrelevant to the market). 
 
A cleaner sweeps the west-side corridor. Some people chat about their 
children. Shifu jokes: ‘Financial stocks don’t go up. Electric stocks 
don’t go up. Everyone should make an appointment to jump from a 
building together.’ A broker laughingly replies: ‘Oh, everyone needs 
to take a number’ (meaning that there are too many people and the 
people have to queue to jump). A man and woman are reading 
newspapers. Some people complain about the decline of IC design 
stocks. 
 
Shifu speaks to a woman: ‘Tell your sister to keep XX [a listed 
company].’ A broker says: ‘That’s a 50,000 short order in the futures 
market. Wa, even if facing a financial crisis, you still have time to 
refinance.’ A man laughingly replies: ‘And have time to escape.’ 
Another says: ‘XX is hitting the down limit.’ A woman tells another 
person: ‘The security of our building also invests in XX.’ That person 
replies: ‘It doesn’t work [to gain information] by reading newspapers, 
because other people read the same information as well.’ 
 
People still chit-chat and curse the stock analysts. A broker says ‘Be 
careful of the futures market!’ One person says: ‘The Korean stock 
solar energy 
stock) seems 
very hot today. It 
is frequently 
discussed in the 
lobby and there 
are many phone 
calls asking its 
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market is breaking the last lowest point.’ 
 
I start to read a newspaper. 
 
There are less people (eight women and one man) and less talk in the 
lobby. 
 
A broker says: ‘The futures market is going up! Zhongxinjin [a listed 
company] is going up!’ 
 
Some people chat. A broker shouts: ‘Shanghai [stock market] is 
plunging. Oh, classmates [fellows], how do I play!?’ 
 
Some brokers start to eat their lunch. The hall is full of food smells. 
One woman starts to eat her lunch which she prepared and brought in 
herself. Her lunch box was heated in a microwave ovn, which is a 
facility in the brokerage office for staff and clients. 
 
I go to buy coffee. 
 
People continue doing the same things. They chat a lot nd the topics 
are not related to the market. In general, they pay less attention to the 
market. There’s no phones ringing either. One man always watches the 
computer and murmurs to himself. 
 
One person goes back to the VIP room with their lunch box. Shifu asks 
a broker: ‘Have you had your lunch?’ ‘Not yet,’ the broker replies. 
‘Could you please buy something for my lunch?’ Shifu says. ‘What do 
you want?’ the broker asks. ‘Don’t buy the same food as last time. – 
Ok! Dumplings and a cup of corn soup.’ Shifu replies. Another broker 
jokes: ‘Remember buy eight dumplings [eight is a lucky number in 
Chinese culture], not ten.’ The broker laughingly replies: ‘Should I 
buy the corn soup with eighty-eight corns?’ 
 
A woman walks in the office. Another woman jokes to her: ‘So late, 
have you come here for lunch?’ Another woman talks to a broker: ‘I 
need to leave now to see a doctor. Bye.’ The broker who went to buy 













































































Including your meal. Let me pay you.’ 
 
The phones start ringing more again. 
 
A man walks into the hall and watches the screen as he murmurs to 
himself. 
 
Many people shout: ‘[The market’s] stopped dropping! Stop dropping! 
It’s time to get the rebound!’ 
 
On-the-spot orders and talk increase. The atmosphere of the hall 
becomes busy again. 
 
The number of people increases. An old woman accompanied by a 
foreign domestic help enters the lobby. This old woman starts to talk 
to two other women (it seems that they are very famili r to each 
other). She asks them: ‘Do you hear any information of Lianfake [a 
listed company]?’ A woman curses the CEO of Lianfake and 
complains: ‘How could he allow the price to fall somuch?’ Another 
says: ‘Have you had your lunch? Lianfake is not good. Each IC design 
stock hit the down limit yesterday.’ 
 
Some women chat. Shifu talks on his cell phone about the result of his 
son’s university joint exam. A broker makes a joke about it. One 
woman talks to another woman about their female acqu intance who’s 
made hundreds of thousands profit in Dalikuang [a listed company]. 
 
A woman asks a man: ‘Why do the game stocks plunge?’ Another 
woman replies: ‘Because of Mainland China … .’ 
 
A man walks into the hall with bread. 
 
Everyone becomes involves in a discussion of an interes ing news 
story about how a person under 18 is not allowed to collect their 
lottery winnings. A broker says: ‘Oh my god! There is still an hour 
more for plunging.’ 
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go up.’ A broker replies: ‘Someone is taking [some p ople are 
buying].’ 
 
Shifu jokes: ‘XX company [a listed company] is afraid that individual 
investors are stranded. This is so nice.’ 
 
Shifu says: ‘XX changes to rise. Do you see? I told you to purchase. 
Why you didn’t buy?’ A woman went to buy a cup of sup and comes 
back. A man calls out a woman’s name and chats about her children.  
 
Someone shouts: ‘The market goes back to today’s starting point.’ A 
broker says: ‘Every time it’s like this.’ 
 
The phone calls increase. 
 
The phones are busy ringing. One person shouts: ‘Change to red! 
[meaning the market changes from down to up] Change to red!’ A 
broker says: ‘F**k you!’ 
 
Someone says: ‘Almost faint! [the index almost goes back to the 
original level when the market opened] XX hits the upper limit.’ 
Another says: ‘The market is rising in the end.’ A broker says: ‘Raise 
Diyijin [a listed company]!’ Another broker replies: ‘Yeah. It’s going 
to hold an institutional investors conference.’ Another person shouts: 
‘The futures market is going up.’ The phones never stop ringing. 
 
The atmosphere suddenly goes calm for a while. 
 
Two women chat about how to get along with their husbands and 
mothers-in-law. Another woman leaves. 
 
The phone calls increase again. 
 
Three women talk about Aizhiwei [a listed company]. One woman 
says: ‘So exciting. It goes up.’ Another woman says: ‘Calm down. 
Don’t get too excited.’ 
 













































































starts to clean the counter and watches the [market] projector screen at 
the same time. 
 
A woman says: ‘Faint! Faint! Shengyangke [a listed company] hits the 
upper limit.’ 
 
One person says: ‘The futures market’s gone up by 100 points.’ The 
loudspeaker in the lobby starts to broadcast the current time (The last 
five minutes’ market information will not display until the end of the 
market trading day, a result from when the government worried that 
someone could trick investors by manipulating the last minutes of 
market trading.). A male cleaner starts to empty the rubbish bin, but he 
also keeps his eye on the market projector screen (This man also 
watched the market in the morning). 
 
A woman says: ‘Hurry up! Hurry up! Earning 100 dollars is also nice.’ 
 
The broadcast ends. A broker says: ‘Now is the last round of the game 
[trading]!’ 
 
There are some phone calls. One man curses the institutional investors. 
People start to move and throw away the used cups. 
 
Phone calls increase. Everyone starts to put their stuff back into their 
bags and walk around. A broker says: ‘Help! Have lost money again.’ 
 
People talk more. Shifu says: ‘Lost money!’ A woman replies: ‘Me 
too!’ 
 
The last trading result is showed on the screen. The cleaner changes 
the rubbish bag. Phone calls increase. Most of them are about asking 
brokers whether their orders have been dealt or not. 
 
The light is turned on in the hall. You can’t see th  projector screen 
clearly. People start to collect their jackets, talk on their cell phones 
and leave. People on the counter fill their orders. 
 
One person says: ‘The show is over.’ People ask each other: ‘What 
sit in front of 
computers on the 
south-side 
counter have 
been there all 
day. 
The broadcast 
gives me a strong 











will you do later?’ People get their bags and leave. 
 
Shifu says: ‘Really unreasonable.’ People say ‘Goodbye’ to ach other. 
A cleaner replenishes the disposable cups. 
 

































This thesis has shown how stock trading is interconnected with lay investors’ social 
relations, what are the features of lay investors’ socio-technical configurations and 
the key market devices used by them, and which factors cause the asymmetry of 
calculative capabilities between professional and lay market actors in Taiwan’s stock 
market and which conditions constrain the extension of this gap. This thesis has also 
explored the interiors of Taiwanese and Chinese brokerage offices and elucidated the 
interlinks between technology, financial markets, social life and these offices. The 
findings of these investigations have been outlined in the previous chapters. Two 
issues are nevertheless raised by my focus on the relation between stock trading and 
daily life: the relationships between social relations and economic action and the 
frames of market actors. 
 
6.1 Social relations and economic action 
 
Since Granovetter’s theory of embeddedness was first proposed in the 1980s, a 
number of social approaches have been developed to investigate the subtle 
relationship between social relations and economic action (Smelser and Swedberg 
2005). In terms of financial markets, three major approaches for this purpose can be 
generalized from the literature: the embeddedness appro ch, the relational-work 
approach and the socio-technical approach, all of which have been applied in this 
study. Due to these powerful theoretical tools, different aspects of the relationships 
found in Taiwan’s stock market have been illuminated, which help us to gain a better 
understanding of lay investors’ socio-economic life. However, the findings of this 
study also imply the limitations of these approaches. 
The first approach originates from Granovetter’s concept of embeddedness. As 
noted, the core idea of this approach is that economic action is ‘embedded in 
concrete, ongoing systems of social relations’ (Granovetter 1985: 481, 487). A 
number of sociological and anthropological studies of financial markets have 
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elucidated the effects of social relations on the participants’ economic performances 
and the operations of the market systems (e.g., Baker 1984; Abolafia 1996). 
As reported in Chapters 2 and 4, social relations are found to be an essential 
element of Taiwan’s stock market, even though this market is an electronic, 
anonymous stock market with millions of participants. Through social ties, lay 
investors in Taiwan are able to collect trading capital, learn analytical skills and 
receive market information and trading advice. On the other side, for professional 
practitioners, the social connections with, for example, the managers of listed 
companies are a useful ‘tool’ to update the information concerning companies’ 
current operations. Furthermore, personal ties are thought by these two groups of 
market participants to be the main (and often also the only) channel to access neixain 
(referring to different types of insider information), though the accuracy of this 
neixain is always a problem. 
The second approach is Zelizer’s ‘relational-work’ theory (Zelizer 2005, 2012). 
In general, this approach argues that all economic activities are constituted of 
‘negotiated and meaningful interpersonal relations’ (Zelizer 2012: 149): 
 
[I]n all economic action, I argue, people engage in the process of 
differentiating meaningful social relations. For each distinct category of 
social relations, people erect a boundary, mark the boundary by means of 
names and practices, establish a set of distinctive understandings that 
operate within that boundary, designate certain sorts f economic 
transactions as appropriate for the relation, bar other transactions as 
inappropriate, and adopt certain media for reckoning a d facilitating 
economic transactions within the relation. (Zelizer 2012: 148) 
 
One difficulty in applying Zelizer’s approach to Taiw n’s stock market and to other 
electronic, anonymous financial markets is the absence of direct interaction between 
the parties undertaking transactions,76  which also poses a problem when the 
                                                
76 It has been argued that the form of social interactions in financial markets are linked to technology 
and the structure of the market (e.g., Knorr Cetina a d Bruegger 2002: 912–14; Clark and Thrift 2005). 
Indeed, the importance of the market’s structure has been emphasized in sociological studies of the 
markets (e.g., White 1981; Baker 1984; Podolny 1993; Zuckerman 1999; Fligstein 2001; also see 
Preda’s review 2009: 58–96). 
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embeddedness approach is used (noted in Chapter 2). However, the insight of 
Zelizer’s approach had implied the importance of lay investors’ ideas about trading 
influencing their market behaviours. 
As shown in Chapter 3, lay investors in Taiwan tend to efine trading stock as 
‘doing a sideline business’ and ‘playing a game’. In practice, they usually use their 
spare money for trading, relying on the income from another job for living expenses 
and taking a relatively relaxed attitude toward trading. That is, they deliberately 
restrict their involvement in the market and are more concerned about the emotional 
rewards of trading. These ideas about the market (and the sets of operations that stem 
from these ideas) form the principles of lay investor ’ market behaviours and their 
everyday models for managing market risk. 
Furthermore, this approach has also elucidated the social aspect of brokerage 
offices in Taiwan. As reported in Chapter 5, for lay investors accustomed to trading 
in brokerage offices, these places are not only a financial space, but also an important 
social space. Those investors tend to give social meanings, incorporated with the 
office’s original economic connotations, to the space and the combined meanings 
shape the interactions, relations and activities thre. 
The third approach centres on the socio-technical rel tions in economic action. 
This approach is drawn from social studies of finance (and social research on science 
and technology) and has been shared by a number of recent sociological studies 
concerning markets and economy (Pinch and Swedberg 2008). Compared to 
mainstream economic sociology (namely, the Granovetterian embeddedness 
approach), which emphasizes human relations in economic actions, this approach 
tend to view each economic action as a dynamic configuration of connected human 
individuals and ‘objects’, where the connections among individuals and between 
them and ‘objects’ are equally important (Callon 1998; Preda 2009: 137–67; 
MacKenzie 2009). This approach argues that dynamic so io-technical relations 
would shape and reshape the social relations within economic actions. Thus, the 
examination of the socio-technical relations within economic activity is a key to 
elucidate the subtle relationship between social rel tions and economic action.77 
                                                
77 The ‘objects’ could include various non-human entities within economic activities, for example, 
communication devices, price recorders, trading system , information and economic theories (Knorr 
Cetina and Bruegger 2002; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Zaloom 2006; Muniesa 2008; Preda 2008; 
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Presently, online social media (such as the Interne forums) has facilitated and 
changed the form of social interactions among lay investors in Taiwan, as reported in 
Chapter 3. This finding is mainly consistent with ot er studies utilizing this approach, 
such as Roscoe’s (2013) studies of UK lay investors. 
In addition, the social interactions and market activities in Taiwanese and 
Chinese brokerage offices are influenced by the relations between the people and the 
trading devices, and the supplemental facilities, furniture and layouts of the offices, 
as shown in Chapter 5. Strong links between the social, the economic and the 
technical have been observed within these places. 
Using these three approaches, different aspects of he relationships between 
social relations and trading activities in Taiwan’s stock market have been explored, 
and social relations have been demonstrated by this s udy to be a crucial element of 
lay investors’ trading activities, as are the roles of ocial relations in other economic 
activities. 
 
Table 6.1 Analytical Approaches to Socio-economic Relationship 
Key concept Relationship Focus 
Embeddedness Economic action is embedded in social relations. Effect  
Relational 
work 
Economic action is constituted of social relations. Meaning 




Weaving Economic activities and social life are woven together to 
form a seamless whole. 
Interweaving 
 
Despite their differences (as illustrated in Table 6.1), the three approaches 
discussed above share a similar model. They tend to focus on an economic activity 
and then reveal different aspects of social relations within this economic activity. 
However, as emphasized, a large proportion of the socio-economic relationships in 
Taiwan’s stock market can be easily overlooked by this common model: the role of 
stock trading in, and its impact on, wider social interactions. 
For lay investors in Taiwan, stock trading is not only a popular financial 
activity but also an important social one. Social relations are as crucial to their stock 
                                                                                                                                
Roscoe 2013). Knorr Cetina and Bruegger’s (2002) study of foreign currency traders is a manifest 
example of this approach. The study suggests that the electronic communication device, which is 
designed for dealing transactions in the global foreign currency markets, facilitates traders around the 
world in building social connections and forming a lobal ‘virtual’ community. 
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trading as stock trading is crucial to their social l fe. As suggested in Chapter 2, 
engaging in stock trading, following the market news, and sharing information and 
opinions about the market have been social activities frequently engaged in with 
immediate family, friends and relatives, even though the actual trading transaction is 
made on an individual basis. When the stock market has been a major issue in 
society, taking part in trading tends to facilitate lay investors in maintaining and 
expanding their social ties. However, on the other and, providing incorrect 
information or inappropriate suggestions to other people may impair a lay investor’s 
social ties. Likewise, social relations, rather than economic reasons, have been found 
to motivate those lay investors who continue to visit and trade in actual brokerage 
offices (as opposed to online trading), as reported in Chapter 5. 
In brief, my findings have suggested that stock trading and social relations are 
woven together to form a largely seamless whole, and comprise a major part of lay 
investors’ daily lives. In order to emphasize this a pect of socio-economic 
relationships, an additional approach is offered by the author here to complement the 
conceptual toolkits used to analyse these relationsh ps: that is, to expose the 
interwoven relationship between economic activities and social life. As the social ties 
outside the markets have impacts on people’s market activities, so is the role of 
economic actions not restricted to merely the relationships between the parties 
engaging in transactions. These economic actions always interact with the market 
agents’ relations with other people as well. The boundaries, operations and meanings 
of economic transactions sometimes are defined by the agents’ social life. 
The economic and the social have never been discrete in human society 
(Polanyi 2001). Presently, any economic action, even carried out in complete 
anonymity, is a constituent of an agent’s social life, as social relations are an intrinsic 
element of economic activities. The four approaches in Table 6.1 are mainly 
compatible, and all are useful to enhance the sociological explanation of market 
activities, even though each approach has its own fcus and standpoint. 
 
6.2 The frames of market actors 
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In Taiwan’s stock market, stock trading is not only interwoven with lay investors’ 
social relations but also with their jobs, schedules, devices and workplaces, and also 
with the appliances, people and events occur in the various contexts. As reported in 
Chapters 3 and 5, during the TWSE’s (Taiwan Stock Exchange’s) trading hours, 
some homemakers may be doing their housework while listening to analysts’ reports 
about the day’s stock market as they are broadcast from cable TV channels; some 
university students will be sitting in their classrooms but paying more attention to the 
real-time share prices on their laptop screens than to their lecturers; in the corners of 
the brokerage offices, some retirees will be chatting with each other while drinking 
cups of tea and watching a large projection screen displaying market information; in 
some company offices, clerks are furtively using mobile devices to check the price 
changes of their portfolios. 
This picture suggests that the agencements of lay market actors are varied, 
bricolaged and also intertwined with these individuals’ daily lives. These 
characteristics of Taiwanese lay investors’ socio-technical configurations raise 
another theoretical issue: the frames of market actors. 
In Callon’s theory (1998; with Muniesa 2005), the construction of the market is 
based on the process of framing agents and goods within the market mechanism. By 
removing social relations from market agents’ calcul tion (that is, becoming homo 
economicus) and assembling the agents with market devices (generating calculative 
capabilities), the actors are made up in the market fields. In other words, the market 
actors are constructed by disengaging the agents from non-market relations, devices, 
activities and mentalities, and simultaneously integrating them into the material, 
mental and institutional structures of the market. Al hough this ‘framing’ is usually 
not for a prolonged period of time, in specific times and spaces at least, the market 
agents, according to Callon’s theory, are described as being detached from the other 
activities, relations and settings in their daily lves. 
Professional traders in financial markets largely exemplify Callon’s concept of 
market actors, though the inseparable relationship between social relations and 
financial-market activities has been demonstrated, as noted above. A professional 
trader is a configuration of an individual with a financial job, a trading room with 
specifically designed proportions, advanced and specialist market devices, supportive 
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colleagues, a systematic knowledge of the market system, self-identification as a 
homo economicus, and regular interactions with other professional market 
practitioners (e.g., Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002; Beunza and Stark 2004; Zaloom 
2006; Lepinay 2007; MacKenzie and Hardie 2009; Preda 2012). 
From an actor-network theory perspective, an actor is a heterogeneous network 
(integrated with both human agents and non-human entities), and its scale (the 
extension of the network) is not fixed (Callon and Latour 1981). This idea implies 
that the boundary between the actor and the environment (as the boundary between 
the contents and the context) is sometimes blurred and movable. MacKenzie and 
Pardo-Guerra (2013) have illustrated this idea in financial markets with their case 
study of Island (a new electronic trading platform). The analysis elucidates the 
development from the peculiarly material cultures of Island (a ‘micro’) to the 
common features of North American and western European stock markets (a 
‘macro’). 
Callon’s notion of framing refers to the demarcation and formulation of the 
actors (the heterogeneous networks) in the market field by the market’s laws and 
structures. Those entities which are irrelevant to the market mechanisms are 
eliminated, at least provisionally, from the networks. The boundary of the market is 
not impervious to change, according to Callon’s argument (1998). Due to the 
‘impossibility of total framing’, the ‘externalities’ (what should be taken into account 
according to the market’s principles but are not integrated into the existing market 
mechanism – e.g., pollution is sometimes not calculted into the cost of production) 
would create overflow and the outset of ‘reframing’. 
However, as emphasized, lay investors in Taiwan have never been disengaged 
from daily life; instead, parts of daily life are alw ys worked into the assemblages of 
lay market actors. This is not a case of overflow, because it is not possible for those 
parts of daily life, which have been the essential elements of lay market actors, to be 
fully formulated by the principles and structures of the market. In other words, the 
socio-technical configurations of lay investors areshaped not only by the framework 
of ‘market’, but also the structures of ‘daily life’. This characteristic distinguishes lay 
market actors from professional market actors, whose assemblages are mainly led by 
the framework of the market, as noted above. 
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Conventionally, the dichotomy between professional and non-professional 
traders is mainly based on their occupations, capitals and organizations (e.g., Mayall 
2006; Harrington 2008; Roscoe and Howorth 2009; Roscoe 2013). However, the 
different frames of these two groups of financial-market participants, as analysed in 
this thesis, suggest that the two assembling models also include other factors, such as 
the differences between their values, dispositions, identities, ideas about trading, 
expectations, views of the market, workplaces, devices, time commitments, 
information sources, colleagues and social connections. 
An additional factor perhaps facilitates the differences between these two 
assembling models: the environments where the market ctors assemble. The term 
‘environment’ here refers to the long, steady and slowly changing context (including 
the social settings and materiality78). If the professional environments are analogous 
to laboratories, that is, a ‘well-designed’ environment for financial-market activities 
(though this is of course only a limited analogy), the daily-life environments would 
be more like a ‘wild’ environment, which contains a plenty of non-market entities, 
activities and relations. 
 
6.3 Contributions and limitations 
 
In showing how stock trading is integrated into layinvestors’ daily life, this study 
contributes to illuminating the effect of micro social factors such as social relations, 
meanings and frameworks of everyday life on the growth of lay investors in financial 
markets. As mentioned above, economic, institutional a d technological factors have 
been used to account for this phenomenon (e.g. Barber nd Odean 2001b, 2002; Wu 
2005; Harrington 2008), but those reasons cannot fully explain why nearly half of the 
adult population in Taiwan are engaging in the stock market. This analysis suggests 
that individuals’ behaviours in financial markets are not only decided by economic 
                                                
78 For example, the materiality of the environment can refer to the appliances which are often found in 
the environment. Telephones, cable TV channels, smart phones, laptops and Wi-Fi connections have 
become popular electronic devices in many people’s everyday lives. These products are no longer 
cutting-edge technology, specialist trading tools, r unaffordable equipment for a great number of 
people. However, due to these ordinary devices, lay financial-market actors are able to assemble in 
daily-life places such as homes, offices and classrooms. 
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rationale and psychology, as the studies in finance and in behavioural economics 
have illuminated, but also are affected by micro-leve  social factors.  
This research responds to a number of calls for more f cused attention to the 
activities of lay investors in financial markets (e.g. Harrington 2008, Roscoe 2013). 
The majorities of studies within mainstream finance research and social studies of 
finance focus on professional investors with limited xceptions (see Chapter 1). 
Through a systematic examination, this study indicates the distinctions between lay 
investors and professional practitioners in a number of aspects.  The characteristics 
of lay investors are elucidated and the construction of lay market actors is illustrated. 
This study also suggests the compatibility of the tr e important social science 
approaches to economic agents: Granovetter’s embeddedness, Zelizer’s relational 
work and Callon’s agencement. As shown in Chapter 2 and 3, in Taiwan’s stock 
market, lay market actors are human-technology networks, as Callon argues, but they 
are constructed in the existing social networks, as the embeddedness theory suggests. 
Stock trading has been integrated into lay people’s exi ting webs of meanings and 
social connections, and the integration is important for their market actions; that is 
consistent with Zelizer’s theory. However, technology plays an essential role in the 
integration, as Callon’s and MacKenzie’s studies suggest, and the strong interaction 
between the categories of the market and the social has been illustrated by 
Granovetter’s embeddedness. Lay investors consider tock-market activities as social 
activities, as Krippner’s and Zelizer’s critiques of embeddedness approach, but both 
they and professional practitioners believe and perform economics in the market to 
some extent, as performativity theory indicates. The findings suggest a dualism in 
those economic agents’ mind: the market is a ‘social sphere’ but also a distinct and 
autonomous ‘economic sphere’. This research offers a way of rethinking what an 
‘economic actor’ and an ‘economic action’ in the market are.    
Lay investors in Taiwan are a large social group, but the number of the 
interviewees was limited and the sample was not selected randomly from the 
population. Some household demographics might not be represented in this work, 
and thus the findings may not be generalized to the entire group.  
The government’s polices are expected to play an important role in lay 
investors’ activities, but this study did not explore this further. Taiwan’s government 
 224 
often intervenes in the stock market and lay investors tend to expect the interventions. 
Hupan (to raise the market index level when the market plunges) is considered an 
obligation of the government, because lay investors p pularly think the government 
should be responsible for their losses in the market to some extent. Where does the 
expectation come from? The relationship between politics and lay investors’ 
activities should be explored by future studies. 
In addition, trading in financial investments (such as mutual funds and foreign 
currencies) as a daily-life activity has also been reported by the interviewees in China 
and Hong Kong. This possibly implies some common characteristics are shared by 
these societies, although unfortunately, due to the limitation of the data, my 
investigation of lay investors in these other Chinese regions is not comprehensive. 
Furthermore, studies of lay investors in Britain and North America have partly 
mentioned the connections between trading and daily life as well (Harrington 2008; 
Roscoe 2013). A cross-country study of lay investors will further help us to elucidate 
the roles of the ‘daily-life framework’ and ‘cultural factors’ in financial markets. I 
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